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Executive Summary 
The Technology Capability Level-3 (TCL3) flight tests were conducted at six different test sites 
located across the USA from March to May of 2018. The campaign resulted in over 830 data 
collection flights using 28 different aircraft and involving 20 flight crews. Flights not only varied in 
duration, but also in the environments and terrains over which they flew. The TCL3 tests highlighted 
four different types of tests: three tests focused on Communication, Navigation and Surveillance 
(CNS); six tests focused on Sense and Avoid (SAA) technologies; six tests focused on USS Data and 
Information Exchange (DAT); and five tests focused on exploring fundamental Concepts of the 
project (CON). This document presents data collected during the TCL3 tests that informed the 
operator’s experiences—the quality of the unmanned aerial system (UAS) Service Supplier (USS) 
information that the operator was provided with, the usefulness of this information, and the usability 
of the automation, both while airborne and on the ground. It is intended to complement the reports 
written by the test sites and the quantitative reports and presentations of the UAS Traffic 
Management (UTM) project. 
 
With the goal of instructing what the minimum information requirements and/or best practices might 
be in TCL3 operations, the driving enquiry was: How do you get the information you need, when 
you need it, to successfully fly a UAS in UTM airspace? This enquiry touches on two requirements 
for displays, which are to provide adequate situation awareness (SA) and to share information 
through a USS. 
 
The six test sites participating in the TCL3 tests flew a subset of the 20 tests (outlined above), with 
most sites working on a subset of each of the four types: Communications, Navigation and 
Surveillance (CNS); DAT; CON; and Sense and Avoid (SAA). The, mainly qualitative, data 
addressed in this report was collected by the AOL (Airspace Operations Laboratory) both on-site and 
remotely for each test. The data consists of the contents of end-of-day debriefs, end-of-day surveys, 
observer notes, and flight test information, all submitted as part of the Data Management Plan 
(DMP).  
 
The topics of inquiry were selected via a process of analyzing the human-automation interaction  
 
1 NASA Ames Research Center; Moffett Field, California. 
2 San Jose State University Foundation, Moffett Field, California. 
3 Universities Space Research Association 
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elements of each TCL3 test, which were gleaned from the statement of work and test site proposals. 
Elements of interest were grouped under six major categories to facilitate later data analysis. These 
six categories were: the information that UTM users to complete their tasks; the characteristics of the 
UTM/ground station displays that facilitated the use of information, as this is where information 
meets the user; the state or experience of the operator while working in the UTM environment—
their level of load and awareness, in particular; the functionality and usefulness of the UTM-related 
automation in the flight tests; the methods the operators used to make use of that automation and 
UTM information; and, the exploration of the UTM concept during each flight test.  
 
There were up to three teams of researchers collecting data from the participants during field test 
days. For at least one of each sites’ test weeks, an AOL researcher was physically present at each test 
site to collect data. To the extent possible, researchers observed all flight crews at some point across 
the test days. In the AOL, a team of UTM developers verified data flowing through the system and 
teams of three or four AOL researchers remotely collected data from the participants at each test site 
about their experiences.  
 
During the 831 test flights of the TCL3 effort, participants provided a number of positive points of 
feedback within 280 individual survey responses and 40 debriefs conducted with crews at test sites. 
Data from CNS and DAT tests were very helpful, and the tests were completed as expected. The 
tools investigated as part of the SAA tests were well-received by operators and helped with their 
overall situation awareness. CON tests were interesting and varied, and generated a good deal of 
data while flying different vignettes and afterwards at broad concept-level discussions. From this 
wealth of data, 11 points are highlighted about the information required, information usage, operator 
approach, automation, concept, and UTM methods or procedures that operators had worked with 
during the flight tests. 
• Test sites appreciated the additional sensor tools that provided increased situation 
awareness about the airspace they were flying in. Telemetry that provides such situation 
awareness to operators came from a range of sensors, and one type of data was not 
distinctly better than another when comparing across tests. However, it was emphasized 
that the data provided needs to be reliable and consistent. 
• Crews stressed that command and control (C2) link displays should be both simplified and, 
if possible, situated on the USS client. Moving forward, indication of the strength of the C2 
connection might be added to USS displays. 
• The interfaces for generating outgoing and reading incoming messages including those for 
alerting need to be improved. Clutter needs to be reduced in all displays. 
• Users were concerned about being flooded with messages if every non-normal UAS reading 
were to be broadcast to the community. This led to a wider discussion of how much is “too 
much” for all types of alerting. Crews differed in their opinions of UTM alerting depending 
on the situation. They wanted to be alerted as soon as possible to events that could affect 
their flight or airspace, but did not want to be distracted by repeated alerts or warnings that 
were “obvious” and suggested that the community specify some lower limits on this. 
• Although users admitted to not wanting to share their data/ information with other 
companies/operator groups, they agreed that some level of sharing has to happen to make 
UTM useful. Implications are that the community should specify lower limits on what 
needs to be broadcast, outlining information that must be shared and when. 
• Crews understood that maintaining an awareness of DAT messages and USS interactions 
was both useful and important. 
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• Although participants appreciated the ability of their SAA tools to alert them regarding the 
nearness of approaching vehicles, they reported a number of issues with this new-to-UTM 
technology, ranging from telemetry reliability to interface interaction issues. They 
concluded, in general, that these tools need more development to become truly useful. 
• Procedures for reservations and negotiations could be more formalized. UTM users were 
able to “step on” each other to reserve airspace, and some did this accidentally, while 
others gamed the system in order to gain an advantage. These loopholes should be 
identified and solutions considered, where incentives could promote efficiency, and 
feedback about the status of applications needs to be improved.  
• The proper method to respond to SAA events was an area of uncertainty for crews. 
Discussion highlighted the variety of approaches crews considered that might be used to 
respond to conflict situations.  
• Although participants did not question the need for Temporary Flight Restrictions (TFRs), 
they indicated that the rules and procedures governing them were unclear. Rules for when 
TFRs will be generated need to be clarified, as do exit times and procedures for exiting, 
and who, if anyone, has clearance to remain within a TFR.  
• Rules or procedures for sending messages and methods for interacting with messages need 
to be formalized. 
 
These themes each relate directly to one of the six overarching categories described above that were 
the focus topics for this effort, and guided the data collection process, to inform the AOL’s question: 
“What information is required to successfully fly in a UTM environment?” As outlined in the points 
above, under the first theme of information properties, alerting was a key topic of discussion and 
concern to many of the operators; where information meets the user, it was found that the 
transparency of the UTM and USS tools was extremely important. Generally, operators indicated 
that they liked the tools that presented data clearly and reliably in this study, but felt that further 
training would be needed to increase SA, acceptance of the UTM concept, and operator willingness 
to participate in such an environment. Operators’ situation awareness was both influenced by the 
usability of the information presented by a crew’s window into UTM—their USS client—but also by 
how aware they were of what information was accessible to them. Further development and research 
on possible procedures, standards, and/or recommendations are needed. All of these themes together 
help us understand to how UTM was used, what went well and should persist, and how the UTM 
experience can be improved. In sum, the TCL3 flight tests were successful, and more was learned 
about the operators, the information they need to fly within UTM, and the procedural requirements 
in a TCL3 environment.  
 
1. Background 
As part of NASA’s Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM) effort 
(Kopardekar, et al., 2016), the Technology Capability Level-3 (TCL3) flight demonstrations took 
place across three months from March through May 2018 and involved six partner groups, or test 
sites, located across the USA. Those three months encompassed 37 calendar days on which vehicles 
flew test flights, sometimes at more than one test-site concurrently (see Table 1 and Appendix 1). 
There were 10 official shakedown (i.e., ‘practice’) flying days and 51 flying days for data-
  
4 
collection2. Each test-site was utilized and configured to meet the needs of the vehicles and the 
criteria specified in the test scenarios written by test sites to fulfill the criteria set out in the NASA 
Statement of Work (SOW, Rios, 2017). Some test sites had as many as five ground control station 
(GCS) locations, from which flight crews conducted their operations, while others had one, 
depending on the test type (see Figure 1a and Figure 1b for examples). Some test sites moved the 
locations of their GCSs depending on the tests they were flying that day, while others were fixed 
bases. Flight crews varied in composition and size but generally were smaller than for the 
Technology Capability Level-2 national campaign (TCL2-nc) (Martin, et al., 2018). Flight crews 
from some test sites were composed of individuals from one organization, while other test sites sent 
multiple crews, each from different teams. Depending on the test, half to two-thirds of the test sites 
(sites 1, 4, 5 and sometimes 6) centrally managed their UTM service supplier (USS) onsite, with one 
USS system operator (USS Op), in some cases located separately from the flight crews, overseeing 
the USS operations for a number (or all) of that test-site’s crews. The other test sites integrated a 
USS Op within each flight crew. Scenarios were developed by each test-site to demonstrate the 
UTM capabilities that they had proposed. Most test sites created multiple unique scenarios to meet 
the variety of test requirements.  
 
Table 1. Flight Days and Shakedown Days for the TCL3 Flight Demonstration 
  Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4 Site 5 Site 6 
Week 1       
Week 2       
Week 3       
Week 4       
Week 5       
Week 6       
Week 7       
Week 8       
Week 9       
Week 10       
Week 11      simulation only 
Week 12       
Week 13       
Shakedown days 1 1 4 0 3 1 
Test days 11 4 6 9 13 7 
Total days in field 12 5 10 9 16 7 
Key: orange fill = a shakedown day; green fill = a data-collection day; blue fill = a simulation only day. 
 
2 One site retested some of their data collection in the lab—hence there were 51 days of testing for data collection with 
50 of these flying vehicles in the field and one simulating all flights in the lab. 
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Figure 1a. Example of a test site with one GCS area for two vehicles (colored lines 
denote vehicle volume plan-areas). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1b. Example of a test site with multiple GCS area for its vehicles (colored 
lines denote vehicle volume plan-areas). 
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2. Method 
2.1 Participant Roles and Responsibilities 
Flight crews varied in number and affiliation: some consisted of just one individual, while others had 
up to six in their crews (Appendix 2). Primary flight crew positions are listed in Table 2, with many 
crew members fulfilling more than one role. Additional positions staffed by some, if not all, of the 
flight test sites are listed in Table 3. 
 
Table 2. Crew Member Roles and Responsibilities 
Crew Member Role Crew Member Responsibilities 
Pilot-in-command Serve as the main pilot for the vehicle 
GCS operator Work the vehicle’s flight planning and flight execution software 
USS operator Monitor and interact with USS displays (NASA) 
Hardware and software flight 
engineers Support specific technical aspects of the vehicle 
Visual observers Safety monitors who provide visual contact with the vehicles at all times 
 
 
Table 3. Test Site Support Personnel Roles and Responsibilities 
Test Site Personnel Role Responsibilities of this Role 
USS manager Ensure the USS software was running and undertook troubleshooting when needed 
Radio control safety pilots Serve as alternate pilots if the PIC needed assistance 
Flight Test Manager Coordinate the crews and flights to conduct the test scenarios properly 
NASA researchers/observers 
Collect observational and survey data, observers 
were available to support media day and answer 
flight team questions 
 
 
Although each test-site created their own configurations of personnel, two types of team 
organization persisted from the previous flight test, TCL2-nc, with respect to UTM (Figure 2).  
 
One type of team organization included having the USS Op role as a dedicated member of the flight 
crew, either completing USS client management tasks alone, or by having one crew member 
splitting the USS Op role with another role (e.g., at Test-Site 3 the flight crew consisted of two 
people: a GCSO/PIC/USS Op and a safety pilot/launch engineer). The advantages of having the USS 
Op role within a flight crew team was that this person was able to focus completely on the crew’s 
mission and communications were reduced. The cost was the number of additional personnel, or, if 
the role was timeshared by one team member, that periods of high workload were compounded if all 
roles were busy at the same time, (e.g., at launch). The second type of team organization was one in 
which a dedicated USS Op fulfilled that role for a number of crews (e.g., at Test-Site 1, one USS Op 
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submitted and managed the 4D plan-areas for the flight, also called flight “volumes,” for four flight 
crews, where each flight crew consisted of a PIC, a GCSO, and a launch engineer). Three test sites 
took this “hub-spoke” approach—Test sites 1, 4 and 5. One test site was a hybrid where some crews 
were co-located, and others were not (because multiple USS were being used). The advantage of 
separating out the USS Op role was that this person became a specialist and overall required 
manpower was reduced. The cost was the increase in communications load as the USS Op had to 
stay in contact with all the flight crews they were serving, and the workload related to managing 
multiple flights in the case that one flight crew/vehicle was having an off-nominal event.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Illustration of two different types of team organization: Centralized 
and Decentralized. 
 
2.2 Vehicle Characteristics 
The vehicles flown during the demonstration were a mix of small fixed-wing, multi-rotor, and hybrid 
UAS vehicles, each with varying performance characteristics and endurance limits. There were 26 
different models of aircraft flown (Appendix 3). The multi-rotor vehicles were able to take-off and 
land vertically in a small area and turn on a point in the air, while the fixed-wing vehicles flew 
similarly to manned light-aircraft, taking off on a climbing trajectory, making banked turns in the air, 
and either gliding down into a belly landing or descending to a lower altitude before deploying a 
parachute. All of these methods required larger areas on the ground than the multi-rotor vehicles. 
Hybrid vehicles performed similarly in-flight to fixed-wing vehicles, but with the vertical take-offs 
and landings of multi-rotor vehicles. 
 
Most vehicles could be controlled either by providing point-to-point direction through a GCS or 
manually by a pilot-in-command (PIC), although some were fully-automated only (GCS control 
only). As an example of the latter, Test-Site 3 managed their operations with automated control only 
(a safety pilot was on hand to take over manual control in an emergency). During all flights, whether 
they were line-of-sight (LOS) or beyond visual line-of-sight (BVLOS), the behavior of the vehicle 
was monitored by at least one visual observer (VO) at all times3. In cases of unexpected vehicle 
behavior, the visual observer could contact the flight crew and/or the Flight Test Manager so that the 
appropriate compensatory action could be taken. 
 
  
 
3 Multiple VO were positioned along BVLOS routes to ensure “eyes on” the vehicles at all times. 
Centralized GCS
USS Op
PIC
GCSOVO
Eng.
Decentralized GCS and Mission Control
USS Op
PIC
GCSO
VO
Eng.
Test 
manager
USS 
Manager
GCS
Mission 
control
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2.3 Interfaces and Information Displays 
Equipment available at each GCS location varied widely across and within test sites. At most GCSs, 
several displays were available to the flight crews to give them information about their vehicle’s 
flight, and some also included displays to show surrounding operations, and/or aspects of the UTM 
system. For example, Test-Site 3 provided four screens for its GCSO/PIC/USS Op. This individual 
did not have LOS contact with (could not see) their vehicle. Standard tools shown on their displays 
were their flight planning/execution software, a USS client, and a fusion of radar, multi-lateration 
systems and GCS telemetry. The fourth screen was available for use to show other information of 
the GCSO/PIC/USS Op’s choice, including weather, vehicle and USS data, radio frequency usage, 
etc. Other test sites, which had more mobile/portable GCSs, used fewer displays. At Test Site 5, for 
example, flight crews only had a hand-held controller, and one display showing the autopilot 
software for their vehicle. These flight crews did not have access to a display of UTM information. 
Instead, UTM information was verbally relayed to them from a nearby centralized location, where 
the USS Op had such a display.  
 
All test sites used at least one surveillance system to provide information about the airspace not 
provided by vehicles’ on-board sensors (GPS: global positioning system; ADS-B: Automatic 
Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast), helping to identify other manned and unmanned aircraft flying 
near the test-site and most added radar capabilities or other tools that they used to complete test 
requirements. During the testing, a NASA-built iOS application (insight UTM, or iUTM), provided 
visualizations of UTM system information and current operations, and was made available to the test 
sites. Test Site 3 elected to use iUTM as an additional situation awareness display. Another in-house 
situation display (SD) tool facilitated data collection within the AOL at NASA Ames Research 
Center, allowing the research team to check flight details and monitor UTM messages in real time 
(see Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3. Suite of tools in use by the AOL research team for TCL3. 
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In the same way that there was a mix of team members and vehicle types, the partner-built interfaces 
to UTM also differed. Across the test sites, five different partner-built UTM Service Suppliers 
(USSs) and the NASA USS were employed during the flight demonstration. Four test sites used 
more than one USS (Test sites 2, 4, 5, and 6), and two test sites used the same USS (Test sites 1 and 
4). The tools and displays available within these USSs varied, primarily because each partner 
developed their USS independently, with no standard regarding how to display various pieces of 
information. The USSs were still under development and had a wide variety of available functions 
and features. To participate in TCL3, all USSs needed to have certain basic capabilities (i.e., 
capabilities to allow proper FIMS/USS and USS/USS communications, plan submissions, position 
reporting, messaging, and alerting), but the manner and extent by which the partners met those 
requirements differed, and are not examined in this paper.  
 
2.4 Method 
During test days, there were up to three teams of researchers collecting data from the participants in 
the field. In the NASA labs, a team of UTM developers verified data flowing through the system and 
teams of three or four AOL researchers remotely collected data from the participants at each test-site 
about their experiences and during shakedowns. To the extent possible, researchers observed all 
flight crews at some point across the test days. In addition, for at least one of their test weeks, an 
AOL researcher went to the field to collect data. Data were collected in a number of ways:  
• observations of the participants during flights 
• end-of-day surveys 
• end-of-day group debriefs 
 
All of these methods solicited feedback on the six areas of interest for these tests (Table 4). In total, 
34 end-of-day group debriefs were collected across the six test sites, some in person and some over 
the phone. Test-specific debrief questions were pre-defined and asked along with alternate questions 
that probed into unique events of that particular day. During these end-of-day debriefs, flight crews 
discussed the UTM-specific topics as they related to the UTM operations at their test-site. Survey 
items were generated with the four topics (Table 4) in mind, but were presented to the participants in 
the context of the flight tests that the Test Site had just flown. Approximately 30–54 questions were 
generated across four surveys, but conditions were set so that participants only answered around 25 
at any one time. Most questions used a seven-point rating format, with 7 representing a very positive 
rating and 1 representing a very negative rating, but some questions were multiple choice or open-
ended. Researchers in the field also took notes while they were watching flight tests. Two sources of 
operational data were also obtained:  
• test sites telemetric flight data, and sometimes other logged data, were shared 
with NASA 
• NASA’s internal records of USS data, were captured through a separate, data-
aggregation server 
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Table 4. Information Topics used for Organizing Qualitative Data Collected 
 
 
2.5 Research Objectives 
With the goal of instructing what the minimum information requirements and/or best practices 
might be in TCL3 operations, the driving enquiry was: How do you get the information you need, 
when you need it, to successfully fly a UAS in UTM airspace? This enquiry touches on the 
requirement for displays to: 
• provide adequate situation awareness (SA) 
• share information through a USS 
 
And, the additional requirement for operators to:  
• have enough knowledge in order to understand what they are seeing 
• respond quickly enough when an action is needed 
 
There are six overarching categories in the consideration of information required to fly under UTM: 
information properties, information as it interacts with the user, the operators’ responses, methods, 
automation, and concept issues (Table 4). Each of these higher-level categories were split into 
between three and seven subcategories.  
• Information Properties: concerned with features of the information items themselves, 
such as saliency, usability and intuitiveness of information items 
• Information meets User: concerned with tool features that made the information more 
or less usable and the operator’s interaction with the tools 
• Operator Status: concerned with the impact of the information on the state or activity of 
the crews, such as workload and situation awareness 
• Methods: concerned with the procedures and processes that crews put in place to 
interact with UTM and achieve their flights 
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• Automation: concerned with the way the automation worked and functions that were 
present or desired 
• UTM Concepts: concerned with the wider world of UTM, encompassing how different 
users might interact with the system and issues that require a higher-level policy or 
concept consideration not just an automation solution (see FAA, 2018 or Kopardekar, 
et al., 2016 for a description of the UTM concept) 
 
The first four categories of the matrix (information properties, information meets user, operator 
status and methods) were included in Revision F of the Data Management Plan (DMP January 2018) 
that was constructed to inform and assist Test Sites with their data collection process. These 
categories were used to guide organizing the comments from debrief discussions and field notes. 
 
2.6 Test Scenarios 
The test aims were presented to the sites as twenty test objectives: three CNS; six Sense and Avoid 
(SAA) technologies tests; six USS Data and Information Exchange (DAT) tests; and five Concepts 
(CON) issues tests. The six test sites opted to look at different sets of objectives, and different 
numbers of tests were awarded to each. The tests completed by each test site are shown in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Test Objectives that Each Test Site was Awarded with the Date(s) on which 
they Flew Missions to Meet those Objectives 
 Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4 Site 5 Site 6 
General 
Shakedown 
      
CNS 1 25, 27 Apr 6, 7, 9 Mar 10, 11 Apr 11, 12 Apr 5, 6 Apr  
CNS 2 30 May 6, 8 Mar   5, 6 Apr  
CNS 3  7, 9 Mar 24 Apr 9, 10 Apr 5, 6, 16 Apr  
SAA 1      3, 5 Apr 
SAA 2 23 Apr    23 Apr  
SAA 3     10 May 10, 11 Apr 
SAA 4 10 May    7, 9 May  
SAA 5     11 May 10, 11 Apr 
SAA 6      3, 5 Apr 
DAT 1  6–9 Mar  16 Apr 19 Apr 24 Apr 
DAT 2  6–9 Mar  16 Apr   
DAT 3  6–9 Mar  16 Apr 19 Apr 24 Apr 
DAT 4   11 Apr 16 Apr  24 Apr 
DAT 5  6–9 Mar  16 Apr 19 Apr 24 Apr 
DAT 6  6–9 Mar  16 Apr  24 Apr 
CON 1 4, 17 May  17–19 Apr   24 Apr 
CON 2 25 May    15 Apr 25 Apr, 15 May 
CON 4 23, 25 May   19 Apr 26 Apr 25 Apr, 15 May 
CON 5 16, 18 May   22 Mar 27 Apr  
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The 20 tests were designed to give insight into specific aspects of the UTM concept, each focusing 
on a different problem or interest. CNS tests focused on data interference and blocking (see 
Appendix 4 for a listing), SAA tests focused on different methods to sense and avoid other vehicles, 
DAT tests focused on the functioning of the UTM system, looking at the impact of adding 
information to the system and the impact of system degradation. CON tests looked at aspects of the 
way UAS may potentially be used, from long flight times to unintentionally breaching restricted 
airspace. Combined, these tests touched on most of the themes from the National Campaign flight 
tests of 2017 (BVLOS operations, dynamic re-planning, responses to alerts from the UTM System, 
and the implementation of off-nominal contingency plans).  
 
With the direction given in the SOW (Rios, 2017), test sites created their own test scenarios to 
investigate one or more of the specified tests. Procedures were not firmly defined in the SOW, and 
test sites were allowed to interpret the document in their own way. Site differences were expected 
and encouraged, and test sites built scenarios that were as large or small in scope as required to 
investigate the questions put forward by the SOW. For those addressing CNS issues, test sites were 
able to address their objectives with several, small variations of a single, simple scenario (see 
example in Figure 4). For CON tests, in general, the scenarios had to be more complex, involving 
multiple vehicles interacting within close proximity (see example in Figure 5). The test sites’ local 
geography and environment also influenced their test scenarios. For example, some GCSs were at 
airfields while other locations were in farmers’ fields, and some GCSs had tree cover, while others 
were on marshy ground close to water, which influenced the scenarios that were created and the 
“stories” that sites tried to tell.  
 
 
Figure 4. Example of a simple scenario (square survey pattern). 
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Figure 5. Example of a more complex scenario with 5 vehicles and more than one USS. 
Note: Magenta polygons are active volumes, cyan polygons are accepted volumes and the 
brown area is the USS client coverage area. The position of an airborne UAS is visible in 
the lower left corner/volume. 
 
 
3. Results 
3.1 Metadata 
In the TCL3 tests, sites were required to define specific information about each operation along with 
each submitted operation into UTM. Some of the required fields included the test site, the exact 
test(s) being conducted, if the operation was intended for data collection (as opposed to debugging or 
shakedown), and whether the operation was a live flight or if it was simulated. As these data were 
input manually before flight, and some partners had more capability to alter the content than others, 
there is a margin of error in the accuracy of what was originally reported. NASA employed two 
efforts to increase the accuracy of the data. During each flight, a NASA researcher would crosscheck 
the data in the lab and query the test site if there was a concern, then publish an amendment to the 
submitted data. Then, once all tests by all test sites were completed, researchers crosschecked 3,020 
rows of data and 2,201 submitted operations to define the set of 831 operations that are currently 
being considered as valid data collection flights. However, it should be noted that error still remains 
within these data. One of the concerns is that, although operations might have only one test listed, 
that test may have been run simultaneously with another (i.e., DAT 5 during CON 4); therefore, the 
counts of flights per test may be askew. Secondly, 35 operations do not have a test specified in the 
data. A third concern is operations that were intended for data collection when submitted, but were 
later scrubbed and re-flown without notice and without changing the previous marker from “data 
collection”.  
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With the above error sources in mind, the current data set for TCL3 operations includes a total of  
831 operations submitted to UTM for data collection (Table 6). Of these, NASA submitted 43 
simulated operations to virtually interact with the test sites during four specific tests (DAT 3, DAT 5, 
CON 2, CON 4, CON 5). The six test sites submitted 788 flight activities, 627 of which were live 
flights and 161 were simulated flights. Data for days that were identified as shakedowns for 
hardware and software testing have been excluded from the final analysis.  
 
Table 6. Number of Live and Simulated Flights Providing Data for TCL3 by Test Site 
Test Site NASA Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4 Site 5 Site 6 Totals 
Live flights 0 94 49 58 111 48 267 627 
Simulated flights 43 0 59 0 0 0 102 204 
Total submitted 
operations 43 94 108 58 111 48 369 831 
 
 
4. Data and Information Exchange Tests 
The DAT tests were created to explore the exchanges between key system components in both 
nominal and off-nominal situations. These were designed to capture system-level robustness and 
usability through detailed evaluation of individual components and their interactions. Specifically, 
the DAT effort looked at the following three interactions: USS-Operator; USS-USS; and Flight 
Information Management System (FIMS)-USS, through six unique tests (DAT 1 through DAT 6). In 
the End-to-End UAS pilot report (UREP) test (DAT 1) operators submitted UREPs while 
completing other tests. Some elements that were evaluated were the usability of the data to the 
human operator and the appropriateness of the data elements. The FIMS Failover test (DAT 2) 
simulated FIMS, or a key FIMS component, failing while there were active flights. Recovery time 
and the effects on operations were measured. The USS Failover test (DAT 3) simulated USS, or a 
key USS component, failing while there were active flights under its management. Recovery time 
and the effects on operations were measured. For the UAS Identification test (DAT 4) UAVs were 
registered with UTM public key infrastructure (PKI) and broadcasted identity information. This 
identification (ID) was received on the ground and others aimed to identify the flight. The general 
effectiveness of this procedure was the focus of this test. In the USS-to-USS Negotiation test (DAT 
5), two operations with overlapping geographical/temporal areas were submitted to UTM, each using 
a different USS to plan and execute a mission. The USS of the second operation had to initiate a 
negotiation with the USS of the first operation to coordinate a strategic resolution of the conflict, 
either by space, by time, or both. Test sites used both automatic and manual methods to detect and 
resolve the conflicts. The Weather Service test (DAT 6) was designed for crews to use a UTM-
focused weather service to aid in the planning of an operation. While the test could be completed in 
conjunction with other tests, the weather data needed to be provided via a defined and published 
interface. 
 
Five of the six test sites were awarded one or more DAT tests, with two sites being awarded all six 
DAT tests. In total, 22 DAT tests were awarded, and these awards were distributed so that each DAT 
test was performed by either three or four test sites (see Table 7). Test sites conducted these 22 tests 
over 10 calendar days, often performing them in parallel with other tests.  
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Table 7. Number of Live and Simulated Flights Providing Data for TCL3 by DAT Test 
 NASA Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4 Site 5 Site 6 Total 
DAT 1   12  8 6  26 
DAT 2   9  4  1 14 
DAT 3 3  21  6 5 3 38 
DAT 4    14 5   19 
DAT 5 13  38  17 7 53 128 
DAT 6   10     10 
All DAT 16  90 14 40 18 57 235 
Note: Colored cells with no flight number identify where the number of operations to fulfill 
this test are unknown 
 
4.1 Method 
4.1.1 Surveys 
There were 54 questions in the DAT survey, with the questions preselected to show only between 
15 and 21 of these questions depending on the test, e.g., those completing DAT 1 saw 19 
questions—10 general and 9 specific to the DAT1 test—as well as a couple of information 
questions. Many questions asked the participant to rate their answers on a 1 to7 scale, where 7 was 
high, or positive, and 1 was low, or negative. Other question types were multiple choice and free-
response. One hundred and eleven surveys were started in total across the five sites. All 111 surveys 
had some data entered but not all were complete. The greatest number of surveys started at one site 
was 47 and the fewest was six, but note that, although three sites undertook five or more DAT tests, 
one site only undertook one. 
 
4.1.2 Debriefs 
There were eleven debriefs that focused on DAT tests hosted across the five test sites. Six were 
specific debriefs focused on one DAT test while the other five touched on more than one DAT test 
(see Appendix 8). Numbers of discussion prompts varied as researchers wanted crews to discuss and 
explore the topics within the time available. Prompts were on the topics of operator situation 
awareness, the procedures for UREPs and negotiation, what crews had gained from the tests and 
technical issues of concern. 
 
4.2 DAT Metadata 
There were 235 operations submitted to UTM for DAT testing, 16 of which originated from the 
NASA AOL for collaboration with the test sites, and 219 originated from the test sites themselves. 
DAT 1 had 26 operations submitted by the test sites, DAT 2 had 14, DAT 3 had 35, DAT 4 had 19, 
DAT 5 had 115, and DAT 6 had 10. As shown in Table 7, there are gaps in the data where it is likely 
that the DAT tests were run during the same flight as another test, but this was not noted in the logs. 
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4.3 General DAT Feedback  
A standard set of 10 questions were asked at the end of every DAT survey. Participants were asked 
to rate their workload, their reliance on UTM, their opinions of the information they received 
through the USS clients, and their safety concerns.  
 
4.3.1 Operator Experience 
After a DAT test, on average, participants rated their workload at their busiest time as “moderate” (𝑥 
= 4) and there was very little difference between ratings across DAT tests (Figure 6). There was also 
little difference between tests in participants’ average ratings of the timeliness of messages, which 
was “okay” (𝑥 = 4.4) overall. Average ratings for reliance on UTM information were “moderate” (𝑥 
= 3.8), although the mean ratings for DAT 2 were slightly higher (𝑥 = 4.8) than for other tests. 
Participants reported that their awareness of their UTM state was “good” (𝑥 = 5), although this is the 
most variable set of means across the six tests. 
 
 
Figure 6. Operator experiences during DAT testing in TCL3 shown by type of DAT 
test (n = 67–90). Note: Rating scale was 1–7; y-axis is longer to show SD. 
 
 
Of note is how large the standard deviation of the mean is for responses about SA, reliance (and 
workload) given the relatively large number of respondents. This emphasizes that opinions varied 
widely within tests, which could be due to the specific test site environment, the specific 
instantiation of the USS client or the way the scenarios were organized and run. In general, 
participants did not have any safety concerns during the DAT testing, although 25% of respondents 
said they were concerned once or more. Half of these responses were related to flight test 
execution—changes in test cards—but a second account for their concern was that participants felt 
the USS client they were using was “distracting” and caused confusion.  
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4.3.2 Information Properties 
On average, participants rated all the properties of the UTM information they received as “good”  
with means varying from 4.7 for clarity of information to 5.3 for accuracy of information.  
Participants gave the highest ratings (on average) after DAT 5 (USS-USS negotiation) and the 
lowest after DAT 4 (UVIN/UAS ID exchange) (Figure 7). 
 
 
Figure 7. UTM information properties during DAT testing in TCL3 shown by type of DAT test 
(n = 24–30). Note: Rating scale was 1–7, y-axis is longer to show SD. 
 
 
4.4 DAT 1: End-to-End UREP 
The DAT 1 test was to send UREPs (UAS operator reports) through the UTM system to be received 
by others in the vicinity (see Rios, et al, 2018, for more details). Test sites were to gather data on the 
update rate, the data quality, the appropriateness of the data elements, and the effectiveness of the 
Supplemental Data Service Provider (SDSP) architecture. Survey questions asked about messages 
sent and users’ thoughts about the information that UREPs provide (information exchange), while 
debrief prompts focused on the uses for, and automaticity of, the UREPs sent (Table 8).  
 
Table 8. DAT 1: Discussion Topics and their Notional Categorization 
into Information Themes 
Information Category Site 2 Site 4 Site 5 Site 6 
Information property 3  4  
Information meets user 2 3 3 1 
Operator status     
Methods 3 1   
Automation 1 3   
Concept     
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Test sites reported they sent five types of UREPs and received three types of UREPs, with point-outs 
of other traffic being the most frequently sent and received. Two sites (1 and 4) sent thousands of 
automated UREPs through the system (see Rios, et al, 2018, for details) whereas the other sites 
compiled and sent UREPs one at a time. Few crews relied solely on UREP information, with most 
saying they supplemented it by looking at data from other sources, and one or two participants 
reported they could not rely on the UREP information they received. 
 
Participants were asked about the usefulness and timeliness of the UREPs they received in the DAT 
1 survey (Figure 8). In general, crews gave a positive assessment of the usefulness of UREPs. 
Participants at one site said being informed of manned aircraft in the vicinity and having weather 
information was useful. There were some comments about feature usability, with one crew saying 
they did not like pop-up messages4. For specific survey questions, where only two sites responded, it 
should be noted that those participants were answering based on their experience with different USS 
client displays. Taken overall, participants at Site 5 rated their experience sending and receiving 
UREPs more favorably than those at Site 2. Site 5 participants reported having “enough” time to act, 
on average (𝑥 = 5) and that the UREPs were “somewhat useful” (𝑥 = 4.33).  
 
For DAT 1, UREPs were generated and sent in a number of ways across four test sites. While one 
site (and a second unofficially) had the option to send automatic or manual UREPs, other USSs 
offered manual UREP generation only. Those who had to construct and send UREPs manually were 
keen to try an automated option. Crews commented that, although sending UREPs with information 
about what they were observing around their GCS was providing good information, it seemed 
strange to send UREPs about the area around the location of their vehicle when they were flying 
BVLOS. They reported feeling “disconnected” when they were reporting for a remote location. 
 
 
Figure 8. Quality of aspects of UREPs sent as part of DAT 1(n = 10–2). 
 
 
One or two crews found bugs in their UREP software, e.g., one instance where the message self-
deleted. Another crew stated that although it was easy for them to send a UREP through their USS, it 
was not easy to search for a new incoming UREP. Crews felt that UREPs could be useful to send 
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information about the local flying environment, such as noting flocks of birds or manned traffic in 
their flight area, and other UAS. Whereas one respondent said they would use UREPs to broadcast 
safety issues, another said that other means should be used for sending safety critical information as 
UREPs are only meant to share non-critical information. Users cited a number of additional features 
they would like to be offered by their USS UREP software: an ability to categorize the type of UREP 
sent, a tighter integration of UREPs in the USS software, and an alert to draw attention when a 
UREP arrives. (Note that some USS clients already have some of these features and every USS 
implemented the UREP functions differently.) When asked if they would like a way to send a return 
message, as this is not a function currently available, some crews declined, stating that UREPs are 
for information only, they are not intended to be a conversation channel. 
 
4.5 DAT 2: FIMS Failover 
The DAT 2 testing was to note the effects on operations and the UTM system in the event of a FIMS 
failure. Survey questions asked about operator awareness of the failure and concerns while FIMS 
was down (operator experience). However, most participants did not know FIMS had failed; only 
one in four confirmed that they knew when the system went down. Answers to subsequent questions 
were predictably, and perhaps artificially, benign due to the lack of awareness, with participants 
(very low n) reporting low levels of additional effort to maintain operations during FIMS failures, 
low levels of concern for safety, and good operational consistency while FIMS was down.  
 
4.6 DAT 3: USS Failover 
The DAT 3 testing was set up to fail all or part of the USS, note the effects through the UTM 
system, and to develop procedures for such an event. Survey questions asked about the impact of the 
failure on both the operator and the flight operations (operator experience), while debrief questions 
focused on the operator’s experience, procedures and alerting (Table 9).  
 
Table 9. DAT 3: Discussion Topics and their Notional Categorization 
into Information Themes 
Information Category Site 2 Site 4 Site 5 Site 6 
Information property   4  
Information meets user  2 1  
Operator status  4 3  
Methods 2 8   
Automation  1 4  
Concept  4   
 
 
4.6.1 Operator Experiences 
Crews reported that when their USS client was down for only a short amount of time, they did not 
have any issues when the system came back up. And if it was a limited fail, there were still some 
USS features available to them. But, when the USS client was down for longer, there were 
“surprises” as it came back on line, such as finding your UAS status to be rogue. Crews noted that 
the system does not know it has failed and is “catching up” as it comes back on line, that means they 
have to wait for information to repopulate also.  
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Crews realized they have to keep some awareness of what the USS client is displaying, so that 
when/if it goes down, they are able to assimilate what they know (and what information they have 
“lost”). They noted, if you are visual line-of-sight (VLOS), there is no issue but if you are BVLOS 
you have to be aware that aborting your mission, and that a return to base (RTB) could cause 
problems if you cut across in-use airspace to return home. Other crews noted that there should be a 
certain level of preparation for this prior to flying. You should know where your volume boundary is 
and you should never penetrate that boundary, especially when the system fails. This means that you 
can still operate safely under UTM and under a USS failure, as long as your boundaries are not 
conflicting because, as long as everyone plays by the rules, they will not be in your airspace, whether 
or not you can see their position through the UTM system. 
 
Participants were asked about the additional effort required of them to maintain operations during 
the USS failure, whether they were concerned about safety during this time, whether their recovery 
time was reasonable and the efficiency of flight operations during USS failure in the DAT 3 survey 
(Figure 9). In Figure 9 the first two items are negatively scored (a higher rating is more negative), 
with participants noting that they were not concerned about safety and only had to put in a small 
amount of additional effort to manage the USS failure, on average. Those at Test Sites 5 and 6 
reported the lowest concern about safety (𝑥 = 1), although only Site 5 also reported a low level of 
additional effort (𝑥 = 1). Participants at Test Site 6 reported their operations were “very efficient” (𝑥 
= 7) and their recovery time was “very reasonable” (𝑥 = 7). 
 
 
Figure 9. Operator effort, concerns and recovery during USS failure (n = 19–21).  
Note: Rating scale was 1–7; y-axis is longer to show SD. 
 
 
4.6.2 Operator Experience: Situation Awareness 
Only 21% of respondents reported they had problems executing flight operations while managing a 
USS failure, noting that it was difficult to maintain SA for those who could not see the vehicle when 
their USS was down, and that operational USS clients could not plan operations while a USS client 
covering the same area was down. One or two participants noted there was no issue with their USS 
client being down by invoking Part 107, a set of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) rules for 
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UAS operations under 55 pounds. For these crews, Part 107 was a way to keep flying outside the 
confines of UTM, with one participant noting that “operators don’t want to be restricted” when they 
feel there is no “reason” for it. 
 
4.6.3 Methods: Procedures 
Crews noted that, having executed DAT 3, they would like more definition about how to handle USS 
failures. They realized they needed to assess what was happening, what the impact of the failure 
was, what other tools they had available, and what they knew at that point in time about other 
operations in the air. Based on this assessment, they needed to decide about how to act. They felt 
that if this evaluation and option choice process was more formalized, it would have helped them 
react to the DAT 3 situation. Also, for those using a different client, what should they do on finding 
that another USS client operating in the same area is down? One test site discussed that procedures 
could be defined for different levels of USS failure—a short outage, versus a medium length outage, 
versus a long outage. For example, with a short outage, you may have an option to hover in place 
until the USS client comes back up, but for a long-term outage you may need to RTB or land in 
place. 
 
4.6.4 Information Exchange: Alerting 
Crews suggested that when a USS client fails, there should be some kind of alarm or alert to warn 
them that it is offline. Crews noted there were too few indications that their client had failed, as some 
parts of the display continued to update. There were also some concerns about the strain that would 
be placed on the human-communication system during a USS client failure, as users call client 
suppliers when they lose their display. 
 
Crews talked about the wider ramifications of a failure like a USS failure. If you have other tools 
that allow you to see the locations of other vehicles, i.e., some redundancy between systems, then the 
loss of your USS is not critical, however, if your USS client is your only source of detecting other 
aircraft, losing it is a critical failure and your choice of action would need to reflect that. For 
example, if the USS was providing a surveillance service, then when it goes down you lose your 
awareness of what is close to your airspace, and if you happened to have a vehicle transiting your 
area then you would lose awareness of what it is doing. At this point the threat is very different from 
a situation where your USS is not providing surveillance. Hence, threat assessments when a USS 
goes down can vary widely by situation. 
 
4.6.5 Automation 
Test sites did learn about the functionality of, and the graphical user interface (GUI) of, their USS 
clients through this exercise. While some found that their USS sent automatic RTB notices some 
number of minutes after failing, others found their vehicles were assigned a rogue status. One 
commenter was concerned that having one USS down may bring others down as the system keeps 
trying to report data to a USS that is not accepting data. Crews said that the only message that needs 
to be continually shared when a client is down are “rogue” messages, and all others could be 
suspended to reduce load on the system. Observations made as a result of using the USS GUI during 
a failure included that the USS status indicator (health) needs to be very clear, as does vehicle 
volume status. 
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4.7 DAT 4: UAS Identification 
DAT 4 evaluated the general effectiveness for retrieving vehicle/operator information from a 
registered vehicle that is broadcasting a UAS Identification (UAS ID) signal. Test sites were 
encouraged to develop multiple configurations or implementations of the concept for this test. In one 
case, a test site identified two vehicles flying simultaneously using three different communication 
methods; ADS-B, secure C2, and an infrared beacon. Other crews noted that this scenario could be 
made complex but that they had designed a simple scenario that looked at when the UAS ID dropped 
out. Survey questions asked about this data exchange (information exchange), while debrief 
discussions focused on the crews’ experiences during the test and technical issues (Table 10).  
 
Table 10. DAT 4: Discussion Topics and their Notional 
Categorization into Information Themes 
Information Category Site 4 
Information property  
Information meets user  
Operator status 15 
Methods 8 
Automation 12 
Concept 11 
 
 
Overall, crews reported that their DAT 4 testing went well. They enjoyed the scenarios the site had 
put together and thought the test showed some interesting aspects of the concept. Crews reported that 
the UREPs added awareness and they liked the interrogation feature. Some crews took part in a 
scenario in which the UAS ID dropped intentionally as the vehicle flew away to test the effect of 
having no identification. Other crews reported that it took them a long while to find the “bad actor” 
vehicle when it was not reporting. However, other UAS’ IDs dropped unintentionally as they flew 
further from their GCS, causing the same effect of lack of SA, but in this case, they could not switch 
the UAS ID back on, and had to wait until the vehicle came back within range to receive UAS ID 
reports.  
 
Participants agreed that some aspects of DAT 4 could be more streamlined and reported that they 
had added some features to their USS clients (above the basic test requirements) that they found 
useful. The group reported that NASA had issues participating in their DAT 4 test, because on that 
day there were too many connections into the NASA server, i.e., the server had more traffic than it 
could manage. Once the issues on NASA’s side had been resolved, the problems for the test site 
cleared up as well. 
 
4.7.1 Information Exchange 
Participants were asked about the usefulness and timeliness of the UVIN/UAS IDs that they received 
in the DAT 4 survey (Figure 10). With only two sites responding to these questions, it should be 
noted that participants were looking at different USS client displays. Taken overall, participants at 
both sites rated the data exchange process favorably. On average, they thought the UAS ID data 
exchanges were “useful” (𝑥 = 5.6) and “quite timely” (𝑥 = 5.3). 
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Figure 10. UVIN/ UAS ID data exchange usefulness and timelines (n = 18–19).  
Note: Rating scale was 1–7; y-axis is longer to show SD. 
 
 
4.7.2 Operator: Communications 
Participants suggested that voice communications (over the radio) worked well in certain 
circumstances. They noted that if you were a UAS operator working where there are manned 
aircraft, a good way to ensure broad situation awareness among all parties would be to announce 
your intentions on the radio in the same way that pilots of small general (GA) aircraft do. To do this, 
all UAS operators would need to know how to follow aviation radio conventions and carry a 
handheld radio. The participants acknowledged that this may not be a scalable solution if there are 
hundreds of UAS in the air but in a local area with just a few operations this could be a workable 
solution.  
 
4.7.3 Concept 
One crew stated that they thought the concept was useful to enhance situation awareness for their 
operation to be able to identify a UFO in real-time. Crews noted that the UAS ID procedure will 
identify operators who are “clueless” but not those who are malicious. In general, crews reported 
that pilots will comply with the UAS ID procedures as they do not want to get into trouble, but 
again, those who have ill-intent will not care about this. One crew noted that the registered user for 
their vehicle, who was revealed during the UAS ID test, was someone who no longer worked in the 
group. They commented that managing and checking valid information attached to UAS ID could be 
a large task. 
 
4.7.4 Automation: Technical 
A number of technical issues were raised during debrief discussions: 
• Crews thought that when they were flying their vehicle away from their GCS, that the 
vehicle itself shielded the UVIN/UAS ID transmission. More testing is required to 
explore this. 
• Crews had some concerns that the ISN spectrum may not be broad enough for the 
usage that it will get for UAS ID transmission but thought that it worked well.  
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• Crews noted that they did not have a good idea of what the transmission station 
searches for as it looks for the UAS ID but that it seemed to work well in this small-
scale test.  
• They also wondered whether pilots will push-back if they have to purchase more 
equipment/ tools for their UAS (like the UAS ID transmitter). 
• There were still some bugs in the software, one crew noted that there was no indication 
when there was an imminent intrusion into their volume, while another crew said there 
was no alert when there was an imminent intrusion.  
• Another crew could not see the “unidentified” vehicles on their displays. 
 
4.8 DAT 5: USS-to-USS Negotiation 
Test sites reported they sent four types of messages and received five types of messages as part of 
their negotiations, with non-emergency re-planning messages being the most frequent topic of 
negotiation (5 sent and 15 received). The message negotiation process varied by site, two sites had a 
choice of methods for sending negotiation messages while the other two sites had a fixed method to 
send negotiation messages. Having a pre-determined message was by far the most prevalent method 
but sometimes this message was sent manually and sometimes it was sent automatically.  
 
As DAT 5 testing was concerned with USS to USS negotiation, survey questions asked about types 
of messages sent and users’ thoughts about negotiation (information exchange and operator), while 
debrief discussions covered all topics of interest but focused on automation, how information is used 
in UTM and the impact of negotiation on the operator (Table 11). 
 
Table 11. DAT 5: Discussion Topics and their Notional Categorization 
into Information Themes 
Information Category Site 2 Site 4 Site 5 Site 6 
Information property 8    
Information meets user 1 3 4 2 
Operator status 7 7 6  
Methods  2 1  
Automation 1 14 4 2 
Concept 1  1 1 
 
 
4.8.1 Information Exchange 
Participants were asked three  survey questions about the value of USS to USS negotiations to their 
operations and whether they had any concerns. As shown in Figure 11, participants reported that the 
information they received during USS negotiations “moderately helped their understanding” of the 
situation (𝑥 = 3.6), they rated the negotiation as “somewhat efficient” (𝑥 = 4.1) and were “not 
concerned” about safety (𝑥 = 2). Participants from Test Site 2 were the most positive about 
negotiations increasing both the efficiency and their understanding of their operations, although they 
were also the most concerned about safety.  
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Figure 11. Opinions of aspects of the USS-to-USS negotiation process (n = 2–24). 
Note: Rating scale was 1–7; y-axis is longer to show SD. 
 
4.8.2 Information meets UTM 
Trust: Debrief teams raised a key issue that USS-to-USS negotiation requires crews to trust each 
other because each team has to share enough information to allow other teams to see the issue that 
requires the negotiation. Crews noted that if all teams are reasonable, negotiation works well, but 
that currently one crew can easily cut others out. Crews suggested that another variable to share with 
others could be the flexibility of your operation—e.g., if you can fly later or at a different altitude—
knowing that may help negotiations go more smoothly.  
 
4.8.3 Operator Experiences 
Participants were asked four survey questions about their workload and SA during USS-to-USS 
negotiations. As shown in Figure 12, participants rated their workload, on average, as “quite low” (𝑥 
= 2.8) and their awareness of both their operation and the surrounding airspace as “reasonably good” 
(𝑥 = 5.1 5.4). They also felt they had a “good amount of time” (𝑥 = 4.9) to take action after they had 
received negotiation information. Participants from Test Site 5 rated their average SA higher and 
their workload lower than other sites and were positive about receiving negotiation information with 
enough time to act. Crews also reported they had enough time to make decisions after the USS 
indicated there was a need to negotiate. 
 
4.8.4 Method 
The methods for USS-to-USS negotiation need polishing. Crews suggested one area in particular is 
to set a limit so that negotiation is not occurring at the time of launch. Participants said firstly, that it 
is awkward and distracting to be negotiating during the take-off sequence and procedures should be 
set to avoid this. Secondly, if you have planned and set up a flight for weeks or months, it will be 
disruptive, frustrating and disappointing to have your plan negotiated away. They suggest there 
should be a clear window before you launch where someone else cannot request your planned 
volume. 
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Figure 12. User experiences during the USS-to-USS negotiation process (n = 19–26). 
Note: Rating scale was 1–7; y-axis is longer to show SD. 
 
 
4.8.5 Automation 
The amount of automation employed for the DAT 5 tests differed among the test sites. One on-site 
NASA representative noted that human intervention was not required for the operations at one test 
site because of the high level of automation. At another test-site, the NASA representative observed 
that verbal communication was necessary for coordinating DAT 5 tests, and asked, “What if pilots or 
GCSs weren’t close enough to each other to verbally chat. Would that change a response to a request 
for clearance to fly in the same airspace?” (Appendix 8). 
 
4.8.6 Concept 
In their survey comments, many agreed that USS-to-USS negotiation was an interesting and useful 
exercise, although more complex than they had anticipated. The issue of other USS “policing” or 
“blocking” space was raised a number of times. Participants noted instances where they were unable 
to complete their testing as they wanted because they had been blocked by others, e.g., an interesting 
case with one USS policing other operations in the local USS network (LUN). The crew with this 
USS viewed that as a capability but others who were shut out did not: “We were conducting 
coordinated flights. With the not-involved USS sending a rejection, we had to cancel.” All 
commenters recommended that this should not be possible within UTM.  
 
4.9 DAT 6: Weather Service 
The DAT 6 testing aimed to send weather (Wx) UAS operator reports through the UTM system to 
be received by others in the vicinity (see Rios, et al, 2018 for more details). Survey questions asked 
about the weather messages sent and what weather information users’ make most use of (information 
exchange), while debrief questions focused on the usefulness of weather information at a GCS. USS 
clients pulled in weather data from a variety of sources including national weather data and local 
university weather reporting. 
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In preparing their flights, crews use all sources of weather data available to them. Crews noted that 
UAS operators who have manned flight qualifications, already have a routine for collecting weather 
data during flight planning, the sources they prefer, and checklists that they like to use. Even though 
crews usually used weather reporting systems, for DAT 6 they did look at the weather data on their 
USS client and reported that much of the weather data they would want to look at was available. 
Most often used was winds on the ground and aloft, but precipitation, visibility, ceiling, density 
altitude and humidity were all considered as well. Crews reported that the most important 
information they wanted was wind speeds, because you could see clouds and precipitation by 
looking out from the GCS.  
 
The range of weather information crews used reduced as they moved on to flying their vehicles. 
Pilots said that once they were flying their UAS, weather checking is all local and observational, 
they do not refer to weather sites any more. Although this might suggest that crews did not like the 
USS weather reports, this was not the case. Those who did not have their own weather station liked 
receiving the USS weather reports, and none said they did not like the additional source of weather 
information. They reported continuing to check winds on the ground and aloft, visibility, density 
altitude and temperature, as well as just looking at the sky, but stopped checking precipitation and 
humidity once they were in flight. Their confidence in the weather data they used was high, as they 
reported it was accurate (𝑥 = 6), reliable (𝑥 = 6) and trustworthy (𝑥 = 5.75).  
 
Crews listed a number of improvements that could be made to the USS weather reports (note that 
each USS client is unique and these comments only apply to the tool a participant used). There were 
some issues with weather UREPs populating over other data–crews felt a minute-by-minute update 
rate was too frequent–and updates every 15 minutes would be regular enough. Someone suggested 
using National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) symbology on the USS clients to 
indicate weather more efficiently, while another suggested weather reports should not be used to 
share critical information. One USS developer reported they are trying to organize the input to 
weather reports and UREPs to reduce the typing load as much as possible.  
 
4.10 DAT Tests Summary 
DAT tests exercised functions of the USS and different types of UTM messages; they were 
successful, with test site crews reporting they learned more than expected from the exercises and 
gained an appreciation of how complex message exchange could become. Opinions and experiences 
varied greatly across these tests depending on the USS development. 
 
Despite this, there were three points that crews made consistently: 
• Rules or procedures for message sending and methods for interacting with messages 
need to be formalized 
– Procedures: When a USS failed, it was unclear how crews needed to react. 
Moving forward, test sites should be encouraged to have a set of procedures that 
specify what to do in the event of a USS failure.  
– Procedures: Crews found negotiation as they were trying to launch their vehicles 
distracting and workload intensive. Moving forward, it is suggested that the 
negotiation end time be specified before a flight begins and/or before the volume 
becomes active.  
– Gaming: When they found their airspace already in use, some crews switched to 
become a Part 107 flight to avoid delays, others set up large volumes to clear the 
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airspace for themselves. Moving forward, rules need to be developed to prevent 
users gaming the system. 
– Trust: To negotiate successfully, users need to share an amount of information, 
which may vary depending on the conditions. Moving forward, an effort to 
specify the information that needs to be shared for productive negotiation under a 
variety of circumstances would be useful. 
• Interfaces for reading and generating messages need to be improved, including alerting 
and reducing clutter 
– Usability: USS client usability in general, and their available features, varied. 
Moving forward, useful steps could be to implement some of the suggestions 
crews had for improving their USS client displays (e.g., a UREP search function, 
that messages persist somewhere but do not clutter the main screen). 
– Alerting: Crews thought the system failure alerts were poor. Moving forward, 
there is a need to improve the alerting for system crash events. 
• Crews realized that maintaining an awareness of DAT messages and USS interactions is 
useful and could be important 
– SA: While general SA was reported to be good, crews recognized the need for good 
SA at all times, as they will need to draw on their own knowledge in the event of 
a system crash.  
– Function: As some USS came back after a (planned) system failure, crews 
discovered a number of unexpected features in their USS clients. Implication: It 
would seem useful to explore these corner cases, with an aim to make the 
functionality of USS recovery more user friendly. 
 
 
5. Concepts Tests 
The Concepts and Use Cases Research Transition Team (RTT) Working Group is responsible for the 
collaborative development and definition of the UTM concept in terms of overall principles and 
assumptions. Elements of the concept are conveyed through use cases that span the range of UTM 
operations and serve to identify information flows, highlight roles and responsibilities of 
stakeholders, and provide an understanding of envisioned operating environments. For the TCL3 
flight tests, there were a total of five concept tests that were conducted at multiple test sites and were 
referred to as CON tests. These tests were designed to exercise key areas of the TCL3 concept and 
provide input to other UTM RTT Working Groups and programs as required.  
 
The CON 1 test investigated the planning considerations and technologies associated with a BVLOS 
landing, takeoff, and return to base. Test sites were encouraged to vary the locations of their BVLOS 
operations to provide insight into a wider range of applicable scenarios. The Contingency Initiation 
test (CON 2) had test sites coordinate a planned emergency that necessitated activating a prepared 
contingency plan. Examples of possible contingencies were given as a “ditch” at a known location, a 
return to base, or an automated loiter, and test sites were again encouraged to develop several 
configurations of this test. CON 3 looked into the usability of a UTM public portal. Test sites 
demonstrated the safety of flying Multiple TCL2/3 Operations for a sustained period in CON 4, in 
the same airspace, demonstrating a more realistic dynamic environment. These were interacting 
operations with distinct scenarios (e.g., multiple deliveries, traffic monitoring, infrastructure 
inspection, real estate photography) to be flown for a few hours. Lastly, the CON 5 tests explored the 
FIMS/USS interaction when a vehicle headed towards controlled or unauthorized airspace.  
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Five of the six test sites were awarded one or more CON tests, with one site being awarded all five 
CON tests. Note that the CON 3 public portal test results will be analyzed in a separate effort from 
the current document. From here onwards, CON3 will be excluded from the counts and tallies 
reported. In total, 14 CON tests were awarded and these awards were distributed so that each CON 
test was performed by either three or four test sites. Test sites conducted these 14 tests over 15 
calendar days, across three months, often performing them in parallel with other tests.  
 
5.1 Method 
5.1.1 Surveys 
There were 58 questions in the CON survey, with the questions preselected to show only between 15 
and 29 of these questions depending on the test, e.g., those completing CON 4 saw 15 questions—
nine general and six specific to the CON 4 test—as well as information questions to determine 
participants’ role and test site. Those who answered questions about CON 2 received 29 items, the 
same nine general items and 20 CON 2-specific questions. Many items asked the participant to rate 
their answers on a 1–7 scale, where 7 was high, or positive, and 1 was low, or negative. Other 
question types were multiple choice and free-response. Sixty-one surveys were started in total across 
the five sites, all of which had some data entered but not all were complete. The greatest number of 
surveys started at one site was 19 and the fewest was eight, but note that although one site undertook 
all five CON tests, another only undertook one. 
 
5.1.2 Debrief 
There were 16 debriefs that focused on CON tests hosted across the five test sites. Twelve were 
specific debriefs focused on one CON test while the other four touched on more than one (see 
Appendix 10). Numbers of discussion prompts varied as researchers wanted crews to discuss and 
explore the topics within the time available. Prompts focused on operator situation awareness, the 
way the UTM system added value to the test flights, the perspective crews had gained from the tests 
and technical issues of concern. 
 
5.2 CON Metadata 
CON tests accounted for the most operations for TCL3 testing with 401 operations submitted to 
UTM. Of these, 27 originated from the NASA lab for collaboration with the test sites, while 374 
originated from the test sites themselves. CON 1 had 13 operations submitted by the test sites, CON2 
had 22, CON4 had 311, and CON5 had 28. As shown in Table 12, there are gaps in the data where it 
is likely that flights that were participating in certain CON tests were simultaneously serving a role 
in a parallel test but were not noted as such in the data. 
 
5.3 General CON Feedback  
A standard set of nine questions were asked at the end of every CON survey. Participants were asked 
to rate the information they used, timeliness of actions, their opinions of the information they 
received through the USS clients, and their safety concerns.  
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Table 12. Number of Live and Simulated Flights Providing Data for TCL3  
by CON Test 
 NASA Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4 Site 5 Site 6 Total 
CON 1  4  4   5 13 
CON 2 10 8     14 32 
CON 4 5 34   25 2 250 316 
CON 5 12 18 1  6 3  40 
All CON 27 64 1 4 31 5 269 401 
Note: Colored cells with no flight number identify where the number of operations 
to fulfill this test are unknown. 
 
 
5.3.1 Methods: Operational Effectiveness 
In the surveys, CON participants rated their flight operations in terms of their efficiency, timeliness, 
and the degree to which they relied on UTM information to achieve those. Crews were positive 
about their operations. On average, they rated the timing of UTM messages as “right on time” (𝑥 = 
4.1, note the midpoint of the scale was the most positive option in this rating) and reported that their 
operations were “efficient” (𝑥 = 5.4). To do this, they relied on UTM information “about half the 
time” (𝑥 = 4.0), although this degree of reliance varied between crews (Figure 13).  
 
 
Figure 13. Operational efficiency for CON flights in TCL3 shown by type of CON test 
(n = 45–48). Note: Rating scale was 1–7; y-axis is longer to show SD. 
 
5.3.2 Information Properties 
Participants were invited to rate eight properties of the UTM information they received through their 
USS (Figure 14). On average, participants rated all the UTM information they received as “good” 
with means varying from 3.7 for noticeability of needed information to 4.8 for accuracy of 
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information. Participants gave the highest ratings (on average) after CON 1 and the lowest after 
CON 5, where there was a FIMS/USS interaction.  
 
 
Figure 14. UTM information properties during CON testing in TCL3 shown by type of 
CON test (n = 33–39). Note: Rating scale was 1–7; y-axis is longer to show SD. 
 
Participants were asked about workload after every CON test, but the question was tailored to a 
specific time, so each of the bars in Figure 15 represent slightly different questions. On average, 
participants rated their workload as “low” to “moderate” during the CON flight tests, with CON 4 
having the highest ratings, when they were asked about workload during first and last flight sessions 
of the day. Crews’ lowest workload ratings were during CON 1, when they were asked about when 
they were landing/taking off BVLOS. 
 
 
Figure 15. Operator workload during CON testing in TCL3 shown by type 
of CON test (n = 3–23). 
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5.4 CON 1: Take-off and Landing while BVLOS 
The CON 1 testing asked crews to operate their vehicles beyond VLOS to land and take off 
remotely. Two of the three test sites arranged for their vehicle to launch within LOS, fly to a remote 
location, land, take off, and return to base. Test Site 3 operated their vehicle remotely for the 
duration of the flight and added an indoors/outdoors component to their CON 1 flight tests. Survey 
questions asked about users’ situation awareness during these maneuvers and users’ thoughts about 
the safety of their operations (operator experience and concept), while debrief prompts focused on 
situation awareness, risk assessment, and operation of UTM (Table 13). As intended, testing for the 
CON 1 TCL3 use case contributed to understanding of other non-CON tests and the general TCL3 
UTM concept. For example, at one test site, an interior BVLOS takeoff and landing also touched 
upon strategically using multiple communications links to maintain command and control of the 
vehicle when there were physical obstructions blocking the primary signal, similar to CNS testing. 
 
Table 13. CON 1: Discussion Topics and their Notional 
Categorization into Information Themes 
Information Category Site 1 Site 3 Site 6 
Information property  3  
Information meets user  6  
Operator status  6  
Methods  1  
Automation  7  
Concept  4  
 
 
5.4.1 Automation: Technical 
Crews from Test Site 3 discussed the difficulties of flying remote indoor/outdoor missions, as 
sending telemetry data from a vehicle inside one building to the operator inside another can be 
challenging. A change from one set of telemetry data to another was required as the vehicle exited 
the building, with the redundant secondary source having to be verified in flight. On re-entry, the 
crew brought the vehicle back into the building in a series of steps because they needed to make sure 
they had good video feed to provide the PIC with situation awareness. Crews stressed the importance 
of good telemetry data and multiple sources of data in this high-risk scenario. 
 
5.4.2 Operator Experience: Situation Awareness 
Participants were asked about their SA when they were operating BVLOS and how helpful the USS 
information was during remote flights (Figure 16). Crews estimated that their SA both for their 
operations and for the surrounding airspace was “high” (𝑥 = 6.25) but they reported that the USS 
was only “a little” assistance with their BVLOS maneuvers (𝑥 = 2.8), although the standard 
deviation for Test Site 3 is large, indicating that participants did not agree on the usefulness of the 
USS client. With such good SA, participants reported that they were only “sometimes” concerned 
about the safety of their BVLOS operations (𝑥 = 3.6), however there was, again, a large variation in 
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participants’ ratings, with some respondents saying they were “never” concerned and others saying 
they were “always” concerned.  
 
 
Figure 16. Operator awareness during CON testing in TCL3 for test sites 1 
and 3 (n = 6–13). Note: Rating scale was 1–7; y-axis is longer 
to show SD. 
 
Crews at Test Site 3 commented that on-vehicle cameras were important for remote landings to 
provide situation awareness to the PIC/GCSO, especially when that remote location was indoors, as 
other sources of information may become unreliable from within buildings. This meant that the PIC 
may have had to rely more heavily on their camera feed as they were trying to navigate indoors and 
other telemetry drops out. They noted that risk assessment is more challenging, and more stressful, 
when the PIC is remotely located than when s/he is in VLOS of the vehicle for takeoff and landing, 
as a remote PIC is relying completely on their sensors and the fidelity of the telemetry. If the sensors 
drop out, they have fewer resources to base their decisions on. The on-site NASA representative 
noted that as the vehicle approached the indoor landing area, the remote PIC and GCSO both 
gradually switched all of their attention from monitoring the mission planner software to tracking the 
vehicle’s live video feed. For their test, there was an additional level of challenge because the 
various feeds the PIC needed to monitor were not all on one tool. 
 
Crews were “moderately confident” (𝑥 = 4.2) that their vehicle was behaving as they expected. One 
person said this was because they had prepared well, while others commented on good telemetry, 
good person-to-person communication, good camera feedback and good visual observers as the 
reasons they felt confident. One person, who was less confident, reported this was because the winds 
were close to the upper operational limit for their vehicle.  
 
Crews also discussed another situation where risk management and SA are crucial and good 
information can make large differences in quality of decisions made—incursion into one volume by 
another vehicle and, in general, emergency events. During an incursion, crews noted that they need 
information quickly and they need it to be accurate. However, respondents did not want as much 
information as possible, they wanted to be assured they would have key information. Everyone in 
the group cited different items of information that they would like to know about the vehicles 
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intruding into their airspace: 1) its position, altitude, speed, and heading; 2) its mission; 3) whether 
the “other” PIC has control of their vehicle; and 4) whether they are getting position information. 
These elements would allow a crew to assess the best action to take with their vehicle. Others were 
hoping for new features in the UTM system, for example an alert and a direction arrow to point to 
the impending issue.  
 
5.4.3 UTM Feedback 
Having used the UTM system during their CON testing, participants provided feedback about their 
experiences which fell into three categories: comments on features or functions that are currently 
available to them through UTM, features or functions crews would like to have in UTM, and how 
much they used their USS client. 
  
Use of client: Crews reported looking at their USS client for information to varying degrees. One 
PIC reported that s/he never looked at his/her client when s/he was flying as it was not something 
that was useful to him/her operationally. But this PIC noted that “there was a lot of weird stuff 
happening” on their USS on that particular day. The NASA representative for these flights noted 
several times that the PIC and GCSO rarely checked the USS client unless it was in their checklist to 
do so. 
 
Opinions on USS features: Crews liked some of the available UTM functions, but disliked others. 
Some participants disliked that a rogue status is unrecoverable. Participants noted that, in the future, 
operators would want their volumes as small as possible so that they can get as many vehicles flying 
close together, and something that impedes this is the volume buffers being standard sizes. Crews 
gave two additional reasons for disliking the way buffers are set up in UTM. Firstly, participants 
stated that they had to make their volumes much bigger than they wanted to account for the 
influences of wind and ensure that wind-drift did not put them into a rogue status. Others argued that 
this calculation is more complex than it seems and an algorithm would need to consider both vehicle 
performance and its interaction with environmental conditions, although these respondents thought it 
would be easier to create flight plans if there were custom buffers for different vehicle types. 
Secondly, the buffers impede a crew from getting multiple vehicles as close together as they would 
like if they wanted to run synchronized flights. Participants noted that if crews shared their flight 
plans and one was flying a longer-distance leg, the volume could either close behind it, leaving the 
space available to others, or the space could stay open and a second vehicle could follow exactly the 
same flight path, just a few minutes behind the first.  
 
Suggestions for new UTM features: Crews suggested a number of improvements to the 
information they received through their USS client. Note that these features were currently 
unavailable to participants through the particular USS client that they were using, but many of these 
features are available through other USS clients. 
• Crews wanted to be able to share a GCS launch area between multiple vehicles, that is 
launch one vehicle after another from the same pad.  
• In the case of overlapping volumes, when you are the second volume in line, 
participants discussed having a feature that would compare the parameters of your 
volume with the other accepted volume and would give you feedback on how long you 
will have to wait before the area is cleared and your volume could be accepted.  
• Crews felt that the UTM system should be able to take holds or delays into account and 
move all the schedules into the future by the right number of minutes. The example 
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given was if one crew has a five-minute hold on the ground, UTM should estimate, 
based on the submitted flight speed or sensed speed of the first vehicle, how long the 
flight is likely to take and then tell other operators how long they might have to wait. 
• Crews noted that they would like a “clearer” set of information from the UTM system—
something close to a countdown—where they would receive a message telling them 
how long they needed to wait after a previous flight launched before they could launch, 
then receive a notification when the first flight exited the launch volume, and a 
notification that they are cleared to launch. These ideas describe a system that takes 
something more like an air traffic control role, where the system assesses and assures 
clear airspace, which is not how the current UTM system is designed to operate. 
 
5.5 CON 2: Contingency Initiation 
The CON 2 test had test sites coordinate a planned emergency that necessitated activating a 
prepared contingency plan. Options included an incursion of one vehicle into the volume of 
another, or an “event” that required a vehicle to make an emergency landing. Two of the three test 
sites chose to have one vehicle breach the volume of another. The third test site set up an “event” 
where their vehicle had to land in place. Survey questions asked about users’ situation awareness 
during these maneuvers, their decision making and their reactions to their contingency plans, while 
debrief prompts focused on situation awareness, information that is useful, and risk assessment 
(Table 14). The contingency scenarios demonstrated in CON 2 also relate to other tests from TCL3, 
such as the general goal of the Sense and Avoid RTT to investigate conflict mitigations, and 
specifically the off-nominal conditions tested in SAA 5. From the UTM concept perspective, 
NASA is able to specify use cases that illuminate whether the current infrastructure and capabilities 
meet the needs of the user.  
 
5.5.1 Information Desired 
Participants listed many items of information that they would like to have when there is a vehicle in 
their vicinity that is having a contingency event. These items included being told the location of the 
vehicle in trouble, also its position, altitude, heading, velocity, flight trend, position history trail, and 
aircraft type. Other desired information was whether the vehicle was hovering, how far it was from 
their ownship, and whether it was in compliance. Some crews said they wanted information about 
every vehicle within a set radius of their ownship. However, an item of information that crews were 
clear they did not need to know was the nature of the emergency that the other vehicle was having. 
Crews talked about the way this information could be represented on a display, noting that symbols, 
colors and icons are better than text for conveying information under time-critical circumstances. 
 
Table 14. CON 2: Discussion Topics and their Notional 
Categorization into Information Themes 
Information Category Site 1 Site 5 Site 6 
Information property 2  6 
Information meets user 5  9 
Operator status 2  2 
Methods 5   
Automation    
Concept    
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5.5.2 Operator Experience: Situation Awareness 
Participants were asked about their situation awareness while the contingency event was occurring 
and how effectively the alerting drew their attention to the event (Figure 17). Half of the respondents 
obtained information about the event from another team member, and the other half obtained their 
information through tools, although only one used the USS client for this (n = 7). Crews estimated 
that their SA, both for their operations and for the surrounding airspace, was “very high” (𝑥 = 6.7) 
but they reported that the USS alerting was only “somewhat” effective at alerting the emergency (𝑥 
= 4) and was “a little” useful (𝑥 = 3). For the alerting questions, the standard deviation for Test Site 
5 is large, indicating that participants did not agree on the usefulness and effectiveness of the USS 
client’s alerting. Participants discussed that alerting is an important function during a contingency 
event and that a key item of information to share with others is the status of a vehicle, especially if 
rogue or out of conformance. If the USS client provider knows this information, they can take steps 
to broadcast that, and a wide alert lets others know there is an event occurring. The on-site NASA 
representative noted that at one site, the test notifications for the contingency event would be so 
frequent, and persist for so long, that the primary function of the display was obscured during critical 
phases of the flight. Alerting is important for operator situation awareness, but consideration should 
also be given for the primary task of aviating safely. 
 
 
Figure 17. Operator awareness during CON 2 testing in TCL3 for Test Site 5 
(n = 5). Note: Rating scale was 1–7; y-axis is longer to show SD. 
 
 
Where participants found the USS client displays useful was in giving them a “birds eye” view of 
the activities going on in the airspace, so that they had an idea of how busy the airspace was even 
though they could not see it from their GCS. A second benefit was that, while the UTM tools are still 
in development, traffic displays give reassurance that the UTM tools are working properly. Crews at 
one test site liked the SA that the USS client gave them because it meant they were able to deconflict 
flights in real time. 
 
5.5.3 Operator Experience: Decision Making 
During the event, vehicles at Test Site 5 had the option to RTB, loiter or ascend/descend to resolve 
the situation. Crews reported they were “quite confident” (𝑥 = 5.2) that their contingency plans were 
the best response options to the event and thought they were “quite appropriate” (𝑥 = 5.2). They had 
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no safety concerns during the flight tests. However, they estimated that they had “slightly less” time 
to react to the event than they had expected (𝑥 = 3.4). Despite crews reporting they were only 
“moderately confident” (𝑥 = 4.4) that their vehicle was behaving as they expected, crews reported in 
their surveys that they were not having any issues, e.g., “My aircraft was reacting as I controlled it. 
At no point did I feel that I had a loss or degradation of control.” Crews reported that they were 
“moderately” confident that their USS client (𝑥 = 3.75) was behaving the way they had expected, 
although few people could see the display and so only these (few) people actually had the 
opportunity to see the messages that were sent through UTM.  
 
Respondents varied in the amount of information they felt they needed to make decisions during 
contingency events. Some reported they just needed to make sure the airspace they wanted to operate 
in was clear of hazards and safe.  
 
5.5.4 Operator Experience: Actions 
Crews were divided over the best way to handle contingency procedures and alerting in UTM. The 
majority (4) thought that shared ability between manual and automated responses was the best 
solution, but others preferred fully manual or fully automated responses. Those arguing for fully 
manual responses did so because every contingency event is unique and needs a specific response. 
Those arguing for fully automated responses noted that the PIC will be too busy to send messages to 
other crews and local entities during an emergency situation.  
 
Supporting the comments of those who said contingency events are unique, debriefs explored that 
crews were creative in the ways they reacted to events. One crew, who was operating the vehicle 
with the emergency, designed an RTB route and then built a TFR around it, essentially putting a 
volume around their vehicle for the RTB transit. They discussed the advantages of doing this; flying 
inside a TFR helps to flag the flight to other users.  
 
The “innocent bystander” crews, who had another vehicle breach their airspace, said they would like 
the USS to tell them when that breaching vehicle (or vehicle that has an emergency and is transiting) 
has left their airspace, because they would like to know that it is safe to continue their mission at that 
point. One crew said that although their goal was to get their vehicle safely on the ground, they 
waited for the vehicle-in-trouble to land before they stopped their loiter, just to be sure that they 
would avoid a conflict. 
 
5.5.5 Procedures: Emergency 
In the case where there is an emergency, rather than have a TFR that requires operations to leave the 
airspace, crews discussed putting procedures in place where they make way for the emergency flight, 
“pull to the side of the road” to allow the flight to pass, but do not have to exit. From the other side 
of the problem, as an emergency vehicle, it would be good to know that the users of the airspace 
were being compliant and had vacated the space that you are now working in. The emergency 
responder would want to know that previous volumes were being closed and vehicles are down. 
 
5.5.6 Procedures: Gaming the System 
In general discussion, participants talked about some ways that bad actors could game the UTM 
system. They discussed that if you went rogue during the contingency event, this status then gives 
you priority over others, with the assumption that you are a disabled flight and you need direct routes 
to RTB. However, this creates a loophole that operators could take advantage of. If they submit a 
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very small volume but then fly their mission in rogue status, under the contingency management 
rules this would give them a priority status over other vehicles to essentially bump accepted users 
out of their space, even though they were not in distress.  
 
5.6 CON 4: Multiple Operations for a Sustained Period  
The CON 4 test asked crews to fly their vehicles simultaneously for extended periods of time – two 
or three hours. Many test sites used these extended flight days to fly other tests concurrently. Survey 
questions asked about users’ situation awareness and workload over time, while debrief discussions 
covered procedures, issues with reserving airspace, and alerting (Table 15).  
 
 
Table 15. CON 4: Discussion Topics and their Notional Categorization into 
Information Themes 
Information Category Site 1 Site 4 Site 5 Site 6 
Information property 4 10 3 8 
Information meets user  7 2 5 
Operator status 2 7 1 1 
Methods 3 11 3 6 
Automation 7 11  7 
Concept 3 10  2 
 
 
5.6.1 Operator Experience: Situation Awareness 
Participants were asked about different aspects of their situation awareness (SA) during the sustained 
flying period in CON 4 (Figure 18). At the beginning of the flight window, participants reported 
“reasonably good” SA on average (𝑥 = 5.4). By the end of the flight window, participants reported 
they felt their situation awareness was still “reasonably good” (𝑥 = 4.8) but it was a little lower than 
their rating at the start of the session, possibly indicating that participants felt some fatigue after 
flying for approximately three hours. However, this was very site-specific. Those at Test Site 4 
reported the largest drop in SA during CON 4, while those at Test Site 6 reported that their SA 
increased (on average). To support this, participants from Test Site 4 reported that it was 
“moderately difficult” to maintain awareness at the end of the session (Figure 18), while teams at 
other sites reported they had less difficulty. The difference might be accounted for in part by 
differences in crew reports of how often they scanned their work area, with Test Site 4 scanning for 
nearby operations more frequently on average than other crews. 
 
Participants were asked which flights they paid most attention to. They gave a range of answers, 
from the flights during specific tests where a tool was intended to “fail,” to flights that shared close 
launch/landing points (Appendix 9). In general, PICs were more concerned when they were flying 
BVLOS than when they could see their vehicles.  
 
Crews discussed their awareness of other vehicles when they were flying. This was very dependent 
on the particular USS client implementation that they were using. Users were more comfortable with 
receiving information through the display if they could see flights visually (LOS). Knowing the 
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Figure 18. Operator awareness and awareness actions during CON 4 testing in TCL3 
(n = 23). Note: Rating scale was 1–7; y-axis is longer to show SD. 
 
 
location of adjacent flights was helpful, some users could see volumes, and one user could see 
volume start and end times, but others could not see any of these pieces of information. Those who 
could see volumes on their USS liked having this information. Information about other flights was 
limited for some USS Operators. One crew noted they were only sent the globally unique flight 
identifier (GUFI) of a flight that had gone rogue but no information about its location or the reason 
for the rogue state. Users said that if they were rogue, they would like to know the GUFI of the flight 
whose volume they were encroaching into—the universal unique identifier (UUID) of that volume. 
Crews were unsure whether they needed to know about vehicles that were having issues but that 
were not likely to intersect with their own operation in any way. 
 
Other participants said they did not look at the USS client at all, even though it was available, 
because they were looking at other displays. To address this, some advocated that tools/displays 
should be combined to make it easier to track information from multiple sources.  
 
5.6.2 Operator Experience: Workload 
Crews were also asked to estimate their workload for the first and last flights of the CON 4 testing. 
On average, participants rated their workload as “moderate” at the beginning of flight testing (𝑥 = 
3.9) but it reduced a little across the flight session (𝑥 = 3.5), although note that some test sites did not 
report a drop in workload. Those at Test Sites 4 and 6 reported higher workload initially but those at 
Test Sites 1, 3 and 5 did not, and this could have been due to the different site environments and the 
complexity of the scenarios. The usability of the USS client likely played into the level of workload 
experienced by the USS Operator. 
 
5.6.3 Operator Experience: Roles 
The crews at one site felt that using UTM was cumbersome. They had elected to have one USS 
Operator for all of their crews. The USS Op explained that having only one person to submit 
volumes for multiple crews was workload-intensive at times. And, if there were UTM messages that 
required a crew to change their plans, the USS Op had to relay these and then discuss the course of 
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action with the crew before either party could take action. The USS Op explained that this was 
awkward and time consuming.  
 
5.6.4 Concept: Procedures 
Crews felt that the UTM system is vulnerable to operators being greedy and over-reserving space. 
There is currently no incentive to be economical with airspace, and it is easier to build a large 
geometric volume than it is to build a complex smaller polygon following your flight path. Also, 
having a larger space gives you a larger buffer. This is particularly true vertically. In the vertical 
airspace, crews said they prefer to reserve space from the ground to 400ft because they would only 
want crews they know and trust to fly in the altitude above them5. It is easier to book the whole 
vertical space to ensure that no-one flies over you. Examples of crews booking large volumes 
include: one USS Op, who said his crew’s mission was to map the entire area, so he submitted a 
volume early that took over the whole test area, blocking everyone else from submitting. He said he 
felt bad because he knew he was stopping everyone else from flying, so the crew landed after their 
first flight and released the airspace but then they had to wait four hours to fly again. He said that in 
a real setting, the crew would not have done that and would have completed all their flights at one 
time, even if it was tying up the whole airspace. Another crew, who was on the field, described how 
they initially could not get a volume (because another crew had reserved the airspace they wanted to 
fly in). When the first crew had finished, the second crew reserved a huge airspace so now they 
could fly un-interrupted, but said they amended it to a series of smaller volumes, as they looked at 
the airspace usage for the rest of the day and realized that doing this would delay other groups in the 
same way they had been delayed. Instead, they organized who would use which space so everyone 
could fly simultaneously. A third crew felt that when their flights are for revenue, they would not be 
able to wait for another group who has booked the whole airspace where they need to fly. They 
concluded that, in this case, they would simply file to fly as Part 107 to make sure that they could 
complete their flight on time.  
 
Participants stated that if the UTM system wants users to be as efficient as possible, it will need to 
provide incentives to users to construct efficient volumes (and possibly penalties for taking 
considerably more space than needed). Alternatively, the UTM system could help you to be 
efficient. Crews discussed that if you could put your flight path into UTM and have the system build 
a buffer around it, then that would enable efficient use of space, but the current system makes that 
impossible because it only accepts a limited number of points (10)6.  
 
In addition to issues of other crews booking large volumes and shutting them out of the airspace, 
crews told researchers that they had put dummy data into all the PII fields in their USS client. This 
meant when everyone at the test site began reserving airspace and their own reservations were 
rejected, they could not contact other teams to negotiate when the airspace would be free or how to 
share it. Crews complained they had to submit volumes using trial and error until they happened on 
an area that was accepted. One crew said they reduced the size of their volume until it was accepted, 
other groups used the site radio channel or personal phone contacts, i.e., pre-existing personal 
knowledge of other teams in the test, to negotiate verbally with others to carve out some airspace to 
work in. 
 
5 Also see section on faulty altitude readings. This is likely to add to crews’ reluctance to let others fly 
above them.  
6 At the time of TCL3, the system only accepted 10 volumes, but this issue has since been solved; 
users can now have up to 250 volumes per flight geography. 
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5.6.5 Automation: Messaging and Alerting 
Crews differed on their opinions of UTM alerting. One crew said they did not want too many alerts, 
while others said they would like warnings about nearing the edge of their volume to go directly to 
the vehicle. They suggested there could be automation that would allow the vehicle to interpret the 
message and speed up or slow down to address the issue.  
 
Crews debated how flying their vehicle manually might interact with a fully-autonomous vehicle. 
They were not sure they could negotiate with an autonomous vehicle and suggested that there should 
be clearly defined “rules of the road” and either the manual or automated system should have 
priority. Others disagreed that priority should be based on level of automation, saying that every 
vehicle should have equal priority.  
 
Participants suggested that USS clients should output the same messages as each other and these 
should be interpretable by whatever or whomever is receiving them (manual or automated). They 
stressed that every user should receive the same information and have equal chances to act on it. 
USS clients could display the information in different ways to suit the person/automation reading the 
messages but the base information going to all clients should be the same. That said, crews thought 
contingency messages should be automated rather than manually sent. Pilots noted that they did not 
have time to compose and send manual contingency messages in real time. PIC should not have to 
announce an emergency state to other crews in the area, that function should be automated. 
 
5.6.6 Automation: Rogue 
One USS operator said he would like to receive information from the USS about how close his 
vehicle is to the compliance boundaries. If he had this information, he would know whether he 
needed to adjust his vehicle to ensure that it stays well within its boundaries. He suggested it would 
also enable him to reduce his time allocated for different volumes. Others agreed for a different 
reason, saying that you do not get a lot of warning that you are going rogue and then you do not have 
time to react, and that more information about being in compliance might help you to avoid 
becoming rogue.  
 
The USS designers informed researchers that they can assign whatever state that they wished to 
flights, that they did not have to assign rogue status because the definition of rogue used by NASA 
only applies to the NUSS. In some USS clients, when a vehicle went rogue, the system built a series 
of tiled volumes. This kept the rogue vehicle in a volume but crews wondered about the UTM state 
that they were in at this point, and about what happened to the other volumes in the airspace that 
they may have been overcutting. It seems that the new volume tiles were assigned higher priority 
than the original volume and so the vehicle went from rogue to priority status.  
 
5.6.7 Automation: Safety 
Eighty three percent of respondents reported that they had no safety concerns about the safety of 
their vehicle during the test. Of the four respondents who did have concerns, one said it was because 
their vehicle was only sending intermittent UTM updates, another had concerns about altitudes, a 
third had to take manual control of their UAS, and the fourth said that using UTM is a task in itself, 
which made it distracting and it took up time that should have been used to focus on flight control. 
 
Crews debated whether UTM needs to be designed to accommodate airspace users who are not 
going to participate in UTM (Part 107 and others). They emphasized that there will always be 
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vehicles in the airspace that are not following UTM, for example, crop dusters who may not want to 
install equipment so UAS can detect them. Others suggested that there should be incentives to 
encourage UAS crews and other airspace users to participate in UTM. This led to a discussion that 
UTM can be dangerous because it gives you a false sense of security that you are alone in your 
volume but, in reality, there could be other vehicles in that space that are not in UTM and that will 
not be shown on any of your displays. Discussions like this suggest USS developers might be 
encouraged to maximize transparency of the system and the use of detect and avoid (DAA) tools. 
 
5.6.8 Automation: Using USS and UTM Information 
Crews liked the USS client information that showed them volumes and said this helped them to stay 
in their volume. Some crews (depending on the USS client) were only able to see other flights that 
were using the same USS on their USS client display7. Not all crews were aware of this and that 
those using a different client would not be shown to them. They were confused at not being able to 
see the volumes for all operators in the area and commented that it made their task far more difficult. 
One USS operator said that his map was easy to use until he had to negotiate and then he could not 
see his plan to help him in that negotiation. Another USS operator said that managing only two 
flights was not an issue but he could imagine that trying to manage a dozen flights would be very 
difficult because the interface was not efficient. Another team commented that they would have 
liked to have their volume shrink dynamically as they covered the space they needed to survey, 
opening the area behind them up for others. Crews discussed that, with their USS client, that type of 
dynamic re-planning would have been very difficult to do. 
 
Participants discussed the real-time reservation function of UTM. They complained about not being 
able to queue multiple volumes in advance and having to work in real time. They noted that the 
ability to reserve a space up to 24 hours in advance would have made their pre-flight roles much 
easier8. USS Operators complained that the process to manage multiple flights is cumbersome, they 
had to submit in one order, activate in another, and all while crews were waiting to fly. 
 
One USS Operator reported that planning flights when there were many crews trying to submit 
volumes and plan was also challenging. He said his screen became cluttered with all the plans that 
were being submitted and, because he did not know the times of the other plans, it became difficult 
to make effective decisions. He had to submit plans and “see what happened” or waited until it 
looked like others were landing and tried to resubmit right at that point, hoping to get their space. He 
suggested a filter that would allow the USS Op to filter submissions by start time, but this would 
require all UTM users to share their volume start times.  
 
Differences between clients were extensive: some users saw contingency messages, while others did 
not and had to integrate the information manually, because this functionality was not built in their 
client. Crews thought conflict alerting in the USS client would be useful, and automated messages 
from the USS would be helpful. They did not think the GUFI should be something that they should 
have to track.  
 
Additionally, crews were still learning the way their USS clients operated. One crew, simulating a 
vehicle with an emergency, flew out of their volume to create an alert through the system. They were 
 
7 Again, this function/ capability is USS dependent. 
8 Reservations in the future were possible through the UTM system but the USS developer had to 
implement this functionality in their client also for it to be available to crews. 
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surprised when their USS created a new volume with a straight flight path to RTB. Users came 
across a couple of issues, or bugs, using their USS client. One group could not modify their start 
time to an earlier time and another group had an arrow that appeared as a target. A second group 
thought there was 30 seconds of lag in their system, which they said would make it of no use. 
Another USS operator could see his TFR, but was unable to select a new plan to stay in 
conformance, so their flight went non-conforming and then rogue while he was waiting for a 
volume, that would have kept him in conformance, to come live.  
 
5.6.9 Equipment: Telemetry 
As in previous flight tests, crews were still nervous that they were not receiving correct altitude 
readings from their equipment. They were also concerned about how crews measured their altitude 
differently—which point was considered zero [this is essentially the AGL (above ground level)/MSL 
(mean seal level)/height above landing zone issue that has been previously noted]. They commented 
that when you are flying in altitude bands of only 100ft there is not much room for error in crews’ 
calculations and a different base altitude reading could cause this. They recommended that a 
common vertical data model needs to be put in place.  
 
One crew was alarmed when a truck with a GPS jammer drove by and disrupted their GPS feed from 
their UAV. They noted that if their vehicle had its GPS blocked at the same time as it lost link from 
the GCS, the vehicle would automatically abort the mission and return home.  
 
5.7 CON 5: FIMS/USS Interaction when Vehicle Heads Towards Unauthorized 
Airspace 
The CON 5 scenario involved test sites flying their vehicle towards, and then sometimes into, TFR 
airspace that was controlled or restricted in some way. Examples of a TFR area that test sites 
simulated are a wildlife refuge and airport property. Survey questions asked about when USS 
information was used, and its quality and quantity, while debrief prompts focused on how TFRs 
should be managed, as well as USS alerts and warnings (Table 16). The use case for CON 5 sparked 
many interesting discussions with the flight crews, especially in respect to how the submission and 
associated notifications for TFRs should be handled. Comments from flight crews discussed here 
may lend information to the Data Information and Exchange RTT as they define what information 
should be shared, and when, for this particular situation. 
 
 
Table 16. CON 5: Discussion Topics and their Notional 
Categorization into Information Themes 
Information Category Site 1 Site 4 Site 5 
Information property 9 20  
Information meets user 1 9  
Operator status 10 8  
Methods 2 3  
Automation 7 6  
Concept 9 8  
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Of the 13 respondents to the CON 5 survey, only one said that they had no access to a USS client. 
Everyone else (n=12) said they were able to see their ownship’s protected geography, which they 
found “moderately useful” (𝑥 = 4). Four (30%) could see the protected geographies for other 
vehicles. Five respondents were able to see the boundary of the restricted airspace (38%), which they 
also found “moderately useful” (𝑥 = 3.5), and two could see pop-up TFR airspace. Despite having 
access to this information, participants reported they were only “reasonably aware” (𝑥 = 4.75) when 
their operation was approaching its volume boundary. 
 
5.7.1 Operator: Situation Awareness 
At two test sites, crews were distributed and had to put in additional effort to make sure that 
information was relayed to the field crew from the base. At Test Site 1, the base had access to the 
USS client and redundant data that was sent into the vehicle automation station.  
 
5.7.2 Operator Experience: Workload 
Crews were asked to estimate their workload at two different times and for two tasks while they 
were flying the CON 5 scenario (Figure 19). On average, their workload was “low” when their 
vehicle was approaching the restricted boundary (𝑥 = 1.6) but it increased as their vehicle went on to 
breach the TFR airspace (𝑥 = 3.4), although note that these ratings were provided by different test  
sites. Those at Test Site 4 reported a higher level of workload for coordination and navigation than 
those at Test Site 5 but this could have been due to the different site environments and the varying 
complexity of the scenarios. At Test Site 4, participants noted that the communications load to stay 
in touch by radio was unanticipated.  
 
 
 
Figure 19. Operator workload during different phases and tasks for CON 5  
(n = 3–5). Note: Rating scale was 1–7; y-axis is longer to show SD. 
 
5.7.3 Information 
Respondents reported they received “some of the information they needed” as their vehicle was 
breaching/nearing an unauthorized airspace (𝑥 = 4.18). Respondents were “reasonably confident” 
that they made the best resolution maneuver to exit the restricted airspace. As for other tests, 
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participants noted that knowing airspeed, altitude, and heading for all the aircraft in their vicinity 
would be useful. 
 
5.7.4 Information: Alerting 
Eleven of 13 respondents reported that they received alerts about the proximity of their vehicle to 
different boundaries (Figure 20). Of these, the most common source of information was another 
crew member (42%), however 35% of the time, respondents reported receiving an alert from their 
USS client that they were breaching or nearing a boundary. Participants’ opinions on receiving 
automated alerting of the restricted airspace varied. Some participants were “pretty impressed” that 
they received a proximity warning and an alert as they crossed the boundary. Another said this was 
“more than enough” information to receive. 
 
 
Figure 20. Types of alert and sources of this information (n = 11). 
 
 
Alerting Format: Some participants appreciated that the audio-alert they received that gave them 
range and bearing of the intruding rogue vehicle. Others preferred a graphical representation and 
thought the PIC should consult a display. 
 
Alerting Triggers: Participants were asked about the most appropriate way to scope and trigger 
alerting. Of the respondents (n = 12), 47% thought the most appropriate way to set alerts would be 
distance-based. Participants varied in how far they thought this distance should be, from 50m to 
926m (0.026nmi to 0.5nmi). 29% thought a time-based alerting system would be the most 
appropriate, estimating a 10 second warning would be best. In debriefs, some said it should be sent 
when the vehicle is 50–75m from the boundary. Others said the warning should be based on vehicle 
velocity and the warning should be issued when the vehicle has 30 seconds before it will meet the 
boundary. Crews definitely wanted warnings if they were flying BLVOS but argued that when they 
would receive the warning depended on the type of boundary that was about to be crossed. They 
would like a warning for a TFR boundary but if it is another operator’s volume then they did not 
think they would need a warning. Twenty-three percent of the group thought they should not receive 
alerts about breaching a restricted airspace because at that point the vehicle is already rogue (outside 
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its volume), which would have already triggered an alert, and the crew should be doing everything 
they can to RTB or fly back into their volume.  
 
Poor Alerting: There were two aspects of the alerting that participants felt could have better 
usability. The first was the short elapsed-time between being non-conforming and rogue. Participants 
commented that having only two seconds (some said 30 sec) to react and rectify the issue was not 
long enough, so they inevitably went rogue. In one case, the vehicle went non-conforming in its 
descent volume and, due to the descent taking longer than 30 seconds, the vehicle was rogue by the 
time it landed. Users also complained that once they had breached a volume or there was a pop-up 
TFR, their alerts repeated every few seconds. A number of crews said they did not need repeated 
messages that they were rogue, nor about the TFR, because they knew after the first alert. They 
would have liked a way to acknowledge, and then silence, that alert. Even without an 
acknowledgement, participants did not want it to repeat every few seconds and suggested a repeat 
cycle longer than 30 seconds would be better.  
 
5.7.5 Warnings 
Crews debated about who should be warned or sent a notification when one vehicle breaches the 
volume of another. Some participants advocated that only the two parties involved should know, and 
others went further to suggest that if UTM calculated that the vehicles were not on conflicting 
courses then the reserver of the volume (in conformance) did not need to be notified. Others argued 
back that the reserver of the airspace should always receive a message about activity in their airspace 
because if the intruder does not take action, the vehicles could quickly be on a collision course. 
Another group argued that everyone in the vicinity should receive the message as this kind of “party 
line” information can be useful9.  
 
Participants compared this situation to one in which a TFR is created near your volume while you 
are flying. Respondents argued that a notification about the TFR should go out to every operation 
that is now inside the TFR and along its borders. However, if someone breaches the TFR once it is in 
place, crews argued that only the intruder and the vehicles operating in the TFR should be notified. 
Associated with this operator awareness debate is a UTM concept debate. Currently, vehicles 
operating under one USS system cannot see the vehicles operating under another USS system, even 
though both systems may have a LUN that encompasses the same physical geographic area. Because 
of this, it was argued that more operators rather than fewer should be notified about volume breaches 
because there is not a way for them to notice this for themselves on their display if the intruder is 
using a different client (note that this situation is possible but is USS client-dependent). These same 
crews noted that, strangely, the general public would be able to see all vehicles through a public 
portal and so crews may have to run a public portal as well as a USS client if they would like to see 
all traffic in their LUN. 
 
5.7.6 Usability of Warnings 
Along with debating about who should receive messages regarding intruders into airspace, crews 
listed information and parameters that would improve the usability of the messages. One team 
thought that messages should contain a potential impact assessment. Another said that the severity of 
the intrusion should be color coded by comparing its flight path relative to the approved operator in 
the volume, e.g., red to indicate that the intruder is heading, within some band of degrees, towards 
the other vehicle, and yellow to indicate the intruder is not going to fly so close to the other operator.  
 
9 See the section below this section about how wide the broadcast of a TFR should be.  
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5.7.7 Temporary Flight Restrictions 
Crews discussed TFRs at length. The groups felt that notifications for popup TFRs should be 
through the UTM system, probably using a graphical feature to draw the area, as crews who only 
received text proximity warnings but could not see the boundary had trouble developing awareness 
of the situation. One participant stressed that they needed to know exactly where and when a TFR 
was going to be in order to assess how it would affect their operation.  
 
Participants considered a number of the rules that govern UTM and how these impacted them in 
CON flight testing. One was the length of time that crews should be given to vacate their volume 
when a TFR is put up over it. One USS client gave crews two minutes to vacate while another gave 
crews five. Crews debated how even five minutes may not be enough to complete a mission, if you 
were flying a long way BVLOS and the TFR was large. Crews liked having a five-minute warning 
that a TFR was going to go active, but thought a graphical depiction of the TFR would be 
additionally useful to show which areas of your volumes are going to be affected.  
 
With respect to long distance flights, i.e., if you are flying a distant BVLOS and the TFR pops up 
over your return route, meaning you may not be able to get back to and across that airspace during 
the five-minute limit, participants noted there needs to be a contingency for cases like this to allow 
them to RTB within conformance. One participant suggested that, since non-priority volumes have a 
time limit10, if you are in the air the TFR should not apply to you. As many emergency responses are 
time critical, it is unlikely that First Responders would be prepared to wait for deliveries to complete. 
 
Crews debated how far/close from their volumes that they would want to be notified about upcoming 
TFRs. One participant said they should be notified of any TFR within one or two miles of their 
volume when they were VLOS, but when you are BLVOS that the limits should be different. 
Another said that they would like to be notified of a TFR that is within a mile radius of any one of 
their flight path waypoints. All agreed that those which are “30-plus” miles away from your volume 
are not of interest (or do not necessitate notification) but could not decide on the maximum distance 
at which a TFR should be shown.  
 
Crews thought it would be good to be notified how long a TFR is going to be in place. If you are 
flying a long mission, you may be able to work in one area of your volume until the TFR expires and 
then go back to working in the area that had been restricted. 
 
Crews spoke about whether TFRs should be negotiable like volumes for non-priority flights. 
Although some crews thought that you should be able to negotiate, others said that only approved 
organizations (e.g., Homeland Security, the emergency services), should be allowed to put up TFRs 
and so you would have to trust that the TFR is necessary, at which point negotiation becomes moot. 
Others thought there should be a way for crews to request permission to enter a TFR, with the host 
entity having the ability to approve or deny the request.  
 
5.7.8 Procedures: TFR 
Crews voiced the need for more defined procedures for handling a TFR. From their GCS positions, 
some crews were unaware that there was a TFR. Others, who did see the alert, said it did not contain 
enough information for them to make decisions about it, for example, the message itself did not 
contain enough information about the nature of the TFR to allow them to determine if it was safety-
 
10 For TCL3, this time limit was 10,800 seconds, which is three hours. 
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related. They knew that they had to exit the TFR, unless they were coordinated with the organization 
setting it, but were uncertain whether they had to take the shortest route out or could exit along their 
flight path.  
 
5.7.9 Emergency Situations: TFR 
Participants discussed the use of TFRs in emergency situations, suggesting that the emergency event 
coordinator/manager (Airboss) would put up a TFR around an airspace that the emergency services 
need to work in. Participants considered who within that space would need to know about the 
activities and, in general, agreed that everyone within that space, manned and unmanned operators, 
should receive messages from the Airboss about intruding/ breaching vehicles or vehicles that did 
not exit the space when asked. Crews also debated whether emergency UAS flights should have 
“more leeway” before they are declared rogue, as they are working in situations that are difficult to 
plan for. 
 
5.7.10 Automation: USS Client Information 
Participants were “confident” (𝑥 = 4.25 out of 5) that their USS client was correctly reporting 
positions as their vehicle breached its volume. This may account for why they were “not concerned”, 
in general, when their vehicle was outside its volume (𝑥 = 6.5), with the majority of participants 
saying they had their vehicle in VLOS—implying they were only concerned about physical safety of 
the vehicle and not UTM constraints.  
 
Some crews argued that the aim should be to create a completely automated UTM system but noted 
that that would entail automating many decision-making and risk assessment tasks that are currently 
completed by pilots. Crews noted that this would change the way they operate. In CON 5, for 
example, their vehicle went rogue and they opted to complete their mission before they initiated an 
RTB. They noted that under an automated system, their vehicle would likely RTB as soon as it 
became rogue. Due to this, they felt that having a semi-automated system, where there is an option 
for a manual override, would be better because it would allow for operators to negotiate under these 
circumstances.  
 
5.7.11 UTM Rules 
Participants discussed a number of rules that govern UTM and how these impacted them in CON 
flight testing. Crews tried to clarify how the rogue state works, noting that it is complex, and it is 
difficult for an operator to know what “rogue” really means and what actions to take to complete 
their flight in a way that complies with UTM. For example, some crews thought if you accidentally 
fly just a little over your protected boundary and are assigned a rogue status, then you are “kicked 
out” of your original volume. At this point they thought they were in a strange situation, where they 
could not use their volume any more but also did not have an approved volume in which to RTB. As 
a work-around, crews created new volumes around their vehicle as a series of small tiles to create a 
safe boundary to get them to their GCS. But then, crews argued, this indicates to other operators that 
the vehicle is not rogue but is in a volume. As these small, in-the-moment volumes are generated 
when a flight amends its status to “emergency,” this also gave them a priority status (as a vehicle in 
trouble) which elevated them from being in the wrong to others having to make way for them. Some 
people argued that this conundrum will lead operators to book much larger volumes for longer times 
than they need, to gain additional protection against going rogue in this way. While others argued 
that they would try to exploit this loophole more often. For either case, crews argued there need to be 
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some rogue conditions that are “forgiven” and operators are allowed to continue, if regulators do not 
want crews either booking much larger volumes or flying under an emergency banner. 
 
5.7.12 Automation 
Buffers: Crews did not think volume buffers should change dynamically to accommodate vehicles 
but that there should be a larger variety of buffer sizes for operators to choose from during planning, 
so that they can accommodate weather and vehicle characteristics. Although, none felt they could 
specify the range of buffer sizes by time. Another operator complained that, as the time between 
going non-conforming and rogue was too short, buffers should be larger.  
 
Functions: One operator noted that a UTM function that assists with airspace design would be 
helpful—if you apply for a volume that is rejected because it is too big or overlapping another space, 
it would be useful to have the system tell you where or how to modify your volume (make it smaller 
or cut out a corner, etc.) in order to be accepted. 
 
UTM issues: It should be noted that USS clients displayed TFRs and rogue messages in different 
ways. For some participants, their launch volume was not quite correct and they received non-
conformance or rogue warnings as they took off. This was annoying but it also marred their opinions 
of the valid TFR alerting. 
 
Participants found the repeated messages through their USS client irritating, arguing that they 
understood the message on its first announcement. They also found that some messages did not 
contain useful information. For example, the message through one USS client was “long” but did not 
contain information about where the breaching vehicle was.  
 
One USS operator could not see volumes of other flights, he could only see where other volumes 
overlapped areas in his volume, so he had to flip between earlier and later versions of his volume 
plan and compare what areas were missing from his original submission to work out how he had to 
amend it to a point where it would be accepted.  
 
5.8 CON Tests Summary 
CON flight tests asked test sites to generate back-stories for missions, and fly BVLOS or for long 
periods. This exercised the UTM system in a different way from other tests, revealing a number of 
issues with procedures, rules-of-play and alerting, as well as the USS client/UTM usability issues 
that were common to all tests. Some of the main issues were: 
• Procedures for reservations and negotiations could be more formalized. Incentives need 
to be given to promote efficiency, and feedback about the status of applications needs 
to be improved.  
– Function: Crews discussed issues they had with UTM volume buffers and with 
the UTM time element. Moving forward, they requested adding some flexibility 
to the UTM process (e.g., buffer options). 
– Design: Crews acknowledged that some USS will develop to be as automated as 
possible, while others will be much more manual. Implication: The same 
messages for an event may need to be displayed by all USS clients. 
– Procedures: Crews discussed both changing UTM status during an emergency and 
possible actions to maintain an ‘active’ status. Implications are that specifying 
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procedures or rules for how operators should act under emergency conditions 
could assist. 
– Gaming: Operators gain if they over-reserve airspace but that puts others at a 
disadvantage. Other operators helped themselves by utilizing emergency status 
when they did not have an emergency and, again, that puts others at a 
disadvantage. Moving forward, rules should be set to prevent gaming the system. 
– SA: While general SA was reported as good, crews recognized the need for good 
SA at all times, especially during indoor-outdoor maneuvers and emergencies. 
Moving forward, crews listed information they would want provided about 
emergency operations. 
– Privacy: These tests raised the question of supplying personal information—in 
CON tests, crews found they needed to contact each other. Moving forward may 
require specifying the level of PII that needs to be provided with emergency 
handling in mind. 
• Crews differed in their opinions of UTM alerting depending on the situation. They 
wanted to be alerted as soon as possible to events that could affect their flight or 
airspace but at the same time did not want to be distracted by repeated alerts or 
warnings that were “obvious”.  
– Alerting a): Crews were concerned both about being alerted in a timely manner 
but not being distracted by alerting. Moving forward, there is a need to establish a 
sweet spot, listing what should be alerted and how often that alert should repeat. 
– Message effectiveness: Users compared their USS displays and found they 
received different messages at different times. Moving forward, the same 
messages for the same events may need to be displayed by all USS clients. 
– Alerting b): Crews debated who should receive warnings when there is an intruder 
into another operator’s volume. Moving forward, this indicates that procedures or 
guidelines for which operators should receive intruder warnings should be scoped. 
– Distractions: Crews commented that they passed too quickly from the UTM 
active status through non-conforming to rogue, and having to respond to the 
rogue state created a distraction. Moving forward, a review of the UTM rogue 
parameters is suggested. 
– Usability: USS screens became cluttered by various items of information where 
there was either too much or repeated information. Implication: Encourage 
developers to review their USS client GUIs to keep information available but not 
overlay other information on the main screen. 
• Participants did not question the need for TFRs but the rules and procedures governing 
them were unclear. Rules for when TFRs will be generated need to be clarified, as do exit 
times and procedures for exiting, and who, if anyone, has clearance to remain in a TFR.  
– Procedures: Crews were unsure of what they were meant to do when a TFR was 
set over the airspace they were using. Moving forward, procedures or rules may 
need to be specified for how operators should act under a TFR. 
– Public and hobby users: These tests led to more broad discussions including that 
of having users outside the UTM system and that this is problematic for SAA. 
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Implication: Users suggested offering hobbyists incentives to encourage full 
participation in UTM. 
 
 
6. Sense and Avoid Tests 
The SAA tests focused on researching and defining technological solutions that will support 
successful sensing of conflicts in different situations. The sensor technologies employed in these 
tests included Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) radios, ADS-B, and airborne and 
ground-based radars. Scripted situations included conflicts between two UAS, UAS and manned 
aircraft, and UAS and a ground vehicle. The interaction of these technologies as well as off-nominal 
procedures, including priority operations, were also studied.  
 
For TCL3, six different tests were defined to explore these areas of interest. The first four SAA tests 
(SAA 1–SAA 4) evaluated the effectiveness of detecting and resolving airborne tactical conflicts. 
These four tests involved two airborne vehicles executing planned “conflict” events while gathering 
data on sensor and operator performance. Test sites were encouraged to fly a variety of conflicting 
live or virtual flight profiles and incorporate secondary conflicts and nearby airspace or ground 
constraints. Additionally, two of these four tests investigated cooperative technologies for conflict 
mitigation; SAA1 with a UAS-UAS interaction and DSRC, and SAA 2 with a UAS-manned aircraft 
interaction using ADS-B In for the UAS, and ADS-B Out for the manned aircraft. The other two 
tests investigated using airborne radar (SAA 3) and ground-based radar (SAA 4) as non-cooperative 
technologies for conflict mitigation in UAS-manned aircraft interactions.  
 
SAA also looked at the interoperability between each mitigation technology in a system level 
assessment under nominal and off-nominal conditions (SAA 5). In addition to evaluating the 
technologies used, test sites were asked to develop procedures for off-nominal conditions and 
investigate how priority operations might change those procedures. The SAA 6 test aimed to 
demonstrate the interoperability and remote identification of a UAS with automobiles using DSRC 
cooperative technology. As DSRC technology was a primary target for two of these tests, the results 
of SAA 1 and SAA 6 are presented jointly in this report. 
 
Three of the six test sites were awarded two or more SAA tests. In total, ten SAA tests were 
awarded, and these awards were distributed so that SAA tests 2–5 were performed by two test sites. 
Test sites conducted these ten tests over 27 calendar days, across three months.  
 
6.1 Method 
6.1.1 Surveys 
There were 55 questions in the SAA survey, with the questions preselected to show only between 23 
and 26 of these questions depending on the test, e.g., those completing SAA 6 saw 26 questions—
nine general and 17 specific to the SAA 6 test—as well as a couple of information questions. Those 
who answered questions about SAA 5 received 24 items, the same nine general items and 15 SAA 5-
specific questions. Eighteen surveys were started in total across the three sites. Many items asked the 
participant to rate their answers on a 1–7 scale, where 7 was high, or positive, and 1 was low, or 
negative. Other question types were multiple choice and free-response. All 18 surveys had some data 
entered but not all were complete. The greatest number of surveys started at one site was 13 and the 
fewest was two, but note that whereas two sites completed four SAA tests, one site only undertook 
two. 
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Although two test sites performed flight tests using ADS-B (SAA 2, with a total of 12 recorded data 
collection flights); two test sites performed flight tests using airborne sensors (SAA 3, with a total of 
seven recorded data collection flights); and two test sites performed flight tests using ground-based 
radar (SAA 4, with a total of nine recorded data collection flights), only the general section of the 
surveys were filled in for these tests.  
 
6.1.2 Debriefs 
Four debriefs were conducted which focused on SAA tests which were hosted across the three test 
sites. Three were specific debriefs focused on one SAA test while two focused on two SAA tests 
(see Appendix 12). Numbers of discussion prompts varied as researchers wanted crews to discuss 
and explore the topics within the time available (Table 17). Prompts focused on the topics of  
operator situation awareness, information required and obtained, the need for sense and avoid 
technology, and technical issues of concern. SAA directly related to SA tools and displays, so these 
topics were central to discussion in debriefs, also.  
 
 
Table 17. SAA: Discussion Topics and their Notional Categorization into 
Information Themes 
 Site 6 Site 1 Site 6 Site 1 
SAA Test Discussed SAA 1 & 6 SAA 2 SAA 3 SAA 4 
Information Category     
Information property 9 17 21 15 
Information meets user 17 10 15 6 
Operator status 11 43 4 5 
Methods 3 10 3 9 
Automation 17 13 15 13 
Concept 21 0 0 1 
 
 
6.2 SAA Metadata 
The SAA tests had the fewest submitted operations at 41, but the total number of flight activities is 
likely to be larger because not all flights were intended to be cooperative and connected to UTM as 
per the specific test requirements. Additionally, fewer sites were awarded these tests to conduct for 
TCL3. See Table 18 for a further breakdown of submitted operations. 
 
6.3 General SAA Feedback  
A standard set of nine questions was asked at the end of every SAA survey, requesting that 
participants rate the information they used, timeliness of actions, their opinions of the information 
they received through the USS clients, and their safety concerns. Sometimes discussion in debriefs 
took a more general focus and was not directed specifically at the test the site had just flown. 
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Table 18. Number of Live and Simulated Flights providing Data for TCL3 by SAA Test 
 NASA Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4 Site 5 Site 6 Total 
SAA1       8 8 
SAA2  8    4  12 
SAA3      2 5 7 
SAA4  3    6  9 
SAA5      2 2 4 
SAA6       1 1 
All 
SAA  11    14 16 41 
 
 
6.3.1 Information Properties 
Participants were asked what information they used to stay within their flight geographies for the 
SAA flight tests. They were given eight items of information to choose from, and participants 
indicated that they used six of these (Figure 21) with two additional items of information that had 
not been listed (see “other” on Figure 21)—visual contact and the “well clear” radius. They reported 
having used vehicle position reports and volumes available on their USS client to stay within their 
flight geographies most often.  
 
 
 
Figure 21. Information used to stay within flight boundary on SAA flights in TCL3 
shown by type of SAA test (n = 14). 
 
Participants were invited to rate eight properties of the UTM information they received through their 
USS (Figure 22). On average, participants rated all the UTM information they received as “okay” 
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with means varying from 3.5 for usefulness of information for planning to 5.1 for accuracy of 
information, on average. Participants gave the highest ratings (on average) after SAA 2 and the 
lowest after SAA 1.  
 
 
Figure 22. UTM information properties during SAA testing in TCL3 shown by type of 
SAA test (n = 13). Note: Rating scale was 1–7, y-axis is longer to show SD.  
 
 
6.3.2 Methods: Operational Effectiveness 
In the surveys, SAA participants rated their flight operations in terms of their efficiency, timeliness, 
and the degree to which they relied on UTM information to achieve them. Crews were positive about 
their operations but reported they relied on UTM information “less than half the time” (𝑥 = 3.4), 
although this degree of reliance varied between crews (Figure 23). On average, they rated the timing 
of UTM messages as “slightly later than needed” (𝑥 = 4.75, note the midpoint of the scale was the 
most positive option in this rating, labelled “right on time”) and reported that their operations were 
“efficient” (𝑥 = 4.8).  
 
While participants had no concerns about the safety of their operations, only one person (out of 13) 
said they would be “comfortable” if they had no additional safety mitigations in place and were 
solely relying on UTM to provide their safety element during the SAA flight tests. The majority of 
respondents (53%) reported they would be “very concerned” with this situation. From the comments 
respondents made listed in Table 19, they were concerned both about the reliability of their USS 
clients and the reliability of some telemetry data. 
 
6.4 Crew Feedback from Debrief Discussions 
In addition to general comments and survey responses from crews on the SAA tests, aspects of the 
debrief discussions will be examined below and organized as feedback on the SAA concepts, 
technologies, alerting, and operator experiences. 
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Figure 23. Operational effectiveness for SAA flights in TCL3 shown by type of SAA 
test (n = 8-14). Note: Rating scale was 1–7, y-axis is longer to show SD. 
 
Table 19. Reasons for Not Relying on UTM for Safety (n =13) 
SAA Test Test Site Comment about Relying on UTM for Safety 
1 6 
The false alerts and “bugginess” of the USS makes me not inclined to trust it 
entirely. Most of the needed conflict mitigation constructs are in place or in 
progress but the software has not had time to mature to the needed level of 
quality assurance. 
1 6 
The XXX client lacked the features required for safe operation of the XXX 
aircraft. Additionally alerting was not implemented. There was a loss in 
usability and a lack of value in the XXX client. While it looked good in some 
places, it lacked basic functionality throughout. 
2 1 
Two streams of data relayed the aircraft’s position to the USS client; both XXX 
GNSS position and GNSS position from ADS-B. ADS-B position relayed from 
the local ADS-B receiver showed latency issues when viewed from the client 
portal. If I was relying solely on position of other aircraft from ADS-B alone, I 
would be worried if I did not have a visual on mine or other aircraft. 
2 5 Since we had a MAC in the air, yes absolutely I would feel concerned about the flight operation we conducted. 
3 6 
Due to the nature of testing and how the USS reliability was intermittent I 
would not have relied on it. Some connectivity loss experienced was only 
apparent when telemetry stopped updating on the USS client display. 
3 6 
At times it was difficult to determine a legitimate radar track from false tracks. 
This is mostly radar tuning related, not UTM related. Presentation of tracks 
could graphically represent and emphasize track age and confidence (as 
reported by the radar); this would make it easier for the operator to visually 
identify a track belonging to an aircraft vs. a false track. 
5 6 App currently lacks enough functionality for pilot to develop trust in the system 
6 6 XXX client provided no information about other aircraft or warning about conflicts 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Timeliness of messages Reliance on UTM information Efficiency of operations
M
ea
n 
ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s
Operational effectiveness item
SAA 1 SAA 2 SAA 3 SAA 5 SAA 6Very 
high
Very 
low
  
56 
6.4.1 Concept 
Concept: Participation 
Participants discussed the approach of the different types of users who fly UAS. They noted that 
crews who currently comply with Part 107 are “good stewards” of the national airspace. They are the 
group who will file, and then fly, flight plans, and will comply with new regulations on SAA 
technology requirements. However, they argued that the hobby market, or even the Part 107 pilots 
who fly racing drones, may have a different mentality and take the position that they are having no 
trouble flying without UTM and they should be exempt. Crews felt, that this subgroup may be more 
skeptical and less accepting of having to add equipage to their UAV.  
 
Other players who will affect how the rules for UTM airspace develop are manned aircraft and the 
regulators. Ideally, UTM airspace would be a fully cooperative national airspace (or at least have 
zones that are designated fully cooperative) integrated with the airspace above, but manned aircraft 
may not want to be cooperative at all times and may resist this, making SAA technology on UAVs 
necessary.  
 
Concept: Airspace Definition 
Regulations should determine which users can fly where, but crews did not think this is the way the 
UAS airspace will be defined. They see the rules of UAS airspace usage being defined by equipage 
requirements, where the level of access and risks that a mission requires determines the level of 
equipment that needs to be on a vehicle. For example, if you wanted to fly BVLOS, there would be a 
list of equipment requirements that you would have to meet to do this. Given the number of groups 
who will fly UAS, crews agreed that there needs to be a system like UTM in place, and that the 
separation aspect of UTM is the real benefit.  
 
Concept: Vehicle Capabilities Procedures 
Crews proposed that there must be a hierarchy of which type of vehicle should give way to others. 
As UAV are more easily maneuvered, and manned aircraft are easier to see (UAV are very difficult 
to see from a manned aircraft), the UAV should have to move to avoid the manned aircraft.  
 
Crews debated the best maneuver for sense and avoid. They cited a case during one of their flight 
tests where the intruding aircraft was between the UAV and its GCS. This PIC thought that the safest 
maneuver would be to fly away at a 90o angle because the other vehicle would not be able to turn to 
intercept him on that course, and therefore this would put the UAV well-clear of the other vehicle. 
Others argued that you cannot predict the flight path of the other/intruder vehicle, and if it was 
taking a curving course the two vehicles could meet even with a 90o maneuver and felt that hovering 
in place would be safer.  
 
Concept: Crew Procedures 
One site wrote their own SAA procedures to guide their actions in their flight tests. In general, they 
advised their crews to stay in communication with each other and think ahead to try to resolve issues 
before they became problems. One of the procedures, in the case where an incursion has happened, 
stated that when an aircraft or target moves inside a warning area that the PIC defines during 
preflight, then the pilot, who has manual control of their system, has to give way and attempt to 
maneuver out of the warning area.  
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Concept: Risk Mitigation 
Participants suggested that work on use cases is an important part of convincing the public to accept 
the risk of UAS flying in the urban environment. They suggested that, initially, the industry can 
mitigate the risks with other means, like limiting locations and flights, until the technology matures 
to where you can fly in the urban canyon. As technology develops, truly autonomous flights can take 
place. They suggested that the general public tends to immediately worry about privacy issues when 
UAS are mentioned and do not yet see the benefits of this technology.  
 
Concept: Automation Toolset 
Crews suggested that automation should be introduced to reduce their load, and in particular, for the 
pilot. The advantage of automation is that the pilot will be able to focus on the aim of their mission 
and they can hand the details of how to achieve that over to the automation. Ideally UTM would be 
transparent to the user, for example, it would automatically assign your mission a volume with all 
the required parameters, as the pilot completes flight path planning. More load would be relieved if 
UTM automation took over some of the flight decision making. If there is an issue, currently the 
pilot reviews the situation and decides whether there is a safe place to land nearby. This is one area 
where the transparency of UTM and more automation could reduce workload by identifying a safe 
landing area, like NASA Langley’s “safe to ditch.” Crews argued that, as flights go beyond VLOS, 
the system will need to have more of this kind of automation, including automated de-confliction, 
because the pilot will be one step removed and will find it more difficult to provide correction or 
evasive action.  
 
Some crews said that UAS should need to have sense and avoid capabilities to be allowed to 
participate in BVLOS. They recommended that the SAA technology should be self-contained, 
automated, and require no human intervention, not only because humans are “slow and miss things” 
but also in case the GCS link with the UAV is lost. Crews argued that if you lose linkage, then your 
vehicle becomes rogue and, if it is a busy airspace, that can have serious consequences. So, the UAV 
has to be able to avoid another aircraft automatically. Others in the group disagreed, saying that the 
human-in-the-loop is important in the case of a lost link, but participants countered that there is very 
little chance of a lost link when crews have thoroughly planned their flight. Then the hazard is 
mainly someone else jamming the signals.  
 
They reasoned that there is already an industry-driven standard autoflight software, a flight planning 
tool and ground control station tool, but what they lack is cloud-based C2 and multi-vehicle C2. 
These are the properties that UTM is bringing to the table. Participants pointed out that, as flight 
crews, they are “stuck in the middle,” being invested in commercial off the shelf software (COTS) 
GCS tools and needing the feature set of their USS, which means they have to drive both softwares 
at the same time, and this is very challenging.  
 
Crews said that it is good to have as much situation awareness as possible and that every new tool 
that can enhance your SA is a good tool. Having better SA is necessary, especially as the 
environment gets more complex. They liked the idea of being aware of the location of other traffic, 
noting that in manned aviation, it is possible to know where other aircraft are through ADS-B. Crews 
stressed that having situation awareness is critical when you are flying BVLOS particularly as UAS 
can fly at high speeds and can rapidly enter the area near your path.  
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6.4.2 Technology 
Equipment: DSRC 
In one discussion the crew said they did not think that DSRC added to UTM, as the user can already 
get telemetry data from other sources. Although DSRC may not add anything by being another 
source of position data, its advantage would be that the UTM community could leverage existing 
infrastructure put in place by other entities (e.g., Department of Transportation). 
 
Crews thought the advantage of DSRC was the traffic and hazard awareness that it provided. They 
liked the idea of knowing the location of other UAS that may interfere with their mission. Crews 
noted that because it is their responsibility to see and avoid other traffic, they will always need to be 
on their guard and looking for UAVs that are not being flown cooperatively, that they will always 
have to fly as though they will have to see and avoid other traffic even if everyone is flying 
cooperatively. Technologies like DSRC that enable crews to see and avoid are important when 
flying BVLOS and will enable the pilot to choose a conflict resolution should they need to.  
 
However, one participant noted that the full value of DSRC was not realized in their flight tests 
because the sensor data was being sent to the server first, processed through the collision avoidance 
software, and then back out to the USS client. They said that their GCS should also receive the raw 
DSRC data from their vehicle because this would provide faster alerting. Crews noted that the DSRC 
tracks were very clear and they could have used this information to make manual deconfliction 
decisions.  
 
Equipment: ADS-B 
Participants said that UAV are difficult to see when they are in flight. ADS-B was invaluable for 
flight identification, and crews used their ADS-B-fed displays heavily to see where target aircraft 
were. Even when they knew the general direction to look, participants said it was difficult to see the 
vehicle. Crews discussed one SAA flight where the manned aircraft flew straight at the UAS. Crews 
were surprised because they had not anticipated that the manned aircraft would be able to pinpoint 
where the UAS was just from its ADS-B signal. The direct line flight meant that the UAS-PIC was 
unable to execute the RTB avoidance maneuver that had been planned, and so made the secondary 
maneuver of descending.  
 
It took one test site a little while to calibrate their ADS-B because the timestamp on the reports was 
incorrect, and initially one UAV looked like multiple vehicles. They filtered the incoming telemetry 
differently to overcome this. Another crew thought they had an intruder very close to them but it was 
resolved because the GCSO had not tied the vehicle’s ADS-B readout to its GUFI in the USS client 
and so the client read the ADS-B as indicating a second, intruding, vehicle. They resolved the 
problem quickly because the ADS-B was tied into the UAV’s tail number and they realized the issue 
as the client announced the “intruder”.  
 
Equipment: Radar 
With respect to the purpose of the test, crews were happy to report that the ground-radar tracks they 
saw were close to their GPS-driven UAV tracks, and they confirmed this for multiple vehicles. 
However, the only information they received were the “blips,” without any additional information. 
They were concerned because UTM/NASA did not see these tracks for all of the UAS, which meant 
that the USS client system was not reporting on all of the radar data it received. 
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Crews noted that radar inherently has false alarms for targets that are real, but not relevant, as radar 
tracks are shown for all airborne vehicles and entities (e.g., birds). While most of the tracks may not 
be potential conflicting targets, crews suggested that it is useful information to see everything 
airborne because it provides additional information about which altitudes have more traffic, and 
about areas the PIC might want to avoid because they are busier.  
 
Automation: Sensor Trust Reliability 
Crews noted that the reliability and availability of sensor data was key because for SAA you need to 
detect other airborne objects at suitable ranges in order to have sufficient time to maneuver. Being 
sure that the sensor data are reliable allows the user to have confidence in threat detection. Crews 
pointed out that pilots and GCSOs want to receive telemetry data and want to be able to trust it, but 
that they did not care what sensor it came from and did not need to know the statistics per sample. 
They just wanted a general impression of the overall reliability of the data. That said, crews tried to 
compare DSRC to radar feeds and found it difficult to compare sensors because an active sensor, 
like DSRC, requires other UAS/aircraft operators to be using it (buy in) for others to receive any 
surveillance. Radar is passive, in the sense that it does not require on-vehicle equipage, which means 
you can receive surveillance of others even if they have low equipage or are not participating. One 
participant suggested that a graphical depiction of good/bad would be sufficient for this, and that it 
would be helpful if the good/bad rating was calibrated against an industry standard that characterizes 
the reliability of sensors. Another participant suggested that each (radar) track could be color coded 
to reflect the confidence-level of the data that had generated it. 
 
Automation: “Safe Zone” Tools 
The various test sites developed different approaches to depict “safe zones.” For example, one site 
employed a spherical protected/ alerting zone for SAA on the USS client, defining a radius to 
generate the protected zone, which was applied in all directions around the UAV, and changed 
colors (from blue to red) as an intruder flew into this area. However, users commented that it was 
difficult to develop good situation awareness from a 2D display of the sphere, as they only saw the 
lateral protected zone out from the waist of the vehicle drawn on the screen. It was difficult to 
reconcile or calculate geometrical distances mentally while the UAV was in flight, as when a vehicle 
was just above or just below the ownship. It appeared that the intruder had breached the protected 
zone but actually was still outside the ownship alerting boundary, because the sphere was laterally 
narrower at that point. A PIC noted that this was unnerving, because they did not have a good 
altitude indication on the USS client, making it very difficult to judge whether vehicles were actually 
in conflict or not.  
 
Using the working assumption discussed above—that SAA functions had to be either wholly or 
partly automated—another test site developed an approach for the way such technology would work 
and, although they could not build it fully, they emulated an automated avoidance function. Their 
concept for automated aircraft avoidance employed a display showing a cylindrical protected area, 
where one could set certain parameters of the cylinder to avoid other aircraft. They added SAA 
features to their UAS software—where the virtual cylinder could, potentially, trigger automatic 
avoidance maneuvers to avoid incoming conflicting aircraft that fly through the boundary. The 
current software development allowed the user to set a radius and altitude to the cylinder. The 
cylinder was color coded and when it turned red, the PIC knew that they had to start avoidance 
maneuvers. In addition, the intruding aircraft icons on the display went from green to amber to red as 
they traveled through the warning zone to the protected cylinder of the ownship. The test site tried to 
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simulate automated avoidance maneuvers11 by having the PIC do what they would have 
programmed the UAV to do, for example, a command to automatically go to a predetermined point 
on the map at a given altitude. There was also a 30 second buffer—that the UAV would execute a 
maneuver if the conflicting vehicle was within 30 seconds.  
 
6.4.3 Operator Experience 
Operator Experience: Situation Awareness 
Participants talked about how they allocated their attention while flying. One participant said he was 
trying to maintain the best situation awareness he could, and the cost of that was that he was paying 
less attention to his tablet and tool interfaces and more attention to the sky and his remote-control 
pad (operations were VLOS). He wanted to keep an awareness of the other UAV while maintaining 
a visual on his own UAV. He said if something went wrong, being able to see the vehicle directly 
would be faster than the other pilot calling him on the radio. 
 
Having tested out their conflict alerting software, crews noted that their UAS software did not 
provide as much vehicle information and sense and avoid parameters as they would like to know. 
Crews listed a number of USS features and functions that they thought would improve their situation 
awareness for conflict situations. They thought altitude, speed, heading, vehicle position on the map, 
velocity and their vehicle’s protected zone would be useful. For the intruding aircraft (manned or 
UAS), they thought the target’s position, altitude and having a longer length on the intruder’s history 
tail would be useful, as would velocity vector, which they could calculate relative to a warning area. 
Ideally, the display would be a predictive vector to give some idea of the vehicle’s forward flight 
path, but a history also provides good information. The crews stressed the need for the history tail to 
be long, so that if you have looked away from the display, there is still enough information on the 
screen when you come back to it to make predictions. One participant discussed that the pilot needs 
to know the difference between his/her ownship and the intruder regardless of whether the data is 
from airborne or ground sensors. This distinction was clearer through ground-based radar than 
through the airborne sensor displays (DSRC) they used.  
 
Crews also stated the need for audio/ audible alerting because they could not watch one display the 
whole time (see earlier conversation) and having the tool annunciate conflict alerts would have 
assisted with pilot workload. During their flight tests, none of the participants heard audio-alerts for 
the conflicts they were flying, although they thought they had heard alerts in previous shakedowns 
and testing.  
 
Operator Experience: Workload 
A real challenge for pilots is that they are managing two sets of software while they are flying their 
vehicle—UTM software and their flight automation software. The chief test site coordinator noted 
that this created an unacceptable level of PIC workload. The UTM software supplies situation 
awareness, and not flight controls, but pilots are unable to capitalize on this because they are 
occupied flying their vehicles and looking at a different display. 
 
Crews noted that, as pilot workload is an important thing to manage, having a very good alerting and 
a visual display is critical. Comparing the airborne (DSRC) and ground based (radar) surveillance 
feeds, one participant thought that there might be differences in pilot workload depending on the 
 
11 The avoid action is where the avoidance actually occurs after the intruder has breached the 
warning zone or cylinder.  
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data source. For example, the pilot needs to know the difference between his own-ship and any 
intruder. As the ground-based radar reports intruder vehicle position relative to the radar rather than 
relative to the ownship, that might increase pilot workload because PIC will need to do a calculation 
to determine the severity of the conflict.  
 
Operator Experience: Trust 
Participants noted that using UAS in urban environments depends on users’ trust in autonomous 
systems and the extent to which they have been proven to mitigate the set of potential contingencies 
that could be required. 
 
Crews complained that their USS did not provide them with enough information about the status of 
their volume. On one client, status was shown through a text note on the side of the page saying 
“accepted” or “activated” or “rogue,” which crews said was not salient enough (note that this 
comment is for one particular client not for clients in general). On their other client, the status was 
noted on a separate window from the one used for flying and did not seem to change during flight. 
One piece of information crews would have liked, in particular, was whether the rogue state was due 
to vertical or lateral (or presumably, temporal) excursions. Another was to be given an indication of 
the direction the UAV needs to move to get back inside its volume. They noted that all their rogue 
statuses were unintentional drifts of the vehicle outside its volume boundary either because they 
were flying too close to the volume bounds or because the takeoff/ landing was difficult to judge. 
 
Crews noted that they had also seen many false rogue states during their shakedowns and testing 
(where they could verify that their UAV was not rogue), to the point where they tended to ignore 
rogue status when it alerted on their USS client. The team was investigating why so many rogue 
states happened with the USS client developer but had not resolved the issue for the flight test. The 
chief test site coordinator noted that effort needs to be made to build pilots’ confidence in UTM 
capabilities. 
 
Crews were concerned about accuracy of altitude measurement on the UAV, as discussed in reports 
for previous flight tests. They were concerned that if one UAV was using geometric altitude and 
another was using ADS-B pressure altitude that the vehicles could potentially climb into each other. 
Consequently, some avoidance procedures did not make sense under certain conditions when the 
altitude measurement method was unknown. Some argued that, to address this, the FAA will need to 
require one type of altitude measurement on UAS (probably barometric pressure altitude). Others 
said that avoidance procedures, like those that apply to manned aircraft, will need to be put in place. 
One pilot advocated that “stop and wait” should always be the first action that a UAS takes. 
 
6.4.4 Automation 
Automation: Issues using USS Clients 
At one site, one of the vehicles was flown using a different client than the others. This client only 
had outbound data, which meant that this PIC did not receive any alerts or notifications. This PIC 
noted that it was frustrating during operations when other crews were seeing alerts and he had no 
indications. He worked with the developers to add a few features to his client, e.g., to show a lost 
connection with the server but, he said, that it was still not enough to give him awareness about 
when the alerting was operating. 
 
Other crews reported having had some confusion regarding functions that seemed to both require 
manual activation and were automatic at some level. Pilots were confused that they had to manually 
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activate their volumes but at the same time these were “auto-de-activating” (these volumes 
automatically expired). These issues arose when the flight was delayed and the crews did not realize 
they needed to resubmit their volumes with updated time parameters. Crews would have liked to be 
able to put a delay on the activation of the currently accepted volume, so that the volume did not 
expire and was available to be activated later.  
 
Users from Test Site 6 commented about the functionality of their USS client. They had some issues 
with clutter when warning boxes popped up in sequence, scrolling down one side of the screen. 
Another issue they found disappointing was that alerts were meant to be annunciated aurally, but 
were not reliable. Some of the participants had heard the alerts when preparing the scenarios but 
during the test the audio did not work. They felt the visual alerting on the USS was good but would 
have been complemented by aural alerting. 
 
Participants mentioned that knowing where moving cars were on the ground would be useful but that 
improvements in the USS client/UTM are more important for the usability of the system. They noted 
that the UTM system needs to improve in the following areas over the system they used in the flight 
tests: the USS client needs to work properly, it needs additional functionality, and the overhead to 
use it needs to be lower, which could be achieved if the interface was more transparent. 
 
Users noted that they would like to see history trails or breadcrumbs (vectors) for other aircraft, that 
the pilot wants to make sure they avoid. They would prefer to be able to see other vehicles and plan 
their flight path to avoid them, rather than having to deal with collision avoidance (i.e., that tools are 
good at the sense-and-alert portion of sense-and-avoid). In general, users said that having to input 
data was undesirable and, as much as possible, UTM should work without users having to tend to it, 
providing information with less input from them. For example, the display currently requires that a 
mouse hover over the target to indicate altitudes, it would be nice if this information was 
automatically provided.  
 
Automation: Tool Trust Reliability 
One participant suggested they needed a predictive capability for SAA, given the current state 
information of aircraft in proximity to each other. He said it would be helpful if the predicted 
trajectory of both aircraft could be displayed and then updated in real time as the pilot is 
maneuvering. This would give the PIC a view of the closure rates and the distance to the closest 
approach.  
 
During one series of flights, a crew noticed inconsistencies in the acknowledgement of the guided 
mode command when their UAS was flying in auto mode, which they thought was an autoflight 
software issue. However, the test site coordination team thought that it could have been too many 
people crowding around the display in the test site control location to see the radar and observe the 
test. They thought the people occluded the antenna and therefore the commands being sent from the 
station, i.e., the “go to guided” command. 
 
Automation: Areas for Improvement 
Crews pointed out the need for sense and avoid technology to be small and light is a limiting factor 
currently, as is the onboard computing power. They also noted the lack of readily accessible 
computer vision technology. 
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Crews frequently saw telemetry hiccups and small delays, where for a second or two no packets 
were received but after a couple of seconds the telemetry came through again. They discussed that 
these hiccups are acceptable with UAV that are traveling more slowly (e.g., at 6m/s) but are 
unacceptable for vehicles traveling faster (e.g., at 50m/s) because the closure rate is so quick that 
you need to be able to see the path of the vehicle at all times. They stated that for these situations, 
the protected cylinder would have to be very large to accommodate the closure rate of fast-moving 
vehicles if the PIC was manually completing SAA, likely so large that this approach may not work. 
Again, they noted that automated SAA may be able to overcome this issue. 
 
As an alternative approach, one participant noted that having a leader line on every vehicle, that  
predicts its trajectory, would be very helpful when vehicles are moving quickly. They argued that a  
leader line may be more useful than a protected cylinder for SAA.   
 
The flight tests revealed a number of small issues with the UAS and USS client software. Crews 
found that, initially, they could not see all the aircraft on their GCS automation displays because they 
had loaded a version of the software that was too recent. They also lost their GPS telemetry for a 
little while but were confused because they were locked on to enough satellites for the GPS to be 
coming through. One PIC thought that someone local to them was jamming the GPS signals. 
 
As in all the tests where crews were exercising their software, one of the SAA test sites found a 
number of functions that did not work as expected and possible bugs in their system. One general 
issue with the automated logic was found when the test site was testing how the vehicle moved 
perpendicularly in its volume. On another flight, the GCS lost the telemetry link on their UAV, 
saying it “strangely disconnected,” forcing them to land with a loss of communications. 
 
Participants brought up the additional workload of having to monitor both a USS client and their 
auto-flight software. They lamented that the larger UAV manufacturers had not integrated UTM 
functionality into their auto-flight packages, and that working with UTM would become much easier 
if they only had one display to monitor12. If manufacturers were building UTM features into their 
products, then UTM integration would be more seamless. For now, USS developers are having to 
build USS components as tools separate from the autoflight software. Pilots felt they would utilize 
the USS more if it was integrated with their auto-flight software. They suggested integrating 
software the other way around—pulling auto-flight software into the USS client (but noted, that 
where this has been done currently the functionality on the USS is not as good as on the auto-flight 
software). They argued that, since integration of functions is unlikely, UTM needs to work on 
making its (UTM) functionality transparent to the user—essentially reducing the overhead of using 
UTM as much as possible.    
 
Crews debated the utility of cloud-based servers. The benefits are the functionality that can be 
gained with a cloud-based system that allows users to revoke remote control, for example, for 
unintended UAS placement. The negative aspects of cloud-based servers arise if the server develops 
a fault, then all operations are affected. Crews advocated for an assessment to calculate whether the 
benefits of cloud-based systems outweigh the risk and, if this is situation-specific, the conditions 
under which you would take on that risk. 
 
12 One participant noted that two of the major ground control station developers/ manufacturers are 
not developing UTM functionality.  
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6.4.5 Alerting 
Users of the spherical alerting zone noted that their alerting was “basic” (e.g., only being able to 
define one radius), and suggested having more than one alerting zone—a warning and then a 
protected region—with a sequence of alerts, or a variable sphere size based on the situation, which 
would make the system more useful. They noted a “hockey puck” (cylinder) shape for the protected 
area would be easier to use than a sphere, and that the saliency of the alerts and their ability to get 
pilots’ attention in an appropriate way needs improvement. They also noted that integrating radar 
and DSRC feeds with the alerting logic would be nice but would be difficult to achieve.  
 
The protected cylinder that Test Site 1 built for their SAA maneuvers had a height of 100m above  
and below the vehicle. However, crews felt that when altitudes are being measured in a number of 
different ways (geometric, pressure, etc.), that a 100m protected zone does not guarantee vehicle 
separation. They were also unsure whether their UAV GCS software was converting altitude 
measurements accurately, leaving them with a degree of uncertainty that they found uncomfortable.  
 
Alerting: Timeliness 
Crews noted that the alerting they received was delayed—when their vehicle was within LOS, they 
could see that the display was “behind” the situation in the sky. Crews thought there was potentially 
a number of sources of the latency, but their critical point was that the lag was significant and they 
would not want to use it for sensing and avoiding. They argued that this implies that SAA needs to 
be automated and to originate in software on the UAV so that the reaction can be close to instant, as 
it will take the PIC too long to react. The added advantage, if the avoidance software was on-board, 
is that if the UAV experiences a lost link with the GCS, it would still complete SAA maneuvers.  
 
6.5 SAA 1 and SAA 6 
The SAA 1 scenario involved a test site flying one UAS towards another UAS, using DSRC 
technology on the first vehicle to sense and avoid the second. Survey questions asked about the USS 
information that displayed conflicts, its clarity and usefulness, and crew SA. Only six responses 
were received for this flight test. Debrief prompts focused on alerting and the usefulness of DSRC 
technology and discussion in the debriefs ranged more broadly to discuss the UTM concept (see 
above). The SAA 6 flight test involved a test site flying a UAS towards a ground vehicle 
(automobile) and using DSRC technology to sense and avoid the car. Survey questions asked about 
clarity and information in USS conflict displays, and the effectiveness of the resolutions, but only 
two responses were received for this flight test. The debrief was combined with the debrief for SAA 
1 and prompts focused on alerting and the usefulness of DSRC technology (see Table 17). 
 
6.5.1 Operator Experience: Situation Awareness 
Participants reported using both position and volume of their ownship, and position and volume for 
the “other” vehicle, to identify potential conflicts and to plan resolutions. The on-site NASA 
representative observed that crews looked at their GCS tools, but sometimes flew their vehicles in 
VLOS and were always careful to be in a situation where one of the crew could see their vehicle. 
The crews used their USS client and a second data fusion display to find that “other” vehicle 
information. They gauged that they were “aware” of conflicts when they had sensor data available (𝑥 
= 6) and that this sensor data gave them enough information to mitigate the interaction between 
conflicting flights (𝑥 = 5.3), Figure 24. However, although respondents thought the conflict alerts on 
their USS client were moderately clear (𝑥 = 4.5), they reported these alerts were only “somewhat 
effective” (𝑥 = 3.5). This may be because crews “received some false alerts when the well clear 
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volume did not overlap” (Participant, Test Site 6). On investigation, the USS client developer 
representative suggested the false alerts could have been triggered by errors in the USS code. 
 
Survey respondents reported that the USS gave them “some of the help” they needed to plan a 
resolution to the conflict (𝑥 = 3.6). Participants said they had “enough time” to take effective action 
to solve the conflict (𝑥 = 5.5) but they were less certain that these solutions were effective 
(“somewhat effective” 𝑥 = 3.75). 
 
 
Figure 24. Awareness of conflict situations during SAA 1 flight tests (Note: n = 2-4). 
 
 
One of the two respondents said s/he could see the ground vehicle’s DSRC messages through the 
USS client, which showed him/her “a little information.” The other participant could not see these 
messages, as their USS client display did not show any information about the ground vehicle. This 
meant that the two participants gave different answers to the questions that followed about how 
clearly overflights were displayed and how effectively they were alerted by the client to trajectories 
over the ground vehicle.  
 
6.6 SAA 5: System Level Assessment and Off-nominal Conditions 
The interoperability between all the mitigations discussed above was the focus of SAA 5, with test 
sites looking at USS to USS interaction. Survey questions asked about situation awareness, the 
timeliness and clarity of messages and the resolution maneuvers made. Only two responses were 
received on the survey for this flight test.  
 
One of the two respondents to this set of survey questions said they were informed about intruding 
vehicles by their USS Operator, and the other did not receive any USS information. The participants 
were not aware of the USS message stream, as neither of them were USS Operators, however, they 
reported they were “somewhat aware” of their vehicle. Because they could not see a USS client, 
participants reported rogue states were “not at all” clear to them. They did have a more favorable 
view of their operations, estimating that their replanning was “reasonably effective” and that their 
resolutions to airspace intrusions were “very effective.”  
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6.7 SAA Test Summary 
SAA testing was exploratory, with test sites using new equipment (to them) to sense and avoid a 
variety of vehicles. This experience not only highlighted features and issues with SAA tools but also 
helped crews to reflect on how they are using their GCS, USS clients and the UTM concept. Some of 
the major points included: 
• The telemetry that provides additional situation awareness can come from a range of  
sensors, one type of data was not clearly better than another, when comparing across tests. 
But, the data does need to be reliable and consistent. 
– Reliability: Some SAA data had uncertain reliability, making those crews unsure 
about all of the data they received. Implication: As above, this suggests continued 
progress to improve the reliability of SAA data.  
– Trust: Users did not always trust the telemetry and sensor data enough to rely on it. 
Implication: The accuracy of information provided through UTM would benefit 
from improvement to make it as consistent as possible. 
• Test sites liked the additional sensor tools they had that provided increased situation 
awareness about the airspace they were flying in. 
– SA: Some crews were not confident enough to fly SAA tests while BVLOS, 
suggesting they did not trust their tools enough to move away from visual contact. 
Implication: Continued progress is needed to improve the reliability of SAA data.  
– Trust: As BVLOS is a higher risk environment than VLOS, this is the type of flight 
where SAA will be needed most and can be most informative. Suggestion: 
Continue work to improve both training and the reliability of SAA data, which may 
counteract the lack of trust experienced by some of the crews in this study. 
• Test sites liked the idea of SAA tools to alert them when intruders were approaching their 
vehicle too closely but reported a number of issues with this new-to-UTM technology, 
ranging from telemetry reliability issues to interface interaction issues. They concluded, in 
general, that these tools need more development to become truly useful. 
– Usability: Some USS displays either lacked SAA functions and/or were cluttered. 
Implications are that it could be advantageous to continue to improve USS GUIs. 
– Functionality: SAA technologies were all good for awareness, but some users were 
just getting to know how to use them and which were best for what situation. 
Implications are that continued testing of SAA technologies could be beneficial. 
– Workload: Crews commented on the level of workload required to monitor all the 
displays in a GCS. Moving forward, in addition to addressing the items above, 
consolidating data onto fewer displays could alleviate workload. 
• An area where crews were uncertain was how to react to SAA events. Discussion 
highlighted the variety of approaches crews had considered that could be used to respond to 
conflict situations.  
– Procedures: Crews created their own procedures for avoiding conflict and giving 
way. Moving forward, a consistent set of procedures should be tested and evaluated. 
– Public and Hobby Users: From their experience of flying SAA, crews noted that 
having operators outside the UTM system will be problematic for SAA. Suggestion: 
Offer hobbyists incentives to encourage full participation in UTM.  
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7. Communication Navigation Surveillance Tests 
Three CNS tests were conducted to examine technologies for communication and navigation by 
measuring data elements, such as the accuracy, latency, and switchover effectiveness. For the first 
test, CNS 1, the test sites attempted to maintain positive control of the vehicle during a scripted 
primary C2 link failure, and subsequently switchover to a backup link. To assess whether the 
redundant C2 was successful, a maneuver command was sent to the vehicle, and the vehicle’s 
response was confirmed. The ability to remain within a flight geography using GNSS navigation was 
the focus of the CNS 2 test. The test sites were encouraged to utilize manmade structures to naturally 
inhibit or block signals between the vehicle and GPS satellites, or create a multipath effect. For CNS 
3, vehicles were equipped with a radio frequency (RF) sensor payload, and gathered data at three 
different altitudes to characterize the RF environment and inform the impact on C2 communication 
in low altitude. 
 
Five of the six test sites were awarded two or more CNS tests. In total, 12 CNS tests were awarded, 
and these awards were distributed so that each CNS test was performed by three to five test sites. 
Test sites conducted these 12 sets of tests over 18 calendar days, across two months. For some of the 
tests, an AOL observer was present in the field and took notes. For all the tests, participants 
completed a survey at the end of the day. Also, at the end of a number of flight days, crews took part 
in a debrief, either with the onsite AOL representative or over the telephone. These discussions and 
responses are reported below.  
 
7.1 Method 
7.1.1 Surveys 
There were 30 questions in the CNS survey, with the questions preselected to show only between 10 
and 25 of these questions depending on the test. All CNS tests received 10 general questions, and 
only CNS1 and CNS2 received additional test specific questions, 15 and 20, respectively. Many 
items asked the participant to rate their answers on a 1–7 scale, where 7 was high, or positive, and 1 
was low, or negative. Other question types were multiple choice and free-response. Ninety surveys 
were started in total across the five sites. All 90 surveys had some data entered but not all were 
complete. The greatest number of surveys started at one site was 25 and the fewest was 11. 
 
7.1.2 Debriefs 
There were nine debriefs that focused on the CNS tests that were hosted across the five test sites. 
Eight were specific debriefs focused on one CNS test while one touched on all three CNS tests (see 
Appendix 15). Numbers of discussion prompts varied, as researchers wanted crews to discuss and 
explore the topics within the time available. Prompts focused on operator situation awareness, the 
UTM concept, usefulness of sensor data, and technical issues of concern. 
 
7.2 CNS Metadata 
There were 134 operations submitted to UTM by the test sites to support CNS testing. Sixty-four 
operations were submitted for CNS 1, 14 for CNS 2, and 55 for CNS 3. See Table 20 for a further 
breakdown of submitted operations. 
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Table 20. Number of Live and Simulated Flights Providing Data for TCL3 by CNS Test 
 NASA Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4 Site 5 Site 6 Total 
CNS 1  21 8 19 15 1  64 
CNS 2  6 4   4  14 
CNS 3   3 21 25 6  55 
All CNS   27 15 40 40 11  133 
 
7.3 General CNS Feedback  
A standard set of ten questions were asked at the beginning of every CNS survey. Participants were 
asked to rate the information they used, timeliness of actions, their opinions of the information they 
received through the USS clients, and their safety concerns.  
 
7.3.1 Methods: Operational Effectiveness 
In the surveys, CNS participants rated their flight operations in terms of their efficiency, timeliness, 
and the degree to which they relied on UTM information to achieve those (see Figure 25). Crews 
were cautiously positive about their operations. On average, they rated the timing of UTM messages 
as “right on time” (𝑥 = 4.4, note the midpoint of the scale was the most positive option) and reported 
that their operations were “quite efficient” (𝑥 = 5.3). To do this, they relied on UTM information 
“about half the time” (𝑥 = 3.7), although this degree of reliance varied between crews, and was 
higher for CNS1 than the other two tests.  
 
 
 
Figure 25. Operational effectiveness for CNS flights in TCL3 shown by type 
of CNS test (n = 44–70). Note: Rating scale was 1–7; y-axis is 
longer to show SD. 
 
7.3.2 Information Properties 
Participants were invited to rate eight properties of the UTM information they received through their 
USS. On average, participants rated all the UTM information they received as “good” with means 
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varying from 4.6 for usefulness of information for planning to 5.3 for level of detail in the client (see 
Figure 26). Participants gave the highest ratings (on average) after CNS 3 and the lowest after CNS 
2, especially for “noticeability of needed information.”  
 
 
 
Figure 26. UTM information properties during CNS testing in TCL3 shown by type 
of CNS test (n = 26–35). Note: Rating scale was 1–7; y-axis is longer to 
show SD. 
 
Participants were asked about their experiences as operators after every CNS test, specifically their 
level of workload and perceived awareness of UTM states, e.g., rogue or non-conforming, or active 
(Figure 27). Participants felt that they had good awareness of UTM states, on average (𝑥 = 4.9), 
reporting the highest level of awareness during CNS 3 and the lowest during CNS 1. On average, 
participants rated their workload as “moderate” during the CNS flight tests (𝑥 = 4.2), with CNS 2 
having the highest ratings. Crews’ lowest workload ratings were during CNS 3. 
 
Participants were also asked how concerned they were about the safety of their operations and 
reported they had “no concerns” about safety 88% of the time (n = 74). There were only two 
responses indicating a crew was concerned about safety “many times” (2.3%). The reasons 
participants gave for being concerned were most often changes in the weather (30%) or an aspect of 
the testing (30%). Only once was a participant concerned during an unplanned off nominal event, 
where a manned helicopter intruded into the test area. However, twice participants reported their 
concerns were due to adding the USS client to their suite of tools, because it was distracting, e.g., 
“the distractions and inaccuracies of the current USS cause unneeded confusion in the GCS” (CNS1 
participant, Test Site 2).  
 
7.3.3 Technology: RF Spectrum 
Participants debated which portion of the RF spectrum UAS are going to use in the future. Crews 
predicted that in the future, when there are many UAS in the airspace, then the RF bandwidth will be 
over-taxed and the command for one aircraft will possibly overlap onto another aircraft, which could 
lead to un-commanded movement. They noted that encryption will help but also that crews may 
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need to declare the frequency they are using, which most will not want to do for privacy and security 
reasons.  
 
 
Figure 27. Operator workload and UTM awareness during CNS testing in TCL3 
shown by type of CNS test (n = 49–75). Note: Rating scale was 1–7, y-
axis is longer to show SD. 
 
 
Currently UAS use industry, scientific and medical (ISM) bands but they predicted that with the 
number of UAS flying these bands will become overloaded. One participant noted that this situation 
will improve when an aviation grade spectrum is available for UAS, but the team speculated there 
will still be a question about whether long term evolution (LTE) or the ISM band might still be used 
by smaller UAVs.  
 
7.4 CNS 1: Effectiveness of Redundant C2 in Maintaining Operational Control of UAV 
The CNS 1 test was designed to evaluate the effectiveness of redundant C2 tools in maintaining 
operational control of UAS. Crews were required to use two C2 tools on their vehicle (e.g., two 
point-to-point radios or a radio and a cell network), send a UAV maneuver command using their 
primary link to verify execution of the sent command via vehicle telemetry, and then to turn this link 
off (simulating a failure of the primary link) and re-execute the maneuver, again collecting telemetry 
data. In some cases, the test sites performed a natural link transition, where they would fly to a point 
where the primary signal was degraded enough to trigger an automatic switchover. It should be 
noted that the impact of a real failure varied across different UAS. For those whose systems were 
redundant, CNS 1 was a test of the auto-switch capability on their UAS to just use one radio, rather 
than two. This should not result in an interruption in telemetry, and was not an event that represented 
a failure for the crew. A failure would have been for the second radio to fail as well. For those crews 
who were using a single-link system, CNS 1 was a C2 failure, in the sense of an interruption in 
telemetry, with a switch to the back-up radio/network restoring the telemetry. This functional 
difference gave crews different perspectives and led to them responding differently to survey and 
debrief questions. 
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Survey questions asked about the process of switching C2 links, crew procedures and users’ 
situation awareness. In debriefs, crews discussed alerting, GCS functionality as a model for USS 
clients, and C2 awareness (Table 21).  
 
Table 21. CNS 1: Discussion Topics and their Notional Categorization into 
Information Themes 
Debrief Topic Category Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4 Site 5 
Information property  7  11  
Information meets user  6 1 9  
Operator status  1  11  
Methods  1 2 2  
Automation  8 6 6  
Concept  5  3  
 
 
From the survey, 86% of the respondents reported that the UAV they were crewing automatically 
switched to its back up link (see Appendix 14 for details). Six respondents indicated that the C2 
failure was shown on their GCS auto-flight software, through a message or icon, five reported that 
nothing was flagged, and a sixth had a manual system. One person noted that their USS client 
showed an alert message, while another reported that their USS client did not receive C2 link-
messages. Forty seven percent of respondents indicated that their system automatically executed a 
contingency flight plan when it lost its primary C2 link, and 72% of respondents also reported that 
their UAS automatically continued on its original flight plan after switching to a back-up C2 link.  
 
7.4.1 Methods: Management of Failure 
Participants were asked a number of questions in the survey to establish how they were managing 
the C2 link failure. Sixty-six percent of survey respondents said they were monitoring the health of 
their ground-stations’ C2 links with their UAVs. However, only 9% used the USS client to do this 
(confirming their USS client showed the C2 link failure), everyone else reported using their GCS 
auto-flight software for this. The 33% who were not monitoring the C2 link reported that it was not 
part of their role to do this, with one PIC explaining that he was not monitoring the C2 link because 
he was relying on his GCSO to tell him if they were switching between links. When the C2 link was 
failed, only 9% of the respondents did not know it had failed, and 27% reported they knew of the 
failure because they were told by a teammate. Surprisingly, of the 53% of respondents (n = 21) who 
said they became aware of the failure through their tools, 80% of this group (n = 17) reported they 
were made aware of the failure via their USS client specifically. (This is only surprising because 
relatively few people reported they were monitoring the USS client for system health and reported 
failure messages coming through on their GCS, see above and discussion below.) They explained 
that the display showing them the C2 failure, provided “a lot of the information” they needed about 
the failure (𝑥 = 5.5; n = 30). 
 
CNS participants were also asked about how they managed their C2 link failure and switched to 
back-up in terms of their efficiency making the switch, the timeliness of their response and, the 
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completeness of the information they received about the failure. Crews reported their failure 
response processes were good overall. They were starting from a good position because they 
reported having “a good amount” of the failure information they needed, on average (𝑥 = 5.5; Figure 
28), with Test Site 4 responding that they thought they received the most information. Test Site 1 
participants had the most varied opinions within their group. On average, crews estimated that their 
response to the C2 failure took “very little time” (𝑥 = 1.8), with all test sites being in agreement on 
how quickly they resolved the issue. They argued that they should not have to share information 
about the amount of time it takes them to complete the C2 switch with other crews through the UTM 
system, but then debated whether they should have to if this process took a long time (e.g., more 
than 10 seconds, see below for a discussion on 10 seconds to alert). Supporting this, they also 
estimated that their C2 link switch to the back-up link was “efficient” (𝑥 = 6.1).  
 
 
 
Figure 28. Crew management of C2 link failure during CNS 1 test shown 
by site (n = 25–35). Note: Rating scale was 1–7; y-axis is 
longer to show SD. 
 
 
7.4.2 Operator Experience: Situation Awareness and Workload 
A primary C2 link failure might seem like a busy time for flight crews, but the participants in the 
survey reported a lower than average level of workload (𝑥 = 2.5) during the CNS 1 tests (see Figure 
29). Participants at Test Site 4 reported that their workload was “very low” on average (𝑥 = 1.4). 
One reason for this may have been that their UAV automatically switched to a backup link and 
continued with its flight without crew intervention.  
 
Also shown on Figure 29 are participants’ estimates of the degree to which they monitored UTM 
information and cross-checked their USS client information with other sources, reflecting their 
comfort level with their situation awareness. The degree to which crews reported they monitored 
their USS ranged from “hardly at all” to “quite often” depending on the test site, with those at Test 
Site 2 reporting they “monitored quite often” on average (𝑥 = 5.2) and crews from Test Site 1 
reporting that they monitored the USS client “hardly at all” (𝑥 = 1.76). Participant ratings were 
dependent on the UTM role organization within the team and also dependent on the role individuals 
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were in. Respondents varied a great deal in the frequency with which they reviewed their USS 
information with other sources. On average, participants reported they reviewed information 
“sometimes” (𝑥 = 3.7) but individual reports varied from “never” to “constantly” and, again, ratings 
varied from site to site. For example, Test Site 5 reported they cross-checked information “often” (𝑥 
= 5.6), whereas Test Site 1 “intermittently” cross-checked their USS client with other sources.  
 
 
 
Figure 29. Operator monitoring and cross checking (situation awareness) during 
CNS 1 testing in TCL3 and operator workload shown by test site (n = 
16–24). Note: Rating scale was 1–7; y-axis is longer to show SD. 
 
 
Crews discussed which information should be available through their USS client. They said 
everyone should see the positions of all the aircraft that are connected to the local USS network. In 
the case of lost link (or stoppage in position reporting for other reasons), all those in the area should 
receive an alert to the possibility of a conflict with that flight. Others thought last known heading, 
altitude, and airspeed should also be broadcast to help other pilots estimate which areas to avoid. 
One participant suggested that UTM should build a caution area around the last known position of 
the vehicle to assist other crews. A second PIC noted that if you lose link, you have low SA and 
uncertainty about your own vehicle. 
 
7.4.3 Information: Alerting 
The discussion, about what crews with a C2 failure needed to know led to a discussion about the 
number of alerts a neighboring crew might receive due to this event. Crews were concerned about 
being flooded with alert messages and being distracted by too much information, both from their 
own UAS and from others. Even for their own UAS, one PIC said they would not want to receive 
pop-up messages for a temporary lost link event, and definitely not for other vehicles. As an 
example, at one test site, there was a visual indicator on their GCS toolkit that simply turned red 
when there was a C2 failure of that vehicle. Another crewmember suggested a lower time limit for 
reporting lost link, and that one second telemetry drops should not be reported (see below that 
systems follow this suggestion to some degree).  
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For other UAS, another PIC emphasized that he would want an extremely low false alarm rate if 
every lost link was going to be broadcast as an alert. Crews pointed out that it is not worth 
broadcasting information that does not affect anyone else, and this would avoid unnecessary 
distractions. Participants argued that, if you still have one C2 link, are in control of your vehicle, and 
are inside your volume, other operators do not need to know you lost your primary radio. Crews said 
they only needed to know about others’ lost link if that operation is not being tracked in any other 
way, or if it would affect their airspace, or the UAV was having trouble (presumably loss of control). 
In the case where the other UAV with the lost link would affect local operations, crews said they 
would want to know as much as possible about that flight. For example, it would be important to 
know if a lost-link-UAV is executing a total loss of link procedure, as this state would make the 
aircraft position uncertain and it would be unable to react to commands. One site said that lost link 
situations may be best shared USS-to-USS, rather than directly to the UAS operator, and then have 
the information filtered down to the appropriate users. They specified that might it be helpful to 
define a level of priority or criticality to avoid clutter arising from C2 link issues of other operations. 
 
7.4.4 Information: SDSP 
One suggestion for our SDSP was a strength-of-signal heat map showing the spot where radio 
coverage is good and poor within a wider area. Crews noted that a large operator or dispatch 
position, deploying many UAS, might find information like this very useful. Participants also said 
that service providers of the C2 link, as a service that UAS operators will subscribe to, should have a 
way of showing their users when a link is down or impaired. 
 
7.4.5 Automation: GCS 
GCSs contained the primary tools through which crews monitored their lost link status. Crews 
described both the representation of lost link status and when this was triggered on their GCS. Many 
crews have a redundant C2 link, where all telemetry sources are connected and the crew is able to 
see the health of each link, sometimes as the number of satellites acquired or as a general rating of 
overall signal strength, depending on the system. Some systems have an auto-switch capability 
where the UAS switches itself to use the best signal available. Systems also vary in their time 
threshold for a lost link alert, e.g., 3 or 10 seconds. If the link is lost for less than 10 seconds (or 3), 
the system does not show an alert to the user. The PIC in the debrief agreed with a lower limit to 
alerting, saying they definitely do not need to be told about lost links less than a few seconds long. 
However, in a situation where a crew needed to reboot a system, which would take a relatively long 
time (e.g., 45 sec), this should be alerted to other operations that are in close proximity. All these 
features reduce the number of alerts presented to the user and led to the crew reports, noted above, 
that they were not aware of the primary radio failure. For those whose systems did not automatically 
switch, crews reported knowing they had successfully switched to their back up radio when the 
telemetry data on their GCS re-started.  
 
Crews described that the strength of their C2 link was shown as a colored bar on some GCS. A good 
connection was represented in green and it turned a series of colors and then to blinking red as the 
signal degraded. Others reported that their systems had signal-strength icons, that changed color with 
the link strength, and pop-up windows to alert its status. Crews suggested these features should be 
copied in USS clients, then lost link alerts would display through a USS client as a color change in 
the aircraft icon or a message.  
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7.4.6 Automation: USS Client 
Crews from more than one test site reported that their USS client did not provide them with enough/ 
timely information to be useful in CNS 1 testing. Crews reported a large lag when they were using 
the USS for their UAS to switch from the primary C2 link to their back-up, noting that when they 
conducted flight operations through their GCS alone, without the USS involved, the switch-to-
backup was a matter of seconds. With the USS in the loop, it took much longer. Crews speculated 
that the amount of telemetry data flowing through the UTM system when many UAV had two radios 
on board and reporting out was enough to slow the USS (UTM) down. 
 
Two additional general issues with their USS were also reported by some crews. At Test Site 2, 
crews noted that their USS client showed them a view that was too high-level (zoomed out) to be 
useful. The UAV icon was larger than small volumes and they could not see its movement within the 
space, so they consulted their GCS for all the information they wanted. At Test Site 4, the issue was 
different. This site had multiple USSs covering in the same area and those USSs did not share 
information, so crews using one USS did not know when UAV on another USS network had 
experienced lost link. USS Ops reported feeling isolated and listening to the radio to try to glean 
information.  
 
7.4.7 Automation: USS Issues 
Crews reported a number of issues with their USS that were revealed during their CNS 1 testing. 
One was a NASA issue: that the NASA side of the UTM system had too many teams wanting to 
make data connections and could not support all of them. This resulted in crew submissions being 
rejected but not for a reason they could address. This issue was resolved during TCL3 testing. A 
second issue was the UTM limitation that it could not accept more than ten volumes (see footnote 5 
above). 
 
7.4.8 Concept: Privacy 
There are two threads to the C2 lost link test. The first is how much crews wanted to know about 
their own UAS, and the second is how much they need to tell other crews. Keeping others informed 
of your C2 link status potentially entails revealing a good amount of data about your operation, and 
many crews were uncomfortable with this. Participants debated about the amount of privacy UAS 
operations should be afforded. One PIC thought it would be okay to show the position of the aircraft 
but not operator details, and suggested using randomized callsigns to protect operator identity. When 
asked specifically about whether they should be required to report a loss of C2 link to the 
community, the group was divided, saying that it depends on the specific situation (as discussed 
above). If you have a secondary link or seamless back-up mode, so there is little to no effect on your 
performance, PIC asked “why would I share that?” But, they agreed that if the failure impaired your 
vehicle’s performance, then you should broadcast this (and will have to follow a public network’s 
rules). Others thought that, regardless of the situation, you would want to broadcast a reduction in 
capability. One participant suggested that UAS could report, along with their position information, 
whether their system is operating in dual-link mode or single-link mode. If the dual-link switched to 
a single-link mode, then other users would be able to infer that the vehicle had experienced a lost 
link. Other participants supported an idea like this because it would provide information but not 
create alerts. (See also discussion above about alerting.) 
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7.4.9 Concept: Participants 
PIC asked how manned aircraft are going to be informed of UAS that are having difficulties, e.g., 
lost link. They argued that helicopter traffic, in particular, either need a way to monitor UAS traffic 
or to be told about unexpected behavior from UAS traffic.  
 
An issue arose when a site had multiple USS covering the same area. Crews experienced their flight 
volume closing without warning midflight. They had no indication on their USS client that this was 
going to happen or why. It became apparent that crews using another USS covering the same area 
were able to close the volume on the first USS, which enabled them to submit, and have accepted, a 
volume for their vehicles to fly in that same area. These “second USS” crews were unrepentant 
because, in the time it took the teams from the first USS to troubleshoot the issue and then resubmit 
volumes, the second USS crews had completed all their test flights. 
 
7.4.10 UTM System 
Participants varied in their opinions of the usefulness of UTM. Two opposing perspectives were an 
argument that all UAS operators should have to participate in UTM because having an operator who 
can decide to not be part of the system and then fly in contravention to all the rules of the UTM 
system will defeat its purpose and make the airspace unsafe. The opposing view was that there is no 
benefit to UTM other than a “no guarantees” assurance that the airspace is clear for you. 
 
Participants want the UTM submission procedure to be more user-friendly. One particular case they 
discussed was moving the window for time of flight, noting that, if they flew before the window 
opened, telemetry was not sent through the system. For example, in the case where the crew needed 
to take off early, due to weather or other constraints, they needed to either make extensive edits in 
UTM or create a whole new operation.  
 
7.5 CNS 2: Remaining within Flight Geography using GNSS Navigation 
The CNS 2 tests explored the impact of GNSS navigation errors on the ability of UAS to stay within 
their UTM flight geography. To achieve this lack of coverage, one site flew their vehicle in close 
proximity to a structure, which increased the level of safety concern for all involved. A second site 
used a shroud-collar on their UAV to mask the GPS signal and flew in an open area. They also had 
radar surveillance as a second source of telemetry and (as the test specified) wanted to see how 
closely the radar signal aligned with their GPS telemetry with and without the shroud. The third site 
flew into and out of a building.  
 
Test sites reported very different experiences with GPS degradation. At the second test site, the team 
reported that it was difficult for them to degrade their GPS signal during the flight tests, and they 
saw no noticeable difference in telemetry between using a collar on their GPS and having no shroud. 
However, the third test site reported that they had trouble staying in their volume because they 
experienced a large GPS drift. This resulted in the UAS going both rogue and non-conforming 
during their CNS 2 tests. They observed high horizontal dilution of precision (of GPS signal) 
(HDOP) values and high horizontal and vertical position variance and one PIC reported he lost GPS 
lock multiple times during the tests. Survey questions asked about the reliability and quality of the 
Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) back up source and users’ situation awareness during 
these maneuvers. Debrief prompts focused on use of the USS client and navigation data availability 
(Table 22).  
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Table 22. CNS 2: Discussion Topics and their Notional 
Categorization into Information Themes 
Debrief Topic Category Site 1 Site 2 Site 5 
Information property 6 5  
Information meets user 2   
Operator status 2   
Methods 4   
Automation 6 1 3 
Concept    
 
7.5.1 Operator Experiences: Situation Awareness 
Participants were asked about the frequency with which they refreshed their situation awareness, by 
monitoring the USS client or cross-checking it with other sources when their vehicle was flying 
using different navigation GNSS (Figure 30). The degree to which crews reported monitoring their 
USS was site dependent, with those at Test Site 2 reporting they “monitored quite often” on average 
(𝑥 = 4.6) and crews from Test Site 5 reporting that they monitored the USS client “sometimes” (𝑥 = 
2.5). However, participant ratings were also role-dependent. Respondents varied a great deal in the 
frequency with which they cross-checked their USS information with other sources. On average, 
participants from two sites reported they cross-checked information “sometimes” (𝑥 = 4.3) but 
individual reports varied from “never” to “constantly.”  
 
Crews were asked whether they needed to know details about GPS signal strength. They all agreed 
that they did, and liked that this information, e.g., number of satellites acquired, was available on 
their auto-flight software (GCS). Crews explained that some of the UAS flight modes are dependent 
on GPS availability, and so knowing how many satellites are in your HDOP gives the crew an idea 
of how reliable these modes will be.  
 
 
Figure 30. Operator monitoring and cross checking (situation awareness) during 
CNS 2 testing in TCL3 shown by test site (n = 7–8). Note: Rating scale 
was 1–7; y-axis is longer to show SD. 
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7.5.2 Automation: Technology 
Participants rated their GNSS back-up source (various technologies) as “reliable” on average (𝑥 = 
5.7) and the discrepancy between the sources as “manageable” (𝑥 = 3.7). The change of GNSS 
source caused the test sites some difficulties with staying within their flight boundaries, but also, 
those flying near structures found the vehicle position reports were inconsistent as both position and 
heading were affected by the obstacle providing the navigation shadow.  
 
Ground radar is another safety tool employed by some sites and used in tandem with their on-board 
sensors. Crews noted that the radar indicated a divergence from the last reported GPS position if the 
GPS signal was very weak, and that although this radar lacked precision, it provided general course 
information if you had nothing else.  
 
7.5.3 Automation: USS Client 
One test site compared their USS client to their vehicle auto-flight software. They bemoaned the lack 
of development/functionality on their USS client, saying the client told them nothing—yet. Issues 
they listed were that the USS map view was the whole flight area and their UAV icon was bigger 
than their volume. There was also no alerting. By comparison, their auto-flight software showed 
them position, speed, how many satellites were forwarding telemetry, and had a range of visual 
alerts.  
 
Another test site noted the complexity of flying UAS from remote sites. They listed all the 
connectivity they had to ensure, first for telemetry then to keep personnel in touch, and the 
difficulties setting up reliable hotspots, linking GCS and then linking to UTM.  
 
7.5.4 Concept: Safety 
A central concern for the CNS 2 tests revealed during crew debriefs, was the strength of the 
telemetry signal that their vehicles were receiving. Signal can be degraded for a number of reasons—
RF interference is one and also overload on the RF circuits (see Section 7.6). 
 
PIC at Test Site 1 pointed out that the impact of signal degradation depends on how you are flying 
your vehicle. For example, if the GPS is degraded, the UAV autopilot may be unable to land the 
vehicle, as it is not designed to do this when the horizontal and vertical positions of the UAV are 
unclear. If they do lose the GPS signal from their UAV, crews reasoned that they have fail-safes they 
set before flight, usually commanding the UAV to loiter, to give the system time to re-acquire the 
signal. At another site, when a crew lost GPS signal, their GCS display froze, and position reporting 
was lost, but when the GPS was re-acquired, the display un-froze and began re-showing positions.  
 
PICs were comfortable with the layers of safety they had supporting them if they lost GPS signal, 
noting that they had a VO, personal awareness of the vehicle location, the ability to take manual 
control, and the comfort of knowing the UAV has fail-safes programmed.  
 
7.6 CNS 3: RF Interference Baseline Monitoring 
The CNS 3 tests asked test sites to characterize their radio frequency (RF) environment and evaluate 
its impact on their UASs’ C2 links. Crews clarified that they were concerned with both frequency 
overload and magnetic interference, such as the interference they have found around metal towers or 
power lines, during these tests. Four test sites performed RF baseline flight tests (a total of 56 
recorded data collection flights) and, by design, only the general section of the surveys was asked as 
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there was not a human factors component to these tests. The discussions reported below are from the 
debriefs that followed some days of CNS 3 testing. Debrief prompts focused on the quality of 
telemetry, what information a crew can glean from a degraded feed and crew situation awareness 
(Table 23).  
 
Table 23. CNS 3: Discussion Topics and their Notional Categorization 
into Information Themes 
Debrief Topic Category Site 2 Site 3 Site 4 Site 5 
Information property 3 3 4  
Information meets user   1  
Operator status   1  
Methods   4  
Automation  7 5  
Concept 1  1  
 
 
7.6.1 Technology: RF Interference 
Crews at different test sites reported different levels of RF interference in their testing. Those at Test 
Site 4 said they saw no interference, although they noted that they have experienced interference 
before when using the 2.4 GHz band. Test Site 4 also saw a drop in LTE coverage, but the USS Op 
confirmed that the drop was the LTE on the RF not related to position updates. Test Site 2 reported 
they did not see any unexpected RF frequency interference, as they were very familiar with the area 
and knew where they would see a decrease in signal on their flight corridor. 
 
In general discussion, crews reported having RF interference problems (in the 2.4 GHz band) when 
they have been flying next to cell repeater towers and have found magnetic interference around 
metal towers and power lines. They described magnetic interference, noting that the GPS fades first, 
then the compass fails, and at that point flying gets “sketchy.” Overload, crews described as cyclical, 
as cell phone usage is higher at some times of the day. They discussed whether the 2.4 gigahertz 
band may suffer from being drowned out by Wi-Fi, but crews thought that the Wi-Fi signals coming 
out of a building are too weak to cause disruption. Crews noted that they are more concerned about 
RF interference than they are about loss of GPS. If they lose GPS, then the UAV has RTB 
commands in its software, so there is not a problem with getting the UAV back to the GCS, but with 
RF interference, you are not sure which commands are getting to the UAV and which are not. 
 
One test site discussed a few possible sources for RF interference with the on-site NASA 
representative. In addition to external interference, ownship payload or electronics equipment could 
potentially also cause issues. Even during this TCL3 testing, the crews cited jammers that caused 
unexpected GNSS interference as a concern that could affect their navigation capabilities. 
 
7.6.2 Automation: Issues 
Crews reported issues they had with their USS client during their flight testing. One test site had an 
issue where their flight geography closed abruptly. Their complaint was that the interface did not 
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give them any warning before the closure, nor any information that told them why. Their second 
concern was that their system stopped reporting telemetry when the volume closed, which meant 
their vehicle disappeared from UTM. For later tests, they ensured that their system kept recording if 
the volume closed, but it still did not live-transmit to NASA.  
 
Two test sites had issues with their volume submissions being rejected by the UTM system. One test 
site did not know at the time of the debrief whether it was an issue they had with not sending data in 
the correct format or time limit, or whether it was an issue with UTM. It caused them to spend some 
amount of time looking through their USS client logs to find “hiccups” and developing a trouble-
shooting plan. The second site was aware that the issue was with UTM, and it was because two sites 
were trying to use the NASA server at the same time and the USSs were both in the other’s LUN.  
 
In addition, crews reported some connectivity issues related to moving locations, because the port 
connections between the USS client and UTM were not always maintained as they moved, so they 
had to recycle the connections. They said that to all the other USSs, they just blipped off their 
screens.  
 
One participant argued that the time constraint to the flight geographies should be removed. Flights 
are delayed all the time, so the UTM system should just recognize when a UAV takes off, 
automatically activate the volume and start sending telemetry, and should automatically close when 
the UAV lands.  
 
7.7 CNS Tests Summary 
Test sites were interested in these C2 TCL3 tests, as all their crews had experienced telemetry faults 
and weaknesses during past missions. However, apart from known locations, the C2 link was 
reported to be stable throughout the TCL3 tests. Awareness of C2 status and data health was 
generally high, often with team members tasked to specifically monitor system health.  
• Safety: Feedback indicated that operators were generally happy with the safety of 
their operations during CNS testing.  
• Technology: Some crews noted a lag in their C2 data. Moving forward, crews made 
suggestions for more direct vehicle to USS connections in an effort to speed up data 
arriving to the user from the sensors.  
• SA: Discussions focused on what operators need to know about other flights. 
Moving forward, operators suggested continued progress to identify what they need 
to know about other operators in UTM and providing that information. 
 
Discussions focused on the human-technology interface, not only what tools and displays were 
available in their GCS, but also what features they would like their USS clients to have. As well as 
clear and timely alerting, crews wanted to be aware of their telemetry strength, but not be distracted 
by it. They were concerned about being flooded with alert messages, both from their own UAS and 
from others, if issues internal to one UAS were broadcast to all others in the area. They were also 
concerned about privacy if they had to report out all issues with their systems. 
• Usability: Crews emphasized that C2 link displays needed to be simple, and could 
be situated on the USS client in this case. Moving forward, indication of the 
strength of the C2 connection might be added to USS displays (simple gauge only). 
• Distractions: Users were concerned about being flooded with messages if every lost  
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link was to be broadcast to the community. This led to a wider discussion of how 
much is “too much” for all types of alerting. Moving forward, crews suggested that 
the community specify some lower limits on what needs to be broadcast, e.g., “lost 
link” of one or two seconds does not need to be broadcast. 
• Privacy: Users do not want to share their data or information, but agree that some 
level of sharing has to happen to make UTM useful. Implications are, as stated 
earlier, that the community should specify lower limits on what needs to be 
broadcast, outlining information that must be shared and when. 
• Procedures: Reports from crews indicated that they had no issues with their CNS 
procedures, possibly as these seem to be more clearly specified for CNS loss than 
other areas.  
• Design: UTM users were able to “step on” each other to reserve airspace, some did 
this accidentally, others gamed the system to gain an advantage. Moving forward, is 
the recommendation that these loopholes should be identified and solutions 
considered. 
 
 
8. TCL3 Conclusions and Recommendations 
Six test sites participated in the TCL3 testing from March through May of 2018, flying a subset of 
20 tests with one of four foci—CNS, DAT, CON or SAA. The mainly qualitative data discussed 
above was collected by on-site and remote NASA researchers. The data consisted of end-of-day 
debriefs, end-of-day surveys, observer notes, and flight test information, submitted as part of the data 
management plan. The TCL3 flight tests were successful, and more was learned about operators, the 
information they need to fly within UTM, and procedural requirements in a TCL3 environment. The 
findings presented above complement data previously collected for TCL2nc (Spring 2017) and 
TCL2 (Reno, 2016). Test-sites, again, markedly improved their tools and organization with respect 
to UTM, but also identified further areas that would benefit from more consideration.  
 
Taking general account of the 280 individual survey responses and 40 debriefs with crews at test 
sites that reviewed the 831 test flights made, the feedback from participants was positive in a number 
of ways. Data from CNS and DAT tests were very helpful, and the tests went as expected. The tools 
investigated with the SAA tests were well-received by operators and helped with their overall 
situation awareness. CON tests were interesting and varied and generated a good deal of discussion 
at both a detailed level of flying during different events and at a broad concept-level. 
 
In addition to items already addressed from previous flight tests, certain themes consistently surfaced 
in many discussions regardless of the particular test site or specific test being discussed. These 
themes relate directly to one of the six overarching categories that were pre-defined (Table 4) by the 
AOL and guided the data collection process to inform the question: “What information is required to 
successfully fly in a UTM environment?” All of these themes together help us understand how UTM 
was used, what went well and should persist, and how the UTM experience can be improved. 
 
1. Information Properties 
• Alerting Information. Crews discussed UTM-specific alerts at length, including rogue states. 
They discussed aspects of alerting triggers, distance from target, priority operations, balancing 
alerting frequency between too often and too seldom, what information should be broadcast, 
  
82 
and procedures for responding to alerts. Moving forward, alert characteristics, including 
information required, and expected proper responses need to be further defined. 
 
• Usability. Under-developed user interfaces contributed to users not accessing UTM 
information, and instead falling back on LOS techniques to ensure the safety and compliance 
of their vehicles. Examples of this included on-screen clutter caused by too many consecutive 
and repeated alert messages, and clutter from multiple (and sometimes too-sensitive) track 
sources being displayed simultaneously. Moving forward, standards could be developed for 
displaying relevant information to increase the usefulness of information offered while 
engaging with the UTM environment. 
 
2. Information Meets User 
• Trust and Reliance. False alarms and/or inconsistent responses from their system led users to 
rely on UTM information less because they could not trust that everything relevant was being 
detected and reported. Moving forward, the reliability of detecting and reporting information 
should be improved in order to increase trust in the systems, and therefore user reliance and 
buy-in to UTM. 
 
• Transparency of Tool. Interfaces showing UTM information did not always give enough 
information to the user about why automated actions took place. This led to longer times for 
the operators to diagnose issues and troubleshoot problems. Moving forward, tool transparency 
and information clarity need to be improved along with user training/experience on the system. 
 
3. Operator Status 
• Situation Awareness was influenced by the usability of the information presented by crews’ 
USS client, but also by how aware they were of what information was accessible. Operators 
who understood how UTM works, their part in the system, and how to access the information 
applicable to their tasks, had positive feedback about their UTM situation awareness. In 
addition to further GUI development, more training before the tests begin can help users 
understand how to utilize their tools and interpret the information meaningfully. 
 
• Workload reports were estimated at low or moderate, a very manageable level, even during 
flight tests that included off nominal events, suggesting that crews were able to manage the 
addition of the UTM role and the extra information load that brings within their teams.  
 
4. Methods 
• Procedures or “Rule Book.” Throughout the TCL3 testing, there was evidence that further 
development and research on procedures, standards, and/or recommendations are needed. For 
example, if two interacting vehicles were operating under different assumptions or guidelines, 
their responses to situations would not be predictable enough to support trust in the system. 
Defining proper responses for an array of theoretical situations, and then assessing them, can 
help users feel more comfortable with overall knowledge of their own and others’ operations.  
 
Example procedure/recommendation areas include: 
– Altitude reporting standardization (AGL/MSL) 
– Operational limits that define a rogue state and the reporting that goes along with 
that state change 
– Actions required in the event of a USS failure 
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– Actions required when interacting with a TFR 
– When and what information to show to other players 
– Guidelines for USS client displays 
– Cooperative planning between users of each USS to avoid “gaming” the system. 
 
5. Concept: Operator Buy-In 
• Training. As mentioned above, more training is advised to increase operators’ situation 
awareness, but training may also increase acceptance of the UTM concept and operators’ 
willingness to participate in this environment. Users with broad UTM knowledge were able to 
interact with the systems purposefully and provide a great deal of feedback regarding what 
they liked and disliked about both UTM concept and specific tools used. 
 
6. Automation 
• Level of Automation. There were many, varied, levels of automation available to the 
participants of TCL3 that affected their experience with, and opinions of, UTM. Some crews 
used tools that were nearly entirely automated, with very few tasks allocated to the human 
operator. Other crews had human operators manually flying their vehicles with little 
knowledge of the automation that was interacting with UTM on their behalf. Most crews used 
a system somewhere in between, making the TCL3 testing a good representation of what is 
anticipated in the future for automation integration. As would be expected, crews that relied on 
automation, and had everything go well, were more receptive to UTM, while crews that 
experienced issues or bugs, had a less positive response. Generally, operators liked the tools 
that were presented to them clearly and reliably. 
 
• Tools. Although tools, like those for the SAA tests, were very well-received, participants 
suggested additional features and functions, which, if not already supported with the current 
configuration, may be helpful additions in the future.  
 
Example features and functions suggested include: 
– Better feedback on USS clients  
– Ability to categorize a UREP 
– Arrival alerts for UREPs 
– Recoverability from a rogue state 
– Dynamic volumes 
– Two or more vehicles sharing launch locations 
– Ability to compare overlapping volumes and make suggestions 
– Ability to add a delay to an accepted volume 
– Integrating USS clients and auto-flight software 
– Severity component to alert messages 
– Always reporting key information with an incoming conflict 
– Audible alerts 
– C2 link-health status indicators 
– Auto-switch to secondary C2 link 
– Redundant sources for critical information in tools 
– Safe landing area identification 
– Automated de-confliction 
– Predicted vehicle trajectories with closure rates  
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Appendix 1: Days of flying for TCL3 
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12-Apr   
 
    
 
  
15-Apr   
   
    
16-Apr   
  
      
17-Apr   
 
        
18-Apr   
 
        
19-Apr   
 
        
23-Apr   
   
    
24-Apr   
 
  
  
  
25-Apr   
    
  
26-Apr   
   
    
27-Apr   
   
    
4-May   
    
  
7-May   
   
    
9-May   
    
  
10-May   
    
  
11-May   
    
  
15-May   
    
simulation only 
16-May   
   
    
17-May   
    
  
18-May   
    
  
23-May   
    
  
25-May   
    
  
30-May             
Shakedown days 1 1 4 0 3 1 
Test days 11 4 6 9 13 8 
Total days in 
field 
12 5 10 9 16 8 
Key: orange background = a shakedown day; green background = a data-collection day; blue 
background = a simulation only day 
 
NOTE: one site retested some of their data collection in the lab – hence there were 51 days of 
testing for data collection with 50 of these flying vehicles in the field and one simulating all flights 
in the lab. 
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Appendix 2: Crew Size and Composition 
GCS and flight crew information. 
 
 Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4 Site 5 Site 6 
Most 
common 
number of 
GCS 
Up to 5 4 2 (note TO site is 
different, there 
was 1 of these) 
2 1 5 
Number of 
crews flying 
Up to 5 3 real, 1 
simulated 
2 3 2 5 
Most 
common 
number of 
personnel in a 
flight crew 
 3 
(not co-
located) 
3-6 
(co-located) 
 
6 
(not co-located) 
2-3 
(co-
located) 
 4 
(not co-located) 
1 to 3 
(co-located for 
some crews) 
 
Common 
crew 
positions 
GCS op, 
USS client 
op, PIC, 
engineer, 
VO 
GCS op, 
USS client 
op, USS 
manager, 
PIC 
PIC & GCSO, 
VOs 
PIC, 
GCS/US
Sop 
GCSO PIC, 
VOs = 
shared by 
both crews 
GCSO/PIC, 
USS Op, 
VO/ safety 
rep (other 
configuration
s were used)  
Additional 
crew 
positions 
test 
manager 
Integration 
manager, 
engineer 
Additional 
collocated = 
UTM specialist, 
data engineer and 
at an alternate 
location: UAS ID 
field personnel = 
shared by both 
crews 
 Additional = 
UTM 
operator  
flight 
manager, 
test 
coordinator, 
package 
loader 
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Appendix 3: Vehicles Flown in Flight Test 
 
 Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4 Site 5 Site 6 
Number of 
UAS 
models 
6 3 2 4 5 8 
Type of 
UAS 
flown 
6 multi-
rotor 
1 multi-
rotor 
1 fixed-
wing, 1 
hybrid 
2 multi-
rotor 
1 multi-rotor 
2 fixed-wing 
1 helicopter 
3 multi-rotor 
2 fixed-wing 
1 hybrid 
5 multi-rotor 
2 fixed-wing 
Model of 
UAS 
S1000, 
S900, 
F450, 
Matrice 
100, 
inspire, 
ptarmigan 
VTOL 
Savant, 
NAV-X, T-
master  
S1000, 
Matrice100 
F7200, 
F6500, 
vapor, 
Sharper A6,  
UASUSA 
Tempest, 
F7200, Solo, 
Matrice 600, 
AR-180 
eBee, Aero, 
Hummingbird, 
Intel Aero, 
Inspire, 
S1000, Eagle 
XF, Phantom 
3 
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Appendix 4: List of Flight Tests 
 
Test 
identifier Title 
CNS Communication, Navigation, and Surveillance 
CNS1 Maintaining control of UA with Redundant C2 
CNS2 Remaining within Flight Geography using GNSS Navigation 
CNS3 RF Interference Baseline Monitoring 
SAA Sense and Avoid 
SAA1 Air to Air Conflict Mitigation Cooperative Technology for UAS-UAS Interaction 
SAA2 Air to Air Conflict Mitigation Cooperative Technology for UAS-Manned Interaction 
SAA3 Air to Air Conflict Mitigation Non-Cooperative Technology for UAS-Manned Interaction 
SAA4 Air to Ground Conflict Mitigation Non-Cooperative Technology for UAS-Manned Interaction 
SAA5 System Level Assessment and Off nominal conditions 
SAA6 Air to Ground Remote Identification and interoperability with automobiles using Cooperative Technology 
DAT Data and Information Exchange 
DAT1 End-to-end UREP 
DAT2 FIMS failover 
DAT3 USS failover 
DAT4 UAS ID 
DAT5 USS-USS Negotiation 
DAT6 Wx Service 
CON Concepts 
CON1 BVLOS Landing 
CON2 Contingency Initiation 
CON4 Multiple TCL-2/3 operations for a sustained period 
CON5 FIMS/USS interaction when vehicle heads towards Controlled or unauthorized airspace 
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Appendix 5: Debriefs Conducted 
Debrief Interviews: Location and test discussed. 
 
P:  
Check marks denote that this test was covered in a debrief that discussed multiple tests. The number 
of multi-test/ multi-topic debriefs is listed in the “multi-test” rows. 
  
Test Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4 Site 5 Site 6 ALL 
DAT1  1 P  P P P 1 
DAT2    P    
DAT3  P  P P   
DAT4   2 1   3 
DAT5  1 P  1 P P 2 
DAT6  P      
DAT multi 
test  1  1 1 2 5 
CON 1   1    1 
CON 2 P    1 P 1 
CON 4 1 P   1 1 1 P 4 
CON 5 2   1   3 
CON multi 
test 1     2 3 
SAA 1      P  
SAA 2 1      1 
SAA 3      1 1 
SAA 4 1      1 
SAA 5        
SAA 6      P  
SAA multi 
test      1 1 
CNS 1  P 1 1   2 
CNS 2 1 P   1  2 
CNS 3  P 2 2   4 
CNS multi 
test  1     1 
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Appendix 6: Flights Made by Test Sites to Fulfill each Test 
Flight activity by Test (includes GUFIs with or without valid positions). 
 
  
 NASA Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4 Site 5 Site 6 ALL 
CNS1  21 8 19 15 1  64 
CNS2  6 4   4  14 
CNS3   3 21 25 6  55 
CNS    27 15 40 40 11  133 
SAA1       8 8 
SAA2  8    4  12 
SAA3      2 5 7 
SAA4  3    6  9 
SAA5      2 2 4 
SAA6       1 1 
SAA  11    14 16 41 
DAT1   12  8 6  26 
DAT2   9  4  1 14 
DAT3 3  21  6 5 3 38 
DAT4    14 5   19 
DAT5 13  38  17 7 53 128 
DAT6   10     10 
DAT 16  90 14 40 18 57 235 
CON1  4  4   5 13 
CON2 10 8     14 32 
CON4 5 34   25 2 250 316 
CON5 12 18 1  6 3  40 
CON 27 64 1 4 31 5 269 401 
ALL 43 102 106 58 111 48 342 810 
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Appendix 7: Examples of Topics Discussed in DAT Interviews with 
Flight Crews 
 
A selection of excerpts from field debriefs with test site crews for DAT tests and the corresponding 
topic category.  
 
DAT 1  
Information: 
Usability of 
information 
7 We need to see the heading, speed and altitude information in 
an easier to read format—during our time in the air we did not 
see any of the other aircraft, real or simulated on the screen. If 
the system is going to deconflict two aircraft it needs to be 
very clear as to what we need to do and what the other aircraft 
has been told to do. This could be shown as a warning box and 
a suggested path/heading with countdown timer. 
Information: 
Accuracy 
9 The distractions and inaccuracies of the current USS cause 
unneeded confusion in the GCS 
Methods: 
Procedures 
4 Our flight operations with our GCS worked according to plan. 
No surprises—the addition of the USS was distracting, our 
USS manager worked to insulate us (the flight team) from 
having to deal with its inconsistencies. We attempted to use 
the USS in conjunction with our GCS but it became a 
workload safety issue so instead we received real time reports 
from our USS Manager. 
Automation: 
Functionality 
4 So the system was doing automatic UREPs for the weather, it 
was doing automatic UREPs for traffic that was ID’d from 
different sensors, and then the manual UREPs were submitted 
by basic crew. 
DAT 3  
Information: 
Usability of 
information 
4 The only way in our system you wouldn’t know it’s not fully 
functioning is that on our big map display your own stuff 
doesn’t get updated anymore or you don’t get any updates. 
Just a static screen. I think that’s a function of the map. 
Information meets 
UTM: Decision 
making 
3 If you had just the UTM part of it go out, you might still have 
access to things like the TFMS feed so you’d know where 
other manned traffic is. You’d still have your links into, you 
know, like supplementary ground radars, ADSB receivers, 
anything else. The person who’s in command of the mission 
would have to make decisions about “what do I know” and 
“what does that mean for me right now?” 
Operator 
experiences: 
Situation awareness 
7 When you come back up, it’s not like instantly you see it, 
right? You need to wait for a little bit for things to catch up, 
‘cause there’s nothing that, um, necessarily tells you right 
away what messages you’ve missed. 
Methods: Rules 10 Not if already in the air. If in planning it would let you submit 
the plan. If flying under normal 107, no need for UTM so can 
continue without UTM as a normal 107 operation. If flying 
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with UTM is a requirement for your operation (say a 
requirement of your 107X waiver) then you would be unable 
to fly. 
Automation: Design 
of system 
5 Because when the network link would come back up, our USS 
because it didn’t know it failed didn’t know it missed 
anything. 
Concept: 
Requirements 
4 Some of the scalability issues with positions reports for USSs 
that are unresponsive. So, if you have to reach out to every 
other USS who’s subscribed in your positions, once every 
second, for every operation you have, that’s already a decent 
amount of independent HGTD (?) calls to be making. If one of 
the USSs is out, every single one of those to that USS for 
every single operation you’re sending every second is gonna 
be timing out. So, you add a lot more strain on your system 
waiting for the time-outs for every single position report for 
the operation.  
DAT 4  
Operator 
experiences: 
Situation 
Awareness 
15 I didn’t really have good visibility into what the ping station, 
which was mounted on top, searches as far as the receiver. I 
didn’t have good visibility to what it was doing, um, I was 
only looking at the hand-held receiver piece of it. Um, and the, 
yeah – like I said, I could – it was detected long before I could 
see or hear it. But again, we were behind trees and a water 
tower and all that other stuff, but, it was kind of good that I 
could see it quite a while. 
Methods: Roles 8 You can have a team of operators and a, because for example, 
they found that the workload was too high for the command 
and control operator. They separate roles but then shared a 
similar space so they can communicate better. 
Automation: Design 
of system 
12 We're very much focused on automation being the answer to 
safety rather than additional knowledge that actually told us to 
take data away because they don't need it because it doesn't 
make a decision. 
Concept: Privacy 11 And for us to have balance between transparency and privacy 
is the distance to be able to handle it on demand, not store 
data, feed it in a particular way that's needed for that. 
DAT 5  
Information: 
Usefulness of 
information 
8 From what I observed I think a key piece of information is 
some context or information not really the intent that can be 
embedded in the operation or put somewhere that can be 
called for a negotiation so that can inform the mission. 
Information: Trust 10 There is a lot of trust in the system, there’s trust that when 
you’re asking for a negotiation that you actually need it, and 
there’s trust from the other side that when I ask you for a 
negotiation, that we’re trusting that you’ll like actually try, and 
we’re trusting that what you get back is actually valid and de-
conflicted.  
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Operator 
experiences: 
Situation 
Awareness 
20 Everyone likes having the display with ADS-B because it’s 
just another level of situational awareness. If this is the display 
they’re using for situational awareness. 
Methods: 
Procedures 
3 And so, you know, like “I got battery, and I got everybody 
sitting here,” so there does need to be some rules of the road, I 
believe, so that if it’s X-amount of time before the window 
then you’re locked out, or you know, there does need to be 
consideration that there are certain times where you don’t want 
your plan pulled out from under you. 
Automation: Design 
of system 
21 I think it's important to have APIs that scale across multiple 
interfaces. 
Concept 3 We think it's important to have small operators be able to 
participate in a USS in an easy way because that's the way we 
keep the whole of the system safe. 
DAT 6  
Information: 
Usability/Usefulness 
3 Yeah, you actually had to click each one and then see where it 
came from or what type it was, but it was just essentially a list 
of time stamps. 
Information meets 
UTM: Input 
demands 
3 We’re trying to make it so you had to fill out the least amount 
of information when you had it…Which is good because then 
it also can be more accurate, right, because you already – well, 
if you did like a weather report in the air, but like if we did the 
ground one, the aircraft might be over there, you know . . . 
Methods: 
Procedures 
4 We have a weather overlay of ER and apps on our screen but 
our pilots also have their own checklist and I think that once 
they are done getting their route, they still go through besides 
the USS screen. They have their own checklist and they would 
also get it on the plane. Commercial airplane pilots already 
have their own source of weather data that they are used to 
getting it from and at the moment they trust. 
Automation: Data 
rates 
2 We’re very much focused on automation being the answer to 
safety rather than additional knowledge that actually told us to 
take data away because they don't need it because it doesn't 
make a decision. 
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Appendix 8: Examples of Notes from DAT Observations 
A selection of excerpts from debriefings and NASA representatives’ field observation notes and 
their corresponding topics.  
 
DAT 1 
Information: 
Transparency of 
tool 
It was easy to send UREPs but the search for new UREPs was not intuitive. 
Information 
meets UTM: 
Quality of alerts 
UREP received, but only see Air temp, wind speed. No aircraft sighting info. 
 
Automation: 
Design of system 
UREPS are .JSON files that come through. Can display graphical information as well as 
text. Issues with the [USS] “listening” for the message every # of ms, and then ignoring 
messages in the past. And if [USS] sends the message in between the “listening” time then 
they don’t get it. 
DAT 3 
Methods: 
Procedures  
Q: How did it “fail” and how did each crewmember react?  
A: We simulated some USS failure by resetting [USS1] while in-flight. In parallel, [another 
crew] was flying some mission. Crewmembers reacted by checking the expected “503 
service unavailable” status codes returned by [USS1] during the USS failover. 
Information 
Required/Desired 
Q: What information do you need when your USS fails?  
A: We just need our USS to restart and to catch up with what happened in the UTM while it 
was failing. 
Automation: 
Design of system 
Ultimately, USS should be fully automated. We should however persist USS failure events 
so that we can inspect what happened. 
Information: 
Required/Desired 
Additionally, there currently was no alert in the GCS for the pilot to know that the GCS is 
down.  
Information: 
Required/Desired 
Q: What information do you need when your USS fails? 
A: The pilots need to know what that failure means for them. Should they land or should 
they keep flying on their flight plan? Should they activate a contingency? The GCS operator 
needs to know the failure (on his end, on the USS end?) and if there are any debugging steps 
s/he should take. Also what s/he should communicate to the pilot (if anything). 
Methods: 
Description of 
operator roles 
Q: What were the individual responsibilities of each person?  
• USS client operator: Monitor the airspace in real time and communicate any USS 
alerts to the GCS operator. 
• USS manager: Coordinate testing with other USSs so that we can execute the tests. 
• GCS operator: Communicate with the pilot about flight plan approval and 
connectivity and telemetry. Monitor conformance. Communicate with USS 
operator if needed. 
Operator status: 
Workload  
USS op was also in charge of slack, has to hand off task to mission command because of 
workload. 
DAT 4 
Operator status: 
Workload  
Both crews are hurrying. 
 
Other [IR beacon detection] device only detects with an active flight plan. 
Information: 
Usefulness  
Flight crew thinks remote ID is useful in real time to help a flight crew have better 
awareness of the UFO (i.e. looking up the vehicle type is useful, looking up the created 
information the registered owner is not). 
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DAT 5 
Information: 
Timeliness 
Q: Did you receive the negotiation information with enough time and enough information to 
safely mitigate the conflict? 
A: Yes. The USS and the GCS interfaces notified users immediately if their proposed route 
was in conflict. If incoming route from another USS were in conflict, the USS screens 
would notify the user. 
Automation: 
Design of system 
Q: Do you think the USS-USS negotiation strategy was effective? 
A: Somewhat. Because some USSs took up the entire airport instead of trajectory-based 
reservation, it was hard to find alternatives that weren’t in conflict. Also, the manual nature 
of negotiation made it cumbersome to figure out alternatives. It was much easier to just call 
and talk. 
Information: 
Usability 
Q: If you were instructed to make changes to your plan because of a higher priority mission 
coming into your airspace, did you have enough awareness or were you provided with 
enough information of the surrounding operations to do this safely? 
A: Yes. There was a map with pictures showing where the conflicts existed and where other 
operations were and it allowed us to visually figure out how to re-plan the flights. 
Automation: 
Design of system 
A NASA representative noted that the highly autonomous nature of the operations made the 
crew irrelevant, or not existent. 
Methods: 
Procedures 
One site flew three versions of this test. To begin, the second operation’s USS initiated 
negotiations with the other USS and their request to replan was granted. In another scenario, 
they requested a manual clearance, which was denied, and then a third scenario, where they 
requested a manual clearance, it was granted, and the operators continued with 
manual/visual deconfliction. Our NASA representative asked, “What if pilots or GCSs 
weren’t close enough to each other to verbally chat. Would that change a response to a 
request for clearance to fly in the same airspace?”  
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Appendix 9: Concerning Nearby Operations 
Nearby operations that were the most concerning to the survey respondent, n = 18. 
 
Test 
Site Theme Comment about Most Concerning Operations 
1 BVLOS BVLOS landing flight from the S1000 
  
6 BVLOS Simulated BVLOS 
6 BVLOS BVLOS operations due to the large area and no single observer. 
3 No 
UTM 
The last flight of the day was an intruder flight, and not within the UTM system. We could not 
actively determine the bounds of the flight, alt, heading, etc. This increases awareness of our 
operations because the aircraft is less predictable without the assistance of UTM. 
4 Altitude The other two operators were at altitudes of 100 ft above and below our location. The altitudes 
planned by each operator were done by AGL. This ended up causing some concern from a fixed 
wing hovering close you our take off location. Since it had launch at the lake bed which is 
approximately 50 ft lower than our location, it was only about 50 to 60 ft above where we were 
going to climb to. The other operators appeared lower than us since they were launching from 
another ground location. If all operators were required to figure out their MSL location, then the 
altitude separation and future segmented operations would be much more seamless to plan and 
accomplish. 
6 Altitude The nearby operation most concerning were XX because their flight path was right above our 
launch location. 
4 Over-
reserve 
The difficulty was the operators were reserving large airspace and it was difficult to fly multiple 
aircraft. 2 of 3 clients could not handle multi-segment ops. That would have reduced the conflict 
although not eliminated it. 
4 Over 
reserve 
Those who just grab the entire base for the whole day as their op when in fact they just need a 
small part for a short time. 
4 No 
reports 
Last with an aircraft not reporting. 
4 No 
report 
Last for flight watching for the non-ID aircraft. 
4 No 
report 
During the last flight another aircraft was orbiting nearby and was not broadcasting its position in 
the UTM map. 
4 Rogue 
Close by 
Rogue ops and ones in close proximity are the most concerning as they are most likely to affect me. 
5 Close by Ops in my Landing zone 
6 Close by Other XX operators, because we launch very close to each other so need to pay attention during 
launch and land. 
6 Close by Most concerning were operations adjacent to my launch/landing zone. 
Reason being due to ascending and descending through their flight level after launch and before 
landing. 
There was good separation and no need for concern, but in my opinion required heightened 
situational awareness despite USS automated deconfliction. 
6 Public Non-participants in area. 
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Appendix 10: Examples of Topics Discussed in CON Interviews with 
Flight Crews 
A selection of excerpts from field debriefs with test site crews for CON tests and the corresponding 
topic category.  
 
CON 1   
Information: 
Quality of alerts 3 
There are like 2 uses for those sensors. One is so that the aircraft does not 
run into something in the building and the second is also situational 
awareness. 
Information meets 
user: Speed of data 
transfer 
6 I think that is really critical as fast as you can tell us where is and how fast and what it is doing so we can take some manual action to avoid it. 
Operator 
experience: 
Situation Awareness 
6 
We have live tracking we know where it is and we are confident we know 
where it is as long as your get positive affirmation that there is a person 
somehow responsive and I think that is the whole idea of the UTM client 
make sure still alive and functional. 
Method 1  
Automation: Status 
7 
Like last year when we did dynamic replan we trying to do specialized 
cases the same points potentially we didn’t run across but the fact that if 
you go rogue you can never go back and it’s nice to have alerts but we also 
can go back. 
Concept: Design of 
concept 4 
So, you can have another aircraft following a little ways behind you, your 
track is closing behind you so he is good to fly behind you but your next 
track would involve going backward so you would not get clearance to [go] 
there. 
CON 2  
Information: 
Sharing information 8 
The main information for us in terms of sharing information amongst USS 
is that if an operation has gone rogue to be alerted to that, that, or be alerted 
to that event so that we can you know, inform or, or educate any of the, 
flights that are handled under, under our USS. 
Information meets 
user: Confidence in 
information 
14 
If I, in the event of a non-planned emergency where I need to, I know the 
aircraft is returning and I'm concerned I'm a potentially in the way, so I 
need to have a way that I can look at it at glance and see that, uh, that I 
need to clear or that I need to change what, what I'm doing. 
Operator 
experience: 
Situation Awareness 
4 
I think that positions are very important. That tells you exactly where on 
the aircraft is that and allows you to make sure that you maintain your 
separation from each other. 
Method: Procedures 
for operations 5 
We have to generate airspace for it, which we do. That airspace is now at 
an increased priority. So it always made any other vehicle that was maybe 
nearby, would make it rogue because you were conflicting with a priority 
airspace. So just because I'm a guy who's misbehaving...is kicking 
everybody else and making them go rogue, is that really a fair thing to do? 
CON 4  
Information: 
Usefulness 
25 My map is like super open and I know it’s not cluttered, so planning a map 
for emissions for me was super easy until the negotiations started and I 
couldn’t see my own plan. ‘Cause I couldn’t click on my own plan. 
Information meets 
user: Desired 
information 
14 I would like back from the USS about how close to compliance I am. So 
that if I'm slow I could speed the craft up and get back in compliance with 
my plan or if I’m going to fast I could slow down. 
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Operator 
Experience: SA 
(lack of) 
11 We couldn’t communicate with anybody, we had no contact information. 
So, basically, we would put a plan it, we’d get rejected, we’d change it, and 
we could see what others had planned or tried to plan, we couldn’t tell 
what, so then we’d just make a boundary that would intersect with the 
fewest lines ... We could see other operations, but like we were in very 
small areas, so we only grabbed just small chunks of pie, and that seemed 
to work better. 
Method: Gaming 
the system 
23 The other thing is, cost … So, if we want to go and inspect the water tower 
and we’re making money here, we have to do this, and there’s somebody 
that just has a huge area … in real life, we would have just flown that 107 
and we would have just avoided it [the other vehicle]. 
Automation: Display 
conventions 
25 All users should kind of appear the same to the UTM. The UTM shouldn't 
necessarily know if it's a human operating or an autonomous system right, 
it’s getting the same information. And then on the other side it should be 
given the same information out, and then however the user as sophisticated 
as they want to be with it, they can do. 
Concept: Usage 
rules 
15 The system is really vulnerable to somebody just being like “I want this 
whole county for all day.” Like you could easily have done that. Be like 
“Oh, I guess that’s what we do!” And so, some kind of incentivization to be 
as efficient with your flight plan as possible is good. 
CON 5   
Information: 
Usefulness 
29 I was pretty impressed by the notifications on just our restricted airspace. 
Um, just with the proximity warning and then actually crossing it was dead 
on and seemed to work pretty great. 
Information meets 
user: Alerting 
10 Yeah, a reminder while you are submitting the flight plan would maybe be 
nice, but I don’t need the 30-second reminder the whole time because I 
already knew it. 
Operator 
experience: 
Situation Awareness 
18 Like you said, you announce that there’s a rogue aircraft, but you won’t tell 
people where. I guess if it was me operating, if you announced that there’s 
a rogue aircraft, I want to know where it’s at. If it’s not going to be a factor 
for me, then I don’t even want to know it’s rogue, because you hear that 
and you’re constantly………just announcing rogue isn’t necessarily 
beneficial. 
Method: Procedures 
for event 
5 We have a two-minute, an arbitrary but a two minute period for you to 
vacate the airspace. So, um, so there's actually kind of hard to tell, but 
there's actually two volumes. Is the larger volume, the original one still 
stays in place and, but it's end time gets shortened, but it's still two, you still 
have two minutes of time in there. 
Automation: 
Functionality 
13 The goal, you know, a lot of folks want full automation, so if you do more 
of that, we've got to add more smarts into the system to actually be able to 
make those, I'd say pilot kind of choices. 
Concept – Airspace 
rules 
17 You can’t cross out – so, that goes back to how big of a performance 
geography do you need, because you can’t – even if the pilot crosses out of 
their protective geography, what’s kind of reserved for them, that impacts 
others. So, just saying “Hey, the pilot understands and is going to try to 
rectify,” that could impact somebody else so, that part, you know .... That’s 
just gonna lead to people requesting a larger amount of airspace for a 
longer amount of time. 
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Appendix 11: Examples of Notes from CON Observations 
A selection of excerpts from NASA representatives’ field observation notes and the corresponding 
topic category.  
 
CON 1 
Methods: 
Description of 
operator roles 
The PIC, the GCSO, the UTM Operator, and the Mission Manager were all located [inside]. 
Outside, there were always VOs, and for CON1 flights, a RC safety pilot was also stationed 
with them. 
Methods: 
Procedures for 
flight/event 
CON1 for [the test site] includes taking off from within a hangar using a laser rangefinder to 
navigate through guided waypoints, exiting the hangar, loitering and switching to Auto mode, 
flying to a further BVLOS location (behind trees in the triangle at the compass rose), landing 
in auto mode, then taking off again automatically, traversing back to the hangar, and landing 
inside in that same automatic-type mode. PIC, GCSO, and UTM Op are all co-located, 
BVLOS of the operation. For CON1 only, there is an RC safety pilot at the original takeoff 
location/2nd landing location to take control if necessary. 
Information: 
Saliency, 
Other: 
Operator buy-
in 
UTM Operator is the only/first person to recognize that during a power cycle, the position 
reporting would stop and they’d go rogue. The sole concern of the PIC GCSO is the safety of 
the vehicle. 
Information: 
Transparency 
of fool 
Terrain data is still missing. Crew can’t yet figure out the problem.  
 
Information: 
Reliance, 
Trust, 
Confidence in 
maneuver 
GCSO begins glancing at video on the return @ waypoint 4, PIC starts @ waypoint 5. GCSO 
starts tracking the video (80% of his focus) at 70 feet from the hangar doors, the PIC starts 
tracking the video (with 100% focus) at 80 feet from the hangar doors, and also with his mouse 
hovering over “LAND.” 
 
Information: 
Saliency, 
Reliance 
No one is worrying about [the USS client}. They’ve never had a state problem that I’ve seen so 
far. 
CON 2 
Information: 
Usefulness, 
Interpretability 
Not only are there visual tracks, but they get text notifications that persist on the screen for a 
period of time. Because of number of false notifications, the text was covering the majority of 
the display. Rendering it useless. 
Other: 
Confounds  
The secondary ground radar was having trouble with the birds in the area. They system was 
smart enough to exclude individual birds, but flocks of birds were large enough to be 
considered a target. This made it difficult to calibrate the radar. Mission manager/UTM op 
decided to calibrate the radar using [a] vehicle. They had the pilot fly various encounters to 
calibrate. They noticed that the [vehicle] would show up accurately but then unexpectedly 
show a negative value for its altitude. Crew continued after a little bit of calibration/code work 
Automation: 
Design of 
system or 
hardware 
XXX client isn’t processing the data very well (fusing the tracks). Tempest crew can’t use tool 
successfully. 
Information – 
Transparency 
of fool 
USS to USS notifications for contingency don’t include a code for “altitude contingency,” so 
they used the loiter identifier. Execute same procedures as above, but change altitude by 100ft 
upon intruder notification instead of loiter. Since, vehicles were already altitude separated, 
100ft change didn’t seem to affect much in the DAA software. 
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Operator 
status: 
Situation 
Awareness 
This led to discussion on how the DAA software works. There is a “preventative DAA” and 
not and the crews admit they don’t fully understand the state changes for the DAA. They know 
it has to do with range proximity, but the state changes are so quick and erratic that it’s hard to 
nail down cause and effect. 
Automation: 
Functions  
XXX client display has 4 levels of “vehicle interaction”.  
o Clear of conflict 
o Preventative 
o Corrective 
o Warning 
CON 4 
Information: 
Timeliness  
[Vehicle] went [non-conforming] because it switched radio links. 
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Appendix 12: Examples of Topics Discussed in SAA Interviews with 
Flight Crews 
Examples of quotes from debriefs with test site crews after a day of flying and the corresponding 
topic category.  
 
SAA 1 SAA 6  
Information: 
Quality of alerts 
9 There is, we didn't get to hear it yet though because the... at XXX they, 
they enabled it to before we had a chance to test it in that flight. Didn't get 
to hear it on the ground wherever we were seeing the alerts on the ground. 
Information meets 
use: Transparency 
of tool 
17 Can we design UTM to be almost completely transparent to the user such 
as just during the course of them flight planning, plotting their waypoints? 
Operator 
experience: 
Situation Awareness 
11 It's when you have it out there by itself and no one's got eyes on it and then 
you've got another object coming out at high speed somewhere near its path 
that you really need all that extra situational awareness. 
Method: Procedures 
for flight/event 
3 That kind of USB permission gain kind of jars that workflow and provides 
a disincentive to use this third party app when it's a lot of overhead just to 
get at the basic level of functionality working. 
Automation: 
Functionality 
17 If you can leverage that existing infrastructure. I'm just looking at the 
interstate highway system for one and if we have these existing nodes and 
the ability of VDOT to use the aircraft that can then connect, communicate 
with their DSRC network in a mobile manner I think opens up a lot of 
opportunities there. 
Concept: Equipage 
requirements 
21 I don't think we're there yet with the regulatory space. I don't know that 
we're going there at all. I think we are really what we're looking at is 
equipage requirements depending on the level of access and sophistication 
and risks that your missions require, so for BVLOS operations and opposite 
for people and things, maybe some of this would be, but we're definitely 
not headed down the path of imposing these equipage requirements on rc or 
just general user. 
SAA 2  
Information: 
Reliability/ accuracy 
of information 
17 We were seeing ADSB aircraft from XXX which is seems to be local and 
some of that is, seems to be there's a discrepancy and some of the ADSB 
timestamps. So like when I view a track list from the Ping station, I'll see 
like 15 aircraft and I'll look at them and they have like all these timestamps 
within like maybe a few hours. It was like four, maybe four hours or so, 
which doesn't really make sense. They should be like, if I log into that and 
they should all be like, I just received that timestamp. The seems like some 
of these ADSB out units from different aircraft are not programmed 
correctly on their timestamp. 
Information meets 
user: 
Appropriateness of 
maneuver 
10 He came straight at me so I couldn't do the RTL because it will cross its 
path….I saw the aircraft continue to move…. like that's unacceptable. So 
then the next movement is down and it so much easier for me to go down 
than it is for uh, for him to go down. 
Operator 
experience: 
Situation Awareness 
43 But this is also the rabbit hole we went down when we were talking by the 
tables that aren't for your, uh, the delay in this, this particular system. The 
delay to getting the information to pilot was such that you couldn't react on 
it as a sense and avoid use. 
Method: Procedures 
for flight/event 
10 What we're talking about is the response. Oh yeah. But it would be a TCAS 
like response of just the UAS. The reason the FAA doesn't want us to put 
TCAS on board UAS is because that would require manned aviation to 
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avoid us. If there was a conflict, there would be both. Both aircraft are 
required to avoid. 
Automation: Design 
of system 
14 It's still that hierarchy of mobility, I guess where we have our mobile 
devices that we get out of the way. 
SAA 3  
Information: 
Quality of alerting 
21 … that's one thing that was missing on our display … I think we needed 
more audible alerting … I don't recall hearing any audibles. I mean, you 
know, we were... It's not a noisy environment but not a quiet environment 
either. 
Information meets 
user: Confidence in 
information 
15 So it's something that could add like just visual colors or visual indicators 
of, of the likes of the track either with trails or sizes of the, of the warning 
of some way, right? But visualizing the confidence of which we report 
actually in the radar packet. The confidence we have in the track that could 
be visually kind of identified on the screen in some way that helps the pilot 
kind of know that. 
Operator 
experience: 
Workload 
4 That's, that's really the big, um, I want to say not real world piece of this 
whole concept right now that the pilots are dealing with, is that they are 
dealing with two pieces of software to manage UTM functionality and then 
to manage is piloting and the work load involved there is really at 
unacceptable levels. 
Method: Procedures 
for flight/event 
3 Another thing that we had to kind of work around for this test with the 
current, uh, USS configuration was, um, that we only had the ability to 
define one radius and we went ahead and assume that that was our, um, 
well, I guess in different tests we actually made different assumptions, but, 
you know, … there's several layers of alerting, right? 
Automation: Design 
of system 
15 The other weakness we saw quite a bit today with the dependence on that 
server and its livelihood, and as you saw, we had a number of server fault 
then, you know, maybe that's the problem that can be solved, but the 
question remains is it a barrier that we want to tolerate? Um, I think there's 
a lot of functionality that can be gained with a cloud based systems … 
SAA 4  
Information: 
Quality of alerts 
saliency of 
information 
15 … a green, amber, red, a display. It was the icon of the aircraft. It has like a 
range warning system, but it doesn't throw up any popups. It doesn't waive 
any flags or anything. You just see the aircraft icons go from green to 
amber to red. 
Information meets 
user: Information 
desired 
6 If I was the cooperative bird, I would want to know basically what, uh, 
what any radar operator would want to know. I want to where the aircraft, 
or where the target is. Uh, is it approaching me? How fast is it going? Is it 
at the same altitude? 
Operator 
experience: 
Situation Awareness 
5 … it's the pilot's duty to give way. So I would start if I was just hand flying 
this thing and I was not prepared for this. Then the instant that I saw that 
track was going to crossover into my amber area. Then I would start, I 
would attempt to maneuver and get them to keep them outside the bubble. 
Method: Procedures 
for flight/event 
9 The way that I've written this to, uh, for the manual side in order to 
compensate for the lack of the timing that a computer would give us is a, 
the wording is that when an aircraft or target is inside the warning area, it's 
the pilot's duty to give way. 
Automation: 
Functionality 
13 Because you have to have that capability.  When the aircraft loses link, you 
don't have the capability of the aircraft avoiding on its own. When you lose 
link, you have a rogue aircraft in the air, in the airspace, if it's a busy 
airspace and that's where we want to get to eventually that's a bad thing. So 
the aircraft has to be able to avoid the other aircraft. 
Concept – Equipage 
requirements 
1 … sense and avoid at all times, otherwise you don't get to play. 
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Appendix 13: Examples of Notes from SAA Observations 
A selection of excerpts from NASA representatives’ field observation notes and the corresponding 
topic category.  
 
SAA 1 
Information: 
Reliability, accuracy 
Can’t always see the second vehicle on the screen – some flights you can see both 
vehicles in others you can’t. On a couple of occasions NASA reports that they can’t 
see [vehicle 1] but we wonder whether it’s actually [vehicle 2] they can’t see. 
Information: 
Quality of alerts, 
Transparency of 
tool 
The ability to submit multiple operations under one volume. [Site 6] are not trying to 
do this but after a flight where there were lots of odd rogue messages but no alerting 
when the vehicles intruded on each other, ANRA said that [Site 6] had submitted 
both vehicles to the same operation that caused those effects because the vehicles 
were “cooperating”. XX couldn’t see why you would ever want to have the alerting 
completely off. 
Other: Operator 
buy-in 
Not enough information on the USS for pilots to be able to fly by it, so although 
they are looking at it during this week of testing they say they would not use it in the 
field. 
Method: Procedures 
for flight/event 
Crew was unclear what constituted a resolution maneuver in the SAA flight tests 
and what defined that they had successfully completed the test.  
SAA 2 
Information: 
Quality of alerts, 
usefulness 
Auditory alerts were turned off  
• Brought up two excellent discussions: 1. Reason why they muted alerts 
(would continually warn about its own ADSB tracks as an intruder) and the 
concept of selectively muting alerts. 2. Refresh rate of displays vs actual 
computational time of data needed to DAA.  
Information: 
Accuracy  
The UAV popped up immediately for the manned AC and he was able to locate and 
fly in the direction of the UAV.  
 
SAA 4 
Method: Procedures 
for flight/event, 
automation 
functions  
Somewhere along their path, they would come within 50m of each other and trigger 
an intruder alert. In an automated DAA, this intruder alert would trigger an 
automated response from the vehicle. Today however, it was a manual response to 
the intruder alert.  
Information: 
Usability/usefulness, 
intuitiveness 
The radar can see both aircraft and sends that data to mission planner, but mission 
planner cannot discriminate between radar tracks belonging to the intruder from 
those belonging to ownship, putting the pilot (when BVLOS) or automation in a 
situation where they might try to “avoid themselves.” 
Information: 
Usefulness 
Successfully got radar displayed on GCS. This involved getting radar tracks, 
converting them into "ADS-B like" tracks to get them into mission planner (GCS).  
SAA 6 
Information: 
Quality of alerts 
First pass at 20mph, we did get an alert on the [USS] display but no audio alert only 
the red volume a message appears. 
Information: 
Quality of alerts, 
reliability 
Car makes a couple more passes, we can see alerting. Some of it is spurious as the 
car is nowhere near the UAV. 
General SAA 
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Information: 
Usability, quality of 
alerts 
Think an audio component would be useful – having to look at the screen to see 
alerts makes it not useful, for 2 reasons: 1) you won’t know when alerts will arrive 
when you’re flying real world missions, so you won’t be looking at the screen 
waiting for them; 2) having to look at the alerts means you take your eye off your 
vehicle.  
Information: 
Quality of alerts 
For one test with the [Vehicle 1] intruding on the [Vehicle 2] we did not get any 
alerting.  
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Appendix 14: CNS Capability on UAV 
 
 
 
Count of responses indicating aircraft that automatically switched to their 
back up C2 link on failure of the primary link. 
 
  
8
3
9
7
3
5
Site 1:  auto switch Site 2: auto switch Site 3: auto switch
Site 4: auto switch Site 5: auto switch No, not automatic switch
  
106 
Appendix 15: Examples of Topics Discussed in CNS Interviews with 
Flight Crews 
Examples of quotes from debriefs with test site crews after a day of flying CNS tests and the 
corresponding topic category.  
 
CNS 1  
Information: 
Availability 
18 I was watching on one USS, we had multiple USSs today executing 
different lost-link things. I couldn’t tell when that happened at all, and I 
was kind of isolated, looking at when XXX’s stuff would go lost link, I’d 
have to listen on the radio to figure out when that even happened. So, 
there’s no information provided right now across USSs and, if we were 
operating in adjacent air spaces, it would be very valuable I think to share 
in some information.  
Information meets 
user: Information 
desired or wanted 
16 It should also broadcast the last known heading, altitude, and airspeed so 
you can take a guess that it is going in that direction and that is a place to 
avoid. 
Operator 
experience: 
Situation Awareness 
12 You really only have to know – even if someone else is even having 
trouble, you shouldn’t have to know about it unless it’s putting them in 
danger or affecting your airspace or where you’re operating.  
Method: Procedures 
for flight/event 
5 If you still have one link and are in control of your vehicle, and you’re 
going to stay in your own space, I don’t care, really. Someone cares, but 
it’s not me if I’m trying to operation my own mission and you’re not 
coming into my space.  
Automation: Design 
of system 
20 We were able to have a flight window open, execute the flight, and be 
midway through the flight before the XX USS figured out that is what we 
are doing. And then the XX USS closed ours and we had no indication for 
why it closed. (This was during the first flight of CNS3 three minutes into 
the flight). 
Concept: Privacy/ 
sharing 
8 I’m comfortable with the notion of, if you lose one link, and your 
secondary link doesn’t impair your mission at all, doesn’t put any other 
aircraft in harm’s way, and you’re confident in the robust, that it’s not 
going to impact anybody, I don’t know if you have to share that.  
CNS 2  
Information: 
Reliability/ accuracy 
of information 
11 … but the fact that the degraded GPS is difficult to get, should give him 
some, uh, mean doesn't provide certainty, but it should certainly give 
[NASA] some additional comfort in [the] CNS work that it's...not that you 
can't jam or anything, but GPS is a highly available and, and uh, is very 
reliable, you know, so much so that even putting a shroud around the 
antenna was not creating difficulty. 
Information meets 
user: Accuracy of 
information 
2 It's also important for a troubleshooting perspective to see if the number of 
satellites and the reported HDOP are incongruent. Like if I have high 
HDOP but I have 16 satellites, there may be something else going on. 
Operator 
experience: 
Situation Awareness 
2 So in the event that I lose GPS, I have a general idea of where the aircraft 
is. Even though I may, it may take me a second to figure out what 
orientation I'm in, uh, and I can take over the flight by a manual control and 
return it back to my position or if I feel that I am not comfortable with that, 
then I can actually have it lands where it is. 
Method: Procedures 
for flight/event 
4 … procedures that, that sometimes it's not clear why things are working 
and why things aren't and we just have to, you know, reset them a number 
of times and, and everything... And eventually, eventually got it. Um, but 
you know, we're, we're learning … 
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Automation: 
Degradation 
10 The biggest problem/fear is RF interferences that changes the flight pattern 
of the aircraft, could be GPS signal interference, C2 band interference, 
backup RC band interference, or overload on the onboard RF circuits. 
CNS 3  
Information: 
Usefulness of 
information 
7 But the thing is that the interface doesn’t tell us why. It actually grays that 
button out with the alert icon in it. If it closes and tells us specifically why 
it closed you because of time conflict or altitude conflict, otherwise we are 
taking another shot in the dark. 
Information meets 
user: Confidence in 
information 
1 That’s probably my biggest concern of stuff we could be flying around – 
power lines or large metal structures (inaudible) interference and you start 
kind of seeing it dance around up there. That makes me more nervous than 
if my video goes out or something like that. 
Operator 
experience: Lack of 
awareness 
1 But for us we didn’t have any explanation in the USS interface for why it 
got closed. They had to go on the back end and figure out why. 
Method: Procedures 
for flight/event 
4 So I was piloting the aircraft and basically just looking, watching the 
aircraft, I wasn’t paying a lot of attention to the ground control station. I 
had XX watching that for me and just kinda trusted him to tell me if 
anything was out of the ordinary or if everything was working like it was 
supposed to. I mean, it works fine for us because I can just keep my eyes 
on the aircraft and do it that way. 
Automation: 
Functions 
12 So, from the moment we send time and receive acknowledgment that loop 
should be less than 3 seconds. If it exceeds that then there is something 
wrong there.  
Concept: Design of 
system 
2 Another USS was on our LUN, …. Multiple USS’s can be on that, but, we 
just saw another USS that came onto our LUN that was pushing our band 
data, and it turned out it was rejecting your plan. 
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Appendix 16: Examples of Notes from CNS Observations 
A selection of excerpts from NASA representatives’ field observation notes and the corresponding 
topic category.  
 
CNS 1 
Information: 
Quality of alerts 
There was a visual indicator located on the bottom of the GCS screen, which remained clear 
when all was good but turned red in case of a loss of communication link, notifying the 
operator about the loss. 
Automation: 
Design of system 
and functions 
The link/signal status is monitored with a dedicated application, developed basically for the 
specific architecture of the UAS they are using. They are logging and monitoring the network 
and links status over time with a very basic terminal application. At the moment the interface 
is used to check the status only of LTE and Wi-Fi signals since the SATCOM is still not 
integrated. The application is test-oriented and color-coded areas are used to check if the 
signal is drop under a specific threshold. For the Wi-Fi link they are also using a dedicated 
commercial application to monitor the status and strength of the signal. 
Information 
required/desired 
The UTM/USS information are monitored as feedback to check if the positions of the UAV 
are updated correctly during the signal drop, during the switchover of the communication 
links. The big concern regards the possibility to go non-conforming/rogue if the 
communication switchover takes too long. 
Automation: 
Design of system 
and functions 
The RF datasets have been collected but at the moment such information will be mainly used 
to characterize the environment around the test site. Currently there are no plans on how to 
integrate such information directly within UTM environment (or if and how real time 
evaluations of RF interference can be shared for operations). 
Automation: 
Design of system  
The time to complete the switchover is very short. The adopted solution, which is 
architecture-dependent, allows to automate the process of switchover and there is no drop of 
information on user/pilot side since the communication links are monitored over time and 
kept in a sort of “hot redundancy” to make the transition as seamless as possible. For this 
reason, the position updates are checked as normal to be sure that there is no information loss 
because of the process (through the UTM client tool). The tool used for link status monitoring 
is instead checked only to be sure that the automatic switchover behaves as expected. 
Information 
required/desired 
NASA Rep question: If it was your vehicle with the C2 link issue, would you be OK with 
sharing that information to other users of your USS? What about neighboring USSs? 
TSO Response: Yes. Major issues with communication links can be shared without problems, 
also if a level of priority/criticality must be defined/formalized to avoid possible 
communication of false alarms. The communication of C2 link issues can be shared with 
other neighboring USSs once it is communicated to the associated USS. From this point of 
view, it is more a matter of data sharing across USSs and not an issue regarding the UAS 
operator, once the C2 problems has been notified. 
Other:  
Operator buy-in 
Once it has been decided to share a subset of the information of a UAS mission (relevant to 
the purposes of traffic control) with other organizations that use UAS for their business there 
are no particular constraints for the public. In that scenario the only limit comes from the type 
of data that can be exploited/useful to public (to avoid overflow of information). The key 
point is to decide what subset of information is shared outside your own organization. These 
rules apply for any data consumer outside an organization, regardless if they are vehicle 
operators or not. 
Inside the same organization there should be no constraints on the amount and type of the 
information shared among the vehicle operators. 
Automation: 
Design of system  
LTE was lost because the signal got stuck in a rare feedback loop. 
CNS 3 
Other: 
Confounds  
The GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) interference can degrade the position quality 
and when it occurs the tracking and positioning signal can be lost completely. Devices like 
chirp jammers can for example disrupt the GPS/GNSS signals quite easily (if not properly 
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mitigated) and UAV navigation capabilities could be strongly affected by such 
technologies/equipment.  
Other sources of interference that can result in a reduction or loss of UAV’s ability to 
navigate as planned could be represented by some form of self-interference due to payload or 
UAV electronics equipment. 
Information 
meets user: 
Effectiveness of 
data  
There was confusion from the team due to non-conforming. Position updates had a delay for 
more than 2 seconds. 
 
 
 
